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FOREWORD 
A NEED FULFILLED 
Virginia H. Knauer* 
The Loyola Consumer Protection Journal is proud to include 
Mrs . Knauer as one of the contributors to its first edition. In her in· 
troductory remarks, Mrs. Knauer outlines the function which the 
Journal can perform, and how the private bar can help improve the 
plight of the American Consumer. 
1 
The editors and publishers of the Loyola Consumer Protection 
Journal are to be congratulated for realizing the serious lack of 
consumer-oriented publications directed to the legal community 
and for taking the initiative to fill this gap. 
In addition to contributing to the creation of a much-needed 
source of centralized information for use by practicing attorneys, 
lawmakers, educators and others, this publication will perform an 
essential role in the solution of two critical problems which cur-
l'ently beset the consumer movement. 
One is the acute need for more and better research, both legal 
and factual. Research, if undertaken, can often overwhelmingly 
P_rove the consumer's case. Its absence, on the other hand, has mate-
:na_lly slowed progress in securing remedies for a buses known to 
exist. This lack of adequate research has too often led to the charge 
that consumer advocates are merely "bleeding hearts." Actually-
and this is a rather sad commentary- the consumer has been 
~esearc?ed from head to toe by those engaged in marketing to 
heter~une what he will buy, how he will be induced to buy, where 
h ~ Will buy, and so on, ad infinitum. However, research into what 
tbs problems are, the scope and scale of these problems, and how 
ey can be resolved is still in its infancy. 
The other critical problem is the lack of good consumer law 
~ourses in law schools. This situation has been perpetuated by two 
a~tors. First, there has long been an absence of adequate text and 
he erence material for use in such courses. Second, law in the main ci:; Pri~arily been approached and learned from a strictly commer-
P01nt of view. As a result, few lawyers have developed an --• Virgins Knauer is President Nixon's Special Assistant for Consumer Affairs. 
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awareness of consumer problems and even fewer have directed their 
careers toward consumer law. Admittedly, the development of ad-
ditional consumer law courses is a long-range project. But it is es-
sential to initiate such programs now. Besides being reflected in 
the private bar within a few years, the impact of such courses 
would certainly be felt in executive, legislative and judicial bodies 
throughout the country. 
The Loyola Consumer Protection Journal can help ameliorate 
these inadequacies. Perhaps its greatest service over the long run 
will be its assistance in enlisting the whole legal profession (in ad-
dition to that minority of attorneys already practicing consumer 
law) in the consumer cause. Beyond materials to be presented in. 
the Journal, which will be of invaluable aid to this group in repre-
senting the consumer's interest, general exposure to such a publi-
cation can be expected to raise the level of consciousness of the en-
tire private bar in the area of consumer affairs. 
I believe it may be reasonably stated that the private bar is the 
sleeping giant of consumer protection. For obvious reasons (not the 
least being a lack of pertinent law school courses and resource mate-
rials for professional use) the organized bar has, for years, avoided 
handling disputes arising from consumer transactions . Various 
obstacles, such as the small amounts generally in controversy, the 
difficulties of proof, and the lack of adequate compensation for pro-
fessional services have helped create a situation in which a relatively 
small group of practicing lawyers handles the bulk of consumer 
litigation. Still, no greater protection for consumers could be pro-
vided than by an aroused and properly motivated bar. Not only 
would consumers receive greatly enhanced measures of protection, 
but the cost of such a program to government at all levels would be 
slight. 
Our needs are extensive. We need test cases brought before the 
courts so that in time we will have established a broadly expanded 
body of enlightened precedent. We need more aggressive prosecu-
tion and enforcement of existing consumer laws, in addition to the 
passage of new laws each year by the Congress and the state 
legislatures. We need lawyers with the expertise to define existing 
problems and suggest workable solutions. We need the increased 
involvement of the private bar at every level. 
Let us look at some of the major problems which the legal 
profession can play a role in resolving. One certainly is the improve-
ment of the grievance and redress machinery available to the con-
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sumer. Small claims court procedures must be improved so as to 
provide the consumer with more adequate legal remedies. We must 
explore the potential of consumer class suits. Given the crowded 
condition of court dockets and the realities of the present-day market-
place, perhaps courts of law cannot handle all controversies. Other 
possibilities should be explored. 
We must also review the whole range of federal and state laws 
which, in effect, give the seller an unfair advantage over the con-
sumer. The holder-in-due-course doctrine in consumer transactions 
should be modified. The risk of dealer fraud now rests squarely 
on the consumer under a system in which a financing agency can 
purchase installment notes free of consumer defenses. The fact that 
some states have removed holder-in-due-course protection from all 
installment sales raises a strong question as to the need for any 
jurisdiction to apply this doctrine. Not only are financing agencies 
quite able to protect themselves, but also the policing of installment 
sales which they would initiate would rebound to the benefit of 
consumers and ethical businessmen alike. 
Essential to the improved consumer protection framework 
which must be developed is the establishment of strong consumer 
affairs offices in every state. Such offices should be adequately 
financed and armed with basic consumer protection laws. They 
~hould have the power to conduct investigations, hold hearings, 
1ssue subpoenas, and enforce the laws effectively. These offices should 
have branches throughout the state, especially in the urban and 
rural ghetto areas, so that they are easily accessible to the poor. 
In short, the opportunities for lawyers to improve the consumer 
protection system in this country are enormous. 
Furthermore, even in representing producers of consumer goods 
a.nd services, attorneys can serve the consumer's interests. I would 
hke to offer four suggestions as guidelines for such attorneys and 
the production interests which they represent. 
First, hesitate before concluding that opposition to proposed 
government standards or regulations is inevitably in the industry's 
long-term interests. As a case in point, for years the citrus industry 
r:sisted regulations for improved juice standards, including ingre-
dlent labeling of juice content. Recently, however, it has come to 
hccept t~ose measures . By ~aking such a position the citrus industry 
as rece1ved favorable notlce across the country. 
b Second, undertake the task of discovering and improving means 
Y which the industry can do an efficient job of self-regulation. 
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Third, support a mechanism for prompt resolution of consumer 
complaints. The old axiom from the country store days, "a satisfied 
customer makes a happy merchant," still applies today. Many com-
panies are reaping benefits from their own in-house, voluntary 
settlement procedures. Another kind of complaint mechanism is the 
successful Major Appliance Consumer Action Panel. This body was 
established by the major appliance industry to handle consumer 
complaints which have not been redressed by dealers and manu-
facturers. 
Fourth, support a permanent, in-house consumer advocate to 
represent the consumer and to question marketing and environ-
mental decisions of the company. 
In summary, there are numerous ways in which the Loyola 
Consumer Protection Journal can be expected to advance consumer 
interests. The Journal stands to serve as an important resource and 
stimulus to the members of the private bar. I wish to extend my 
best wishes to the Loyola Consumer Protection Journal and to all 
those connected with the publication. 
5 
COLLOQUY: 
Consumerism, Lawyers and the Legal System 
The following is an excerpt of a discussion between four law 
professors who are concerned with consumer protection. The dis-
cussion raises the dilemma which confronts those who work in the 
law and see in it the potential to alter the human condition: can law 
~ave a control impact on modern bureaucratic institutions? The 
1tnportance of this conversation, however, is not dependent upon the 
conclusions which it draws in relation to consumer protection. 
What is exciting about this dialogue is that it: ( 1) transcends its 
own example of consumerism; and (Z) illustrates the prerequisite 
process of definition which must be undertaken prior to any con-
sideration of law reform. · 
Law reform is discussed here in terms of consumer protection. 
The arguments are based on the assumption that there exists a 
class of consumers and a class of manufacturers, and that the manu-
facturers have the capacity to exploit the consumers. However, 
what is being considered is not just the plight of the modern day 
consumer, but the plight of modern day man. The implication 
which arises is that, in a sense, modern man is the ultimate con-
sumer. He consumes goods and services. He is always in the 
P~sition of being exploited by the variety of social and political in-
Stitutions with which he must deal on a day-to-day basis if he is 
to survive in an institutionalized society. Thus, the question of how 
to aid and protect the consumer in his relationships with manufac-
turing institutions has a universality about it: Man is not viewed 
solely in relation to manufacturing institutions, but in relation to 
all institutions which have the capacity to exploit him because of 
the posture of the particular relationship . 
. I~ order to discuss possible ways of protecting consumers, the 
Participants in the dialogue ·engage in a process of defining what 
they mean by "consumer protection." What is it that consumers 
~eed protection from? What role does the institution play? This 
Interchange of ideas is exemplary of the thought process which one 
~~st go through prior to engaging in any kind of law reform ac-
t~lty. Consideration must be given to the nature of the relation-
s 1PS between the various components of the problem; in this case, 
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the components are consumers, manufacturing institutions and 
lawyers. 
THE PARTICIPANTS 
NEIL 0 . LITTLEFIELD,1 JOHN E. MOYE,2 HOWARD I. RO-
SENBERG,3 and ROBERT H. SULNICK.4 
THE DISCUSSION 
MOYE: To begin with, the judicial system is a poor system for 
protection. That includes the lawyer as well as the courts and 
the judges. The time element involved and the cost of litigation 
do much to make it a very poor system for protecting the consumer. 
Crowded court calendars often force the consumer to wait a year 
and a half or two years to get into court, and during this time he is 
usually suffering with the defective goods. 
SULNICK: I think it is very important to make a public-pri-
vate distinction in talking about the kind of things we have in mind. 
And then I think we must speak of compensation and control. Com-
pensation refers to the private remedy, while control is the public 
remedy. On a private level of analysis, I believe you are absolutely 
right when you indicate that the present system is a poor one. 
When a client has to wait three years to get to court to seek com-
pensation for his defective automobile, he is clearly being denied 
"justice." There is just no way around it. 
ROSENBERG: Well, I would say so, even if he must wait three 
months. 
SULNICK: Yes, I agree. As for compensation, you really can-
n ot fully compensate him; the delay has been too great. But the 
question I would ask is this, "If there is a class of consumers and 
1 Professor, University of Denver College of Law; B.S. University of M aine, 1953; 
LL.B. Boston University, 1957; LL.M. University of Michigan, 1959; Co-editor, CAsEs 
AND MATERIALS oN CoMMERCIAL TnANSACTIONs UNDER THE CoMMERCIAL ConE (1968) . 
Recent articles: The Plight of the Consumer in the Uniform Commercial Code, 48 
DENVER L.J . 1 (1971); Consumerism: A Review and Preview. SPECIAL DENVER L.J. 
12 (1970); Preserving Consumer Defenses : Plugging the Loophole in the UCC, 44 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 272 (1969); Home Solicitation Sales Act of 1967, 4·2 CoNN. B.J. 436 
(1968) . 
2 Lecturer on Commercial Law, University of Denver College of Law; B.B.A. Uni-
versity of Notre Dame, 1965 ; J.D. Cornell University, 1968. Author, Debtor-Creditor 
Remedies : A New Proposal, 54 ConNELL L. REv. 249 (1969). 
3 Adjunct Professor, University of Denver College of Law; General Counsel, Legal 
Aid Society of M etropolitan Denver. . . 
4 Acting Associate P rofessor, Loyola Umvens_ty o~ Los Angeles School of Law; A.B. 
University of Indiana, 1964; J.D. DePaul Umvers1ty, 1967; LL.M. New York Uni-
versity, (1 968) . Co-author, LAw AND SociAL SciENCE REsEARCH (1969) . 
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a class of manufacturers, should the assumption not be that strict 
liability enforced on a class action basis, will control behavior?" 
That is a big assumption, but it has historically been that way. The 
next question I have to ask is, "Can this historical assumption be 
justified in the twentieth century?" Then one must determine what 
the essential value of a lawsuit happens to be. Will the purse-string 
approach be sufficient? Would the implementation of complete 
strict liability make it cost more to produce safer products? In 
other words, "What is the possibility that the class action lawsuit 
will have some deterrent effect?" 
MOYE: But you still come back to the same problem that How-
ard brought up before. Whether compensation or control is the 
goal, it must still be pursued on a case by case basis, requiring a 
great deal of time. 
LITTLEFIELD: Since Bob has posed so many questions, let's 
~ake them one at a time. I think what he is suggesting to us is that 
lf we think in terms of a public-private dichotomy, then maybe we 
can still use the court system, but employ a different group of 
plaintiffs or recognize consumer vs. the industry as opposed to J olm 
Jones vs. the manufacturer. 
SULNICK: I agree, but I would add that tort actions for com-
pensation on a private level are basically useless. On a public level, 
the common law may have a function to play which I think it 
~as always played historically. The common law is certainly not 
llleffective; it depends upon what you think you want to do with it. 
. JOURNAL: There seems to be an underlying problem. Could 
lt. be that the principal course of consumer problems is not the reme-
dies, but the legal system itself? Isn't it a question of the legal sys-
t~rn itself? Isn't it a question of the legal system not being acces-
Sible to potential plaintiffs? 
. SU~NICK : As I see it, the real problem is the lawyer - what 
he 1s w1lling to do, how he sees his role in society and how he is 
Willing to respond. 
LITTLEFIELD: W ell this is true only if you thinlc of the law-
yer as something more than a businessman. A new aspect of the 
legal profession would hav·e to be created, something like Nader's 
suggested public service law firm, rathe1: than blame the present 
system. 
SULNICK: Well, I am not sure. The thing that I always get 
hung-up on is that I think before this nineteenth century boom of 
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private law, lawyers were basically public servants. I mean, they 
were not businessmen. Today the legal profession is another road 
to business. It's very nearly impossible to go out and set up a busi-
ness from scratch, but far less difficult to become a lawyer. It's a 
business. 
LITTLEFIELD: Well, it might be interesting to discuss to 
what extent it was true in the seventeenth century that lawyers 
were a different breed of cat; but that's not too relevant. Let us take 
what we've got today. 
MOYE: I do think lawyers will respond if they have the means 
with which to respond. The problem does not lie with the lawyer 
so much as with the remedies available - what he can do with 
what he's got, and do it profitably. 
SULNICK: Well, even if you take away that profit, he still has 
a lot to work with: a whole history of common law and writs. 
MOYE: But how does he eat? 
SULNICK: I think a more realistic question would be, "How 
much does he have to eat?" I don't know of many starving at-
torneys. 
ROSENBERG: Hypothetically, if we took all lawyers and di-
vided them into those who would represent commercial interests 
and those who would represent clients unable to afford an attor-
ney, we would not see that much change. Dividing manpower up 
equally, the institution is still there. Again, all we would be doing 
would be winning more cases, thus making a little more law on a 
case by case basis. Still the lawyer is stuck with the present struc-
ture of the institution. 
In other words, it seems to me that the basic problem is power. 
You have here two groups, one with power and one without it. The 
legislation and case law is the result of that situation. Legislation 
and case law do not grow in a vacuum; they are the result of a 
power balance which, in this case, is totally unequal. Lawyers 
work within that power balance and they aren't really doing much 
to chan ge it. 
SULNICK: I have no problems with that, except that I would 
say that lawyers on the consumer side today have more power than 
they recognize- which is actually part of the problem. In other 
words, I would say that there is a definite relationship between how 
effective a lawyer can be and the kind of problem he has to work 
with. 
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The lawyer is a vital part of consumerism. He can translate 
consumer power into action through the courts. That is what an 
attorney's skill is all about- taking a problem, translating it into 
power, feeding it into the courts and getting a result. The same 
thing happened in the nineteenth century. Lawyers for industry 
used negligence law to obtain results for their clients. At the pres-
ent time we are witnessing a similar development in the area of 
consumer protection. 
UTTLEFIELD: You have been talking about the lawyer in 
the references you have just made. I think there is a slight ambi-
guity in talking about the lawyer as an individual attorney, and the 
lawyer as a group of lawyers. I still do not see how you get over 
the basic hurdle; lawyers in the nineteenth century and the early 
:part of the twentieth century had a case and a plaintiff for whom 
lt was worth going to court because a death or injury was at issue. 
Now, I want to know how you get that ball rolling with respect 
~0 consumerism. It is true that some O.E.O. attorneys are doing 
lt with test cases, but it is a small start. 
"W 
SULNICK: But that is J·ust it. You used the word "worth." 
orth" is a value judgment. It was worth going to court because 
the client had some kind of compensable injury that the attorney 
could get a third of. Again, I would suggest that the problem is 
: eally one of lawyers in the twentieth century: how they view their 
)ohb, their profession and how they are trained in law school. If 
t. ey are educated solely in terms of making money, then you are 
nght · . . this whole idea is washed up. On the other h and, if law-
rers v?lue_ the prevention of institutional malfeasance so that manu-
actunng mstitutions do not act negligently, then I think the com-
mon law will work. 
And I think lawyers do work together. If one lawyer tries a 
ca:e and wins, other lawyers will use similar techniques so they can 
~11 · Again, it all goes back to a question of values and what at-
orneys think is worth while - what motivates a lawyer to respond. 
en . LITTLEFIELD: Well, I a:r;n not sure they ever operated in any 
~ronment other than a certain bureaucracy with court fees and 
;aned costs to pay and the economics of a law suit. I am a little 
~-U~zled as to how all of a sudden you think that if lawyers are 
w.am d d"ff 
0 
e 1 erently we can restructure the way the legal profession 
Perates for valid consumer ends. 
MOYE: Maybe we are looking at the wrong cause. Maybe the 
--------------------------
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problem is not the lawyer, but the remedies. It would be nice if 
he had strictly social ideas at hand and was pursuing all our present 
remedies to redress all of our consumer grievances. Maybe the 
problem would be better resolved if we could devise a method tore-
structure our remedies so that lawyers would be more eager to pur-
sue them. 
SULNICK: In a sense, I think that is correct. But the reality 
of our current political and economic situation is such that this re-
structuring will not come about, and therefore the burden is on the 
lawyer. For example, if the Attorney General were to bring a pub-
lic nuisance action against a particular company for pollution of 
the air, then nobody else would have to worry about it. The At-
torney General has the facilities, the power and the remedy. I guess 
that is what you were talking about before. · 
ROSENBERG: For what reason would the Attorney General 
fail to bring the action? 
SULNICK: For a variety of political and economic reasons. 
And because of this failure, the burden does fall on the individual 
attorney, whether he wants it or not. 
MOYE: Well, it will be the responsibility of the entire legal 
system to eventually fashion remedies which work better for the 
consumer. 
ROSENBERG: Let's say that you have attorney-generals one 
and two. Each operates a little differently in the area of consumer 
protection. The reasons are simply the political and economic fac-
tors you have mentioned. Now, if these factors are sufficiently com-
pelling, the attorney-general will really be a consumer advocate; in 
effect, consumers will have developed consumer power. It seems 
to me that's where the source of power lies. The primary question 
is not one of cases and remedies, because the cases and remedies 
will be shaped by whoever has the power. VVe have a whole sys-
tem of mercantile law because a certain group of people gained 
power some several hundred years ago and have developed it. The 
crucial question is how consumers will develop their own power. 
JOURNAL: In other words, a more significant question would 
be, "How can consumers act as a group rather than as individuals?" 
Much of this discussion about remedies assumes that the consumer 
is acting as an individual. If consumers can gain power by acting 
as a group, then will not the remedies follow? 
MOYE: Yes, definitely. I speak of remedies as an end. VVhen 
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you get more political and economic power on the side of consumers, 
the rest will follow. 
JOURNAL: But how do consumers as a group get power to act, 
and once they have it, how do they act as a group? 
LITTLEFIELD: This is an organizational question - How do 
they organize and get power? 
I tend to feel that perhaps for the purpose of this discussion we 
could more profitably assume that right now consumers have more 
~ower than they are using. This may be seen either in the legisla-
~lve halls, though they do not know what to ask for in these halls; 
ln the attomey-generals' offices, though they do not know what to 
ask for in those offices; or in the courts, though they do not know 
how to frame the causes of action. What should be aimed at goes 
beyond getting immediate results, but .toward restructuring some of 
the ways in which consumer remedies are effected. 
Let's take a short-range approach to the question of consumer 
Power. What are some of the various ways we can utilize the 
Power that is presently there? 
SULNICK: You and Howard both said that consumers have 
P0"':'er and we all agree. But I think we should articulate what the 
bas1s of that power is. Is it that we have a critical consumer prob-
le:rn and that we have defects in consumer goods? Is it not enough 
to si:rnply state that consumers have power? 
LITTLEFIELD: Well, I think the power is based upon an 
awareness of certain public officials - courts, senators and repre-
sentatives and attorney-generals- that there are a lot of consumers 
~ut there who will react. I think this is really the function of the 
. allot box, at least in part. Consumers are beginning to get a feel-
ln.g that they have common problems with respect to the sale, dis-
~nbution and financing of consumer goods. These people will vote 
h~ public officials in either of these three categories who do some-
t lng about what is bothering them. 
MOYE: It works another way, too. Courts and public officials 
~r~ ~eco:rning increasingly aware that manufacturers are selling 
~~ enor goods - more than in the past - and are at the same 
ll'ne exacting higher financing charges. 
b . SULNICK: The basis of their power is that the consumers are e1n · · 
f l g lnJ.u~ed, they feel the injury, and therefore respond. They 
ee the InJury of purchasing inferior products: cars that will not 
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start, dresses that burn up, things that wear out in three months, 
and so on. 
MOYE: But are you not actually saying that because the con-
sumer is feeling this injury, public officials understand that he is 
being exploited? That is the kind of power that does presently exist, 
although it is not being used effectively. 
ROSENBERG: I suppose that what you are talking about is that 
consumer awareness is growing. And with such growing aware-
ness, the courts and the legislatures are responding. You know, 
again, I go back to my original point that consumers do have more 
power than they believe they have. But awareness itself is a form 
of power. I think that much of the response by public officials is 
the result of this awareness. 
SULNICK: I agree that awareness is power. I have to ask an-
other question because I do not think we can pass over the distinc-
tion between compensation for injury and control of the seller. If 
we assume that consumers have power predicated upon an aware-
ness, then we say that the thing to do is to utilize that power. But, 
as to what end? If for compensation, then the courts may be a very 
good vehicle as the remedy. I think you were right, John, in dis-
tinguishing between remedies and other things. There are, of 
course, legislative and administrative remedies, as well as a host of 
informal ones, such as organization, demonstration, the use of media 
and even civil disobedience. All of these remedies are available to 
consumers, but so much depends on why they are using a partic-
ular remedy. Is it to get dollars and cents compensation? Or, pos-
sibly to assure control, so that consumers will have better products 
which do not fall apart in three months? The effectiveness of a par-
ticular remedy depends on the remedial goal which is sought. 
MOYE: Well, we are looking at both theories, are we not, both 
compensaton and control? Consumer power which exists right now 
must be developed and put to good use. What we are saying is, 
"Let's see what we have and let's see how best to use it for both 
purposes?" The objective, of course, being to get the consumer his 
$75.00 back for the couch or get the couch back to the manufac-
turer; ultimately, to force the manufacturer to make better products. 
LITTLEFIELD: Yes, but I think the two concepts apply in dif-
ferent situations. If you talk about the environment, there is only 
one thing you are interested in: control. We do not want a pol-
luted environment, right? When you have injury-producing prod-
ucts, you want control. I can agree with that easily. But when it 
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comes to how the ordinary John Q. Public enjoys his television set, 
his stereo, sofa, food and whatever, I am not sure you need to worry 
about anything more than getting his money's worth. 
SULNICK: I think it is a question of control. Maybe con-
sumerism is not the best way to make the point, but I think you 
should be worried about the next generation and whether it will 
have to deal with the same problems using the same remedies. Pos-
sibly the best analogy is to education. If you have a poor curricu-
lum today, do you not want to change it so future generations do 
not have to suffer with it? · 
LITTLEFIELD: No, I presume that if you get the right kind of 
remedies and the correct way of getting at the problems we are 
talking about, what is going to happen is that merchandising will 
op:rate upon a theory that somebody does not have to pay for some-
thmg unless it comes up to snuff. I do not care whether industry pro-
duces ten percent defective goods and therefore must take them 
back; nor do I care whether they produce one hundred percent good 
ones. I take it your control remark is aimed at doing away with 
sho~dy products per se. In the area that I am talking about -
has1c satisfaction of human wants- this can be cured in a number 
of ways. Some people may be willing to pay fifty dollars for a T.V. 
set that does not work very well. Howard's problem is that most 
people in the ghetto are paying three hundred dollars for a fifty 
dollar television set. 
th
. SULNICK: I am not sure that we are talking about the same 
1ngs. 
MOYE: I think we are. 
LITTLEFIELD: There is a difference, because on the one hand 
We are speaking about adequate compensation which in the con-
~u~er area would have to be penalties or fines so as to control be-
avior, whereas on the other our conversation is directed toward 
camp · ensat10n for compensation's sake. 
. . JOURNAL: Is control the same thing as eradication, Bob? Or 
ls ~t possible to ever eliminate the problem? Professor Littlefield's 
P.01nt seems to be that you can still control it, but I think he is wor-
~ed about controlling it to the extent that you suggest. That is one-
c:dred P.ercent control as opposed to eighty percent control and 
pensatlon for the other twenty percent. 
W SULNICK: I would much 'rather have one-hundred percent. 
e should have one-hundred percent good products. 
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LITTLEFIELD: What is the social value to be gained by hav-
ing one-hundred percent good sofas, televisions and radios, other 
than having an ideal society which produces goods? 
SULNICK.: Well, just that, you admit consumers are no longer 
being exploited; they will be getting what they pay for. 
LITTLEFIELD: But can't we cure exploitation by simply re-
quiring merchants to take the bad ones back or sell them at a lower 
price, or do something else with them? 
ROSENBERG: Neil, aren't we hindered by the kinds of con-
trols that are built into our system now? If you have a plant that 
is a nuisance, you can go on maintaining it; but you must pay com-
pensation to some people for the privilege of doing so. 
LITTLEFIELD: No, because then I think the negative social 
value in the nuisance is also desirable as a social value to do some-
thing about. We ought to have smog-free air, a noise-free environ-
ment and a meaningful society; these are social values. To achieve 
such a state demands that we eradicate the nuisance. 
ROSENBERG: Alright, but are you willing to go that far in 
terms of a total eradication of consumer abuses? 
LITTLEFIELD: I see a difference between controlling injury 
and death-causing consumer goods and producing goods that work 
perfectly all the time. I see a utility and a need for shoddily-built, 
honestly-priced and honestly-sold goods. 
SULNICK: What is the use? 
LITTLEFIELD: Well, for example - and this is a little per-
sonal - I never pay more than $150.00 for a television set. It is 
a good set, but doesn't perform as well as one selling for $300.00. 
Bob, you will agree with my basic assumption that it will cost more 
to build a very good television set than just a good television set? 
SULNICK.: I am not necessarily sure it does. I think the ad-
vertising may cost more and the cabinets might be a bit more at-
tractive. But, I am not really sure in my own mind that actual 
tubes that go into the sets are any different. That's what bothers 
me. 
JOURNAL: I think what Howard was saying earlier is that, 
particularly with low income people, consumers may be paying 
substantially more than the set is actually worth as far as quality is 
concemed. 
SULNICK.: Hypothetically, Company X manufactures an 
-
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equally good color television set to the one produced by Company 
Z, but Z's sells for twice as much. Now why should this be? The 
answer is summed up in one word: advertising. Also, a few other 
problems enter the picture: labor costs, the cabinet is a bit more 
attractive and so on. However, I think the actual working abilities 
of the color sets are quite comparable. 
MOYE: Neil's solution, or premise, would be that no matter 
what Z puts into the television set, it has to be worth what con-
sumers pay for it, or else we have a consumer abuse which should be 
controlled. Aren't you merely saying that you should have the 
quality of the goods for the price that i.s paid? 
LITTLEFIELD: I think our society is sufficiently affluent to 
allow us to be less concerned with the fact that some people like to 
keep up with the Joneses by paying $200.00 more for their television 
set than they need to. 
SULNICK: But not only do the Joneses want to buy that, but 
everybody wants to. That was what Marshall McLuhan's book was 
all about. We are totally conditioned to buy things, whether we 
need them or not. At this point I feel it is beyond our control. 
Huge institutions use their power to make us buy things. Pretty 
soon everybody wants the $6,000.00 car, which probably is not any 
safer than the $2,000.00 car. It is truly a question of control. 
LITTLEFIELD: My basic problem with control is, whether the 
car sells for $6,000.00 or $2,000.00, will it be safe? 
SULNICK: Well, what I want to have is a safe vehicle that will 
sell for $2,000.00- that is where we differ. 
LITTLEFIELD: Why do you want it to sell for $2,000.00? 
. SULNICK: Because that is a more equalitarian way of distribu-
~lllg money in this economy. Why should an automobile manu-
act~er make $5,000.00 profit on a car just because of advertising, 
and lll the process, give you an inferior product? Why not give you 
ba sadfe car at a more reasonable price of $2,000.00 which could likely e one? 
. . MOYE: Bob, you raised two issues. One was the eradication of 
~nJury and environmental problems. Then there is the second prob-
em of getting goods inferior in quality to the price paid for them. 
SULNICK: There is still .~ control problem to resolve. 
b MOYE: So let's try to get the consumers to eliminate these 
a uses by a means of control. We should try to give them what-
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ever rights and remedies they need in order to obtain goods of equiv-
alent quality to the price paid. 
JOURNAL: What we see emerging from what you just said is 
that, whereas there is a control function as far as injury is con-
cerned, there is another control function in the question of how we 
can get manufacturers to produce good quality goods. 
MOYE: Manufacturers are going to operate on a cost basis. 
They are going to decide whether it is going to cost them more to 
put out ten percent defective goods and take them back, or put out 
ninety-five percent good products with no returns. Now, you have 
to develop a system so that whatever they decide, you have the 
available remedies - the power to force them to do the best they 
can. That is what we need. In a way, that puts us back where we 
are. If we have the power, how can we use it now? If we do not 
have it now, how can we develop it? 
THE CONSUMER EDUCATION ACT-
An "Ounce of P:·evention" 
Senator Alan Cranston* 
In the marlcet place, the consumer's lack of knowledge is often 
his own worst enemy. Despite a constant public interest in bettering 
the American school system, there has been relatively little effort 
made to broaden curricula to include consztmer education. Thus, 
members of the buying public are frequently ill-equipped to protect 
themselves in the world of caveat emptor. In this article, Mr. Cran-
ston discusses the Consumer Education Act, which is designed to 
remedy this situation. The text of the proposed legislation is repro-
duced at the end of Mr. Cranston's article . 
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. On June 2, 1971, I introduced a bill entitled the Consumer Edu-
catzon Act.1 This legislation proposes to create a new Office of Con-
sumer Education with authority to allocate up to $85,000,000 in 
grants over the next three years to help schools teach young people 
how to spend their money more wisely. In addition, it could save 
consumers and the Federal Government millions of dollars each 
Year. 
Prevention counts for a lot more than cure in the consumer field. 
Once the buyer has wasted his money it is generally too late for him 
~0 do anything about it. In most cases he does not even realize that 
e has wasted his money. The function of consumer education is to 
;nake the consumer more aware of the value he receives in exchange 
or the money he spends. 
. Th~ complexity and size of the market place today make it 
~mperatiVe that the consumer become better informed so as better 
0 
protect himself. The government cannot do the whole job; the 
conhs~mer must have the information he needs to make wise decisions 
on 1s own. 
Legal redress can only do so much to protect him. Law suits 
~re expensive, time consuming, and come into play only after the 
amage has already been done. · 
of •th~l~n Cranston is the senior Democratic Senator from California. He is chairman 
the co~ate Subcommittee on Production and Stabilization, as well as a member of 
-- ttees on Banking. Housing, and Urban Affairs. 
1 
S. 1981, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). 
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The extent to which our society is consumption-oriented clearly 
illustrates the significance of this problem. Each year the American 
people spend in excess of $600,000,000,000 on goods and services. 
For example, in 1970, expenditures included $85,300,000,000 on 
durable goods, $150,000,000 on new household appliances, $271,-
500,000,000 on perishable goods, and $270,200,000,000 for various 
services. 
This high level of consumption is encouraged by the advertising 
efforts of American business. In 1970 alone, advertisers spent 
$18,000,000,000 to encourage consumers to buy their products. 
According to a Columbia University School of Journalism study, the 
average person spends nineteen hours per week watching television. 
Another study, by the Carnegie and Ford Foundations in cooperation 
with the Office of Education, found that pre-schoolers spend an 
average of 54.1 hours per week before the television. The Columbia 
University study also estimated that the average American is 
exposed to 1,516 commercial messages every twenty-four hours; this 
estimate arrived at by counting all the major media - television, 
radio, newspapers, and magazines. This is a mind-boggling statistic. 
In view of the amount of money spent by the American Con-
sumer each year and the intense pressures exerted on him by the 
advertising industry, the need for improved consumer education 
becomes clear. The Consumer Education Act is intended to fulfill 
this need. 
The Federal Government now spends more than $200,000,000 
each year for consumer protection, including at least $25,000,000 
annually in law suits alone. Hardly any of these expenditures are 
applied to consumer education. 
In most states, home economics courses represent the only form 
of consumer education. However, a mere 35% of all high school 
girls, and less than one percent of all high school boys, are enrolled 
in such programs. Moreover, the consumer education aspect of home 
economics is narrowly limited to such topics as nutrition and home 
budgeting. 
We desperately need specialized courses dealing extensively 
with the following: consumer purchasing of food, clothing, furniture 
and appliances; the environmental effects of consumer decisions; 
purchasing and maintaining an automobile; apartment rental and 
home buying; short-term consumer credit; budgetary and money 
management; fraud, quackery and deception; banking and savings; 
investments; life and health insurance; consumer law, Social Secur-
1972] CON SUMER EDUCA TION ACT 19 
ity, Medicare and Medicaid. Illinois and Hawaii are, at present, the 
only states where such courses are required. New York, New Jersey, 
Massachusetts and Wisconsin are the only states where m ore than 
five percent of the high schools offer these courses on an elective 
basis. 
The Consumer Education Bill would establish a separate Office 
of Consumer Education within the Department of H ealth, Education 
and Welfare's Office of Education. It would have a director who 
:'Vould be chosen by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare 
111 .consultation with a newly-createg Council on Consumer Edu-
Cation. 
The twenty-one member Council would be the only one of 
several within the Office of Education to have an independent bud-
get.2 It would consist of state and local consumer protection officials, 
along with representatives from the Justice Department, the Food 
and Drug Administration, the Federal Trade Commission, the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and private con-
sumer groups such as the Consumer's Federation of America. 
The Council would be responsible for co-ordinating all feder al 
consumer education programs and would evaluate local school and 
adult education programs seeking grants. Grant money would be 
~sed to develop consumer education courses and to encourage their 
Integration into elementary and high school curricula. 
1 The bill authorizes grants totalling $25,000,000 yearly in fiscal 972 and 1973, and $35,000,000 in 1974. It provides for one hundred 
percent federal grants with no matching funds required from local 
school districts. Omitting the requirement of matching funds is a de-
~art~re ~rom the traditional practice by the Office of Education . 
diut .111 v~ew of the fiscal crisis confronting most states and school 
I stncts, It is apparent that the Federal Government m ust give the 
ocal taxpayer comprehensive assistance . 
. Minigrants of up to $10,000 would also be available for inno-
Vative community consumer education programs. In addition, lar ger 
tants for qu~lified adult projects would be awarded, especially to 
ose grants aimed at people with little formal education. 
th In view of the amounts expended by the Federal Government in 
er:l ar~a of consumer protection, these grants are appropr iate. Fed-
$20 aid to high school home economics courses h as amounted to 
,000,000 annually for the past three years. That same amount --2 $250,000 per year. 
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is budgeted for fiscal 1972. Last year California schools alone 
r eceived $1,650,000 of these funds to support home economics 
classes in 274 of California's 365 secondary school districts. 
In addition , the Food and Drug Administration spent $83,000,-
000 on consumer protection in 1971; the Agriculture Department 
spent $78,000,000;3 the Federal Trade Commission spent $11,000,-
000 ;4 and $10,000,000 was expended by the Legal Services Program 
of the Office of Economic Opportunity. 5 The budget for the Presi-
dent's Advisor on Consumer Affairs is $810,000. Furthermore, the 
Justice Department spends millions more each year on civil suits 
and anti-trust actions in the consumer's interest. 
All of this adds up to well over $200,000,000 annually. By 
educating the American Consumer, the grant program embodied in 
the Consumer Education Act will have the long-run effect of reduc-
ing the level of Federal Government spending in the area of con-
sumer pr otection. 
Th ere is no question that we need additional protection and 
assistance for consumers. This assistance is available through the 
legislative process. Much has been done, but much more needs to be 
accomplished if we are to improve the position of the consuming 
public. However, we cannot and should not attempt to legislate 
everything. Alon g with the legislative effort we must have - and I 
per son ally believe that this is most critical- education of the indi-
vidual con sumer. Educated consumers will be less likely to make 
the er rors which h ave led to the abundance of consumer disputes 
in our courts. The Consumer Education Act will provide an import-
ant ounce of prevention to replace the more expensive pound of cure. 
92o CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION 
s. 1981 
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 
JuNE 2, 1971 
MR. CRA NSTON in troduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 
to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare 
A BILL 
To autho rize the United States Commi ssioner of Education to 
establish consumer education programs. 
3 Including $4,000,000 for law suits. 
4 The entire amount was spent on legal action. 
5 Nearly twenty percent of its $53,000,000 total budget. 
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Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
§tates of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the 
Consumer Education Act". 
STATEMENT OF FINDINGS AND PURPOSE 
SEc. 2. (a) The Congress of the United States finds that presently there do 
not exist adequate resources for educating and informing consumers about their 
role as participants in the marketplace. 
(b) It is the purpose of this Act to encourage and support the development 
of new and improved curricula to prepare censumers for participation in the 
marketplace to demonstrate the use of such curricula in model educational 
pr.o?rams and to evaluate the effectiveness thereof ; to provide support for the 
Imtiation and maintenance of programs in consumer education at the elementary 
and secondary and higher education levels; to disseminate curricular materials 
and other information for use in educational programs throughout the Nation; 
to provide training programs for teachers, other educational personnel , public 
service personnel, and community and labor leaders and employees, and gov-
ernment employees at State, Federal and local levels; to provide for community 
consumer education programs; and to provide for the preparation and distri-
bution of materials by mass media in dealing with consumer education. 
CONSUMER EDUCATION 
SEc. 3. (a) (l) There is established , within the Office of Education, an 
Office of Consumer Education (referred to in this section as the "office") which, 
under the supervision of the Commissioner of Education (hereinafter referred 
~o as the "Commissioner"), Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (here-
Inafter referred to as the "Secretary"), and Council on Consumer Education, 
shall be responsible for (A) the administration of the program authorized by 
subsection (b) and (B) the coordination of activities of the Office of Education 
Which are related to consumer education. The Office shall be headed by a Direc-
tor, with an established reputation in consumer education and the fields covered 
therein , who shall be compensated at a rate not to exceed that prescribed for 
Grade GS-17 in section 5332 of title 5, United States Code. · 
(2) For the purposes of this Act, the term "consumer education" means 
Preparation with skills, concepts·, and understanding required for everyday life 
to achieve within a framework of his own values maximum satisfaction and 
Utilization of resources. 
(b) ( l) The Director shall carry out a program of making grants to, and 
contracts with, institutions of higher education, State and local educational 
agencies, and other public and private agencies, organizations, and institutions 
(including libraries) to support reseawh, demonstration, and pilot proj ects 
designed to provide consumer education to the public except that no grant may 
be made other than to a nonprofit agency, organization, or institution. 
(2) Funds appropriated for grants and contracts under this section shall 
he available for such activities as-
(A) the development of curricula (including inter-disciplinary cur-
ricula) in consumer education; 
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(B) dissemination of information relating to such curricula; 
(C) in the case of grants to State and local educational agencies and 
institutions of higher education, for the support of education programs at 
the elementary and secondary and higher education levels ; 
(D ) preservice and inservice training programs and projects (includ-
ing fellowship programs, institutes, workshops, symposiums, and seminars) 
for educational personnel to prepare them to teach in subject matter areas 
associated with consumer education, and for public service personnel (such 
as, but not limited to, social workers and poverty workers) government 
employees, and labor leaders and employees; 
(E) community education programs on consumer education, including 
special programs for adults; and 
(F) preparation and distribution of materials suitable for use by the 
mass media in dealing with consumer education. 
In addition to the activities specified in the first sentence of this paragraph, such 
funds may be used for proj ects designed to demonstrate, test, and evaluate the 
effectiveness of any such activities, whether or not assisted under this section. 
Activities pursuant to this Act shall provide bilingual assistance when appro-
priate. 
( 3) (A) Financial assistance under this subsection may be made available 
only upon application to the Director. Applications under this subsection shall 
be submitted at such time, in such form, and containing such information as the 
Council on Consumer Education shall prescribe hy regulation and shall be 
approved only if it-
(i) provides that the activities and servi ces for which assistance is 
sought will be administered by, or under the supervision of, the applicant; 
(ii) describes a program for carrying out one or more of the purposes 
set forth in the first sentence of paragraph (2) which holds promise of 
making a substantial contribution toward attaining the purposes of this 
section; 
(iii) sets forth such policies and procedures as will insure adequate 
evaluation of the activities intended to be carried out under the application; 
(iv) sets forth policies and procedures which assure that Federal funds 
made available under this· Act for any fiscal year will be so used as ~o 
supplement and. to the extent practical , increase the level of funds that 
would, in the absence of such Federal funds, he made available by the 
applicant for the purposes described in this section, and in no case supplant 
such funds; 
( v) provides for such fiscal control and fund accounting procedures 
as may be necessary to assure proper disbursement of and accounting for 
Federal funds paid to the applicant under thi s Act ; and 
(vi) provides for making an annual report and such other reports, in 
such form and containing such information , as the Commissioner may rea-
sonably require and for keeping such records, and for affording such access 
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thereto as the Commissioner may find necessary to assure the correctness 
and verification of such reports. 
(B) Applications from local educational agencies for financial assistance 
under this Act may be approved by the Director only if the State educational 
agency has been notified of the application and has been given the opportunity 
to offer recommendations. 
(C) Amendments of appl ications shall, except as the Council on Consumer 
Education may otherwise provide by or pursuant to regulation, be subject to 
approval in the same manner as original applications. 
(4) Federal assistance to any program or project under this section, other 
t~an those involving curriculum development, dissemination of curricular mate-
nals, and evaluation, shall support up to 100 per centum of the cost of such 
program including costs of administration; contributions in kind are acceptable 
as local contributions to program costs. 
(c) (l) There is hereby established a Council on Consumer Education 
~hnsisting ?f twenty-one members appointed by the_ Secretary. '!'he Secretary 
all appomt one member as Chairman. The Counc1l shall cons1st of persons 
kppointed from the public and private sector with due regard to their fitn ess, 
~owledge, and experience in matters of, but not limited to business, academic, 
~fientific, legal, and information media activities as the_y relate to t~e pro_blems 
the consumer and consumer education, and shall give due consideratiOn to 
~1ographical representation in the appointment of such members: Provided, 
lat the Council shall include representatives from State and local agencies 
responsible for enforcing consumer protection laws and shall include a repre-
st~ntative each from the DeJJartment of Justice the Food and Drug Administra-
lon f h D ' T. d 0 t e epartment of Health, Education, and Welfare, and the Federal 
I a. e Commission. 
(A) Each member of the Council shall be appointed for a term of three 
years : Provided, however. That eleven of the original Council appointees shall serve · · · · ' 
t an lllltial term of two years. No Council member shall serve more than 
wo consecutive terms. 
(B) The Council shall select a chairman from among its members. 
C (~) Each member of the Council shall receive travel expenses to and from 
erounc1 meetings together with compensation at the per diem rate of a Gov-
m nmt. ent employee with the rank of GS-] 8 for each day they attend Council 
ee mgs. 
(2) The Council shall -
t . (A) advise the Commissioner and the Office concerning the adrninis-
ration of; preparation of general regulations for, and operations of pro-
grams ass1sted under this section; 
f (B) make recommendations to the Director with respect to the alloca-
wnfof fu~ds appropriated pursuant to subsection (d) among the purposes 
~et orth m paragraph (2) of subsection (b) and the criteria to be .used 
m approving applications, which criteria shall insure an appropriate geo-
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graphical distribution of approved programs and proj ects throughout the 
Nation; 
(C) develop criteria for the review of applications and their dis-
position; 
(D) evaluate programs and projects assisted under this section and 
disseminate the results thereof; 
(E) develop an overall organizational plan outlining the objectives 
of the consumer education program; 
(F) make a biannual report to the Congress evaluating ; 
(G) coordinate all Federal consumer education programs; and 
(H) hire a staff of up to five persons to help it carry out its functions 
pursuant to this Act. 
(3) The Secretary shall obtain the advice of the Council prior to appoint· 
ing the Director. 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
SEc. 4. The Secretary, in cooperation with the heads of other agencies with 
relevant jurisdiction, shall, insofar as practicable upon request, render technical 
assistance to local educational agencies, public and private nonprofit organiza-
tions, institutions of higher education, Federal, State, and local government 
agencies, and other agencies deemed by the Secretary to play a role in consumer 
edu cation. The technical assistance shall be designed to enabl e the recipient 
agency to carry on consumer education programs. 
SMALL GRANTS 
SEc. 5 (a) In addition to the grants authorized under section 3, the Com-
missioner, from the sums appropriated pursuant to this Act, shall have the 
authority to make grants, in sums not to exceed $10,000 annually, to nonprofit 
organizations such as citizens groups and volunteer organizations working in 
consumer education, and other public and private nonprofit agencies, institu-
tions, or organizations for conducting courses, workshops, seminars, sympo-
siums, institutes, and conferences, especially for adults and community groups 
(other than the group funded) in consumer education. 
(b) Priority shall be given to those proposals demonstrating innovative 
approaches to consumer education. 
(c) For the purposes of this section, the Commissioner shall require evi-
dence that the interested organization or group shall have been in existence one 
year prior to the submission of a proposal for Federal funds and that it shall 
submit an annual report on Federal funds expended. 
(d) Proposals submitted by organizations and groups under this section 
shall be limited to the essential information required to evaluate them, unless 
the organization or group shall volunteer additional information. 
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ADMINISTRATION 
. SEc. 6. In administering the provisions of this Act, the Director is author-
Ized to utilize the services and facilities of any agency of the Federal Govern-
m~nt and of any other public or private agency or institution in accordance 
blth appropriate agreements, and to pay for such services either in advance or 
Y way of reimbursement, as may be agreed upon. The Director shall publish 
a~nu_ally a list and description of projects supported under this Act and sha~l 
distnbute such list and description to interested educational institutions, cih-
~ens' groups, consumer organizations, and other organizations and individuals 
Involved in consumer education. 
AUTHORIZATION 
d" There is authorized to be appropriated $20,000,000 for the fiscal year 
en mg June 30, 1972; $25,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973; 
and $35,000,000 for the year en ding .Tune 30, 1974, for carrying out the pur-
poses of this Act: Provided, however, That during each of those three fiscal 
Eyedars, _$250,000 shall be used for the support of the Council on Consumer ucatwn. 
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HOW TO PROTECT CONSUMERS THROUGH LOCAL 
REGULATION AND ARBITRATION: 
A Cooperative Venture with Cozmty Government 
DONALD P. ROTHSCHIL.Dt 
and 
PIDLIP J. DAVIS* 
In the following article the authors discuss what they feel to 
be the most important element of effective consumer protection: or-
ganization at the local level. Drawing from their personal experi-
ence, Donald Rothschild and Philip Davis present an outline of 
factors which should be considered wherever consumer protection 
at the local level is contemplated. This approach is based on the 
belief that there is no universal formula which can be applied to 
protect the interests of the consumer. Rather, specific mechanisms 
must be fashioned according to the particular characteristics of the 
municipality in question. This article is intended to provide guide-
lines for such efforts. 
+ Professor o£ Law, The George Washington University. A.B. 1950, University of 
Michigan; J .D. 1965, University of Toledo; LL.M. 1966, Harvard University. 
• Law Student, B.A., Trinity College. Director, Arlington Consumer Protection Proj-
ect, Consumer HELP. Member, George Washington Law Review. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This article will propose a methodology for the establishment 
of local, municipal and county control of consumer protection. 1 The 
basis for this recommendation is a case study of the development 
0~ ? consumer protection commission in Arlington County, Vir-
ginia, which evolved this past year under ideal circumstances for 
purposes of analysis. The County Board had determined that the 
County needed such an agency and enlisted Consumer HELP of 
~he George Washington University Law SchooP as consultant "to 
Investigate all aspects of the venture."3 This investigation in-
clu~ed "a study of the legal aspects and r ange of consumer pro-
te~bon available for Arlington County citizens."4 The contract per-
nutted the Center to work with the Board Commission from the 
~esearc~ stage to the formal opening of the Arlington Co~sum~r 
rotectlon Commission offices. 5 The chance to work on this proJ-
e~t from its inception presented a unique opportunity to examine 
t e advantages and problems of local control under "laboratory 
conditions." 
cal ~lthough the genesis of Arlington County's agency was atypi-
d ' _Its use as an example of local control serves more than aca-
enuc purposes. The Commonwealth of Virginia delegates less 
ptower to its municipal and county subdivisions than many other 
~ ates. Thus, anything that Arlington County has the power to do, 
ebsubdivisions of many other states should be able to match and 
go eyond! 6 ---ltl~ni~i;eirc\db'y. ~he authors indicates that at least eighteen counties and fifty-three 
end of thi' su . 1
1
visions have consumer protection agencies. Sec, e.g., Appendix at the 
2 s arh c e. 
lloth?~~~~mer . HE_LP is an outgrowth of a clinical course, supervised by Professor 
Center G' which IS offered to second and third year law students at the National Law 
ters cu; l e?rge Washington University. The program operates three complaint cen· 
tw0 Ye~ udmg two storefronts) which have received over 14,000 consumer complaints in 
Plaints ~s tf oyeration, and a research center which utilizes computers to analyze com-
Underg'rad erra s, and solutions. Consumer HELP is staffed by over 100 law students, 
to the A. 1~ates, and volunteers each semester, working on over 10 projects in addition by Cons r IngtH County program. See generally Consumer Help (brochure published 
3 LettUltl~r ELP Center, 714 Twenty-first Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006). 
Donald .pr R rohm ~elt W. Johnson, County Manager, Arlington County, Virginia, to 
4 ld · at schild, July 15, 1971. 
5 • 
The ~~~l~er HELP was hired by the Arlington County Board on July 10, 1971. 
on SePte~bion establishing the Arlington Consumer Protection Commission was passed 
5, 1972 C er 11, 1971, and the Commission office was officially open ed on February 
forltlal ~d . onsumer HELP personnel have continued assisting the Commission as in-
6 The VIS?rs on a volunteer basis since the opening of the office. 
sufficient pohhce .Power frequently conferred on municipalities and counties is usually 
§IV c I dau~ 
1
or1ty for the enactment of local consumer protection programs. See text , . , zn ra. 
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II. LOCAL CONTROL OF CONSUMER PROTECTION 
A. THE NEED 
[Vol. 1:26 
Prior to examining the Arlington experience, it is desirable 
to consider the need for expanding what may seem to be an al-
ready overpopulated consumer movement.7 
The principal justification for local control of consumer pro-
tection is to enable assistance to be given in direct response to in-
dividual needs. Existing empirical evidence demonstrates the ne-
cessity of tailoring governmental consumer protection activities to 
the unique problems that arise within limited geographic, socio-
economic and political subdivisions. This evidence supports the 
proposition that consumer problems and cures vary in type and in 
kind according to the demographic characteristics of the local 
units. 3 Housing problems present an oversimplified, but illustrat-
tive, example of such variation. A large number of complaints 
from consumers living in the inner city will likely be concerned 
with rental property, while complaints originating from suburb-
anites will probably deal with the sale of property. This is ob-
viously due to the fact that there are proportionately more lessees 
in urban areas than are found in suburban areas . However, the 
m ore significant variables are far more subtle and arise from the 
dysfunctional marketplaces which exist in urban areas. 9 As Pro-
fessor David Caplovitz' recent study Debtors in Default indicates, 
these u rban marketplaces tend to work to the detriment of poorly-
educa ted, low-income consumers from minority groups. The con-
sumers who are forced to shop in such marketplaces are particu-
larly susceptible to and least able to deal with predatory sales and 
credit practices.10 
The press for consumer protection in Congress and in state 
legislatures thus far has concerned itself with consumer problems 
more common to suburban than urban marketplaces. State legis-
latures particularly address themselves to problems found statewide 
7 See text §IV, H infra. 
8 Consumer HELP has provided such data as evidence of the need for local protec· 
t ion agencies to government councils in the District of Columbia, Montgomery County, 
M aryland, and Arlington County, Virginia. 
9 See Rothschild, Consumer Protection at Last Through Local Control of Retail In· 
stallment Sales Contracts, 37 GEo. WAsH L. REv. 1067 (1969). See also FEDERAL TRADil 
C oMMISSION, R EPORT oN DisTRICT OF CoLUMBIA CoNSUMER PROTECTION PROGRAM, 1-2 
(1968) . 
10 See 2 D. CAPLOVITZ, DEBTORS IN DEFAULT (1971). See also D . CAPLOVITZ, Tg!l 
P ooR P AY MoRE (1963). S. MARaoLrus, THE INNOCENT CoNSUMER vs. THE ExPLoiTEltS 
(1 967). 
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~nd tend to overlook problems endemic to particular locales. This 
1S not to say that suburban consumers are free from serious prob-
lems or that all consumers do not have some problems in common. 
The point is that there is a substantial need to focus sharply on spe-
cific consumer problems arising in distinct marketplaces in order 
to afford complete protection. In other words, the need for local 
c?~trol is emphasized by the necessity of varying responses to spe-
:lhc individual consumer problems arising because of the variation 
ln marketplaces. ' 
B. ADvANTAGES 
. Consumer protection afforded a specific group of consumers 
bnngs the control aspect close to the source of the problem. If con-
~umer regulation is to be tailored to the consumer, write-in, phone-
In and walk-in consumer input is desirable. This can best be ac-
~omplished by local agencies. The "mailbag approach" of the 
ederal Trade Commission has been criticized because it subordi-
nates individual consumer problems. However, this approach has 
~orked more effectively at the Commission's regional offices because 
trey. ar: closer to the source of the complaints. 11 The advantage is f OXImity. The disadvantage is that resources are greater at the 
hederallevel. In addition, immediate and direct access to consumers 
as collateral advantages. 
One reason why the Federal Trade Commission or any national 
consumer-oriented12 group is unable to deal directly with individual 
co~sumer problems is the necessity of a massive staff which is re-
(Ulred to resolve individual disputes. Volunteers afford an excel-
cent source of manpower. Consumer HELP has utilized its close 
f~~tact with consumers to enlist volunteers as one method of satis-J ln . 
tl. g Its manpower needs.
13 The Consumer Education and Protec-
on As · · qu · soc1at1on (CEPA), a successful consumer action group head-
artered in Philadelphia, has also built upon its success by enlist-----11 Co, t1rssroN 0~6 ABA. RF.PORT OF THE CoMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE CoM-
FEnER o\.L 9), with E. Cox, R. FELLMETH, & J. ScHULTZ, THE CoNSUMER AND THE 
that the Tn~nE CoMMISSION (1969), and. F T ~ANN: REP. _39-42 p971) (indicating 
Plaints) seglonal offices of the FTC are mcreasmg their deahngs With consumer com-
12 A· ee also Comment, Deceptive Advertising, 80 H ARV. L. REv. 1005, 1064 (1967). 
to deal exa~ple is the Center for Auto Safety - a group established by Ralph Nader 
safety w!i-ehf1cally with problems of "lemonsi" warranty service, and automobile 
18 C lc works to strengthen federal regu ation and enforcem ent efforts. 
1-rany ~nsumer HELP's staff has numbered as many as 140 students and volunteers. 
service e onhsumers who have received aid have, in turn. volunteered several hours of 
ac Week. See Consumer Help brochure, supra note 2. 
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ing as members those consumers it assists.14 Local govemment units 
can achieve similar results. They have an advantage over private 
groups in that they provide stability and prestige which consumer 
protection groups may lack. Moreover, municipal and county in-
volvement enables private consumer groups to develop a significant 
paraprofessional staff to provide further services that would other-
wise require additional civil servants which many local governments 
cannot afford to supply. In reality, this means that volunteer help 
is a prerequisite to providing adequate consumer protection. 
Another advantage of local consumer activity arises from the 
involvement of business groups. The further removed consumer ac-
tivity is from individual problems and specific marketplaces, the 
greater is the level of abstraction in dealing with consumer prob-
lems. This, in tum, causes the line demarking consumer from busi-
ness interests to grow sharper. The allegation that "we are all 
consumers" may ring true in a city council meeting, but it becomes 
suspect when stated before a congressional investigating commit-
tee by an automobile executive in response to an allegation of cor-
porate irresponsibility. Business support and participation is far 
easier to obtain at the community level than at the national or 
state level. Appealing to one's sense of community loyalty is a 
successful way of recruiting business cooperation in resolving con-
sumer disputes. There is no longer any doubt that a large propor-
tion of consumer problems can be resolved by voluntary methods 
when dealing with business at the local government level.15 
It is the widely held opinion of consumer advocates that the 
most important element of consumer protection is "preventive" ac-
tivity, i .e., consumer education. Consumers must be made aware 
of th e abusive business practices to which they may be subjected 
and of how to recognize and to overcome them. Certainly, if con-
sumer problems are to be attacked on a permanent basis, the pres-
ent level of consumer awareness must be greatly enhanced many 
times. The mass media undoubtedly has a role to play in this 
educative process . Thus far, however, efforts by public broadcast-
14 CEPA is a nonprofit, unincorporated association of low-income consumers whicb 
was organized in 1966. The Association negotiates consumer disputes and, failing reso· 
lution of the conflict, will picket the merchant to encourage satisfaction while enlistirl!l 
the aid of clients in consumer boycotts. 
15 From their experience with the Consumer HELP Center, the authors estimate 
that the use of voluntary m echanisms by private consumer protection agencies in the 
Washington, D. C. Metropolitan area has resulted in the resolution of well over 70% 
of the cases handled by such agencies. Moreover, the figure in Prince Georges CountY"• 
Maryland has been found to exceed 80%. 
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ing and by commercial public service programs, although commend-
able have fallen far short of this goal and their "Nielsen ratings" 
have been appalling. 16 "Action lines" found in several urban news-
papers help solve individual problems and dispense information 
and may assist consumers who find themselves with simple com-
plaints or requests. However, this approach is piecemeal and does 
not provide the depth of information to deal with the more complex 
c~nsumer problems. This is not to say that media efforts should be 
discontinued. However, it should be recognized that protection of 
the consumer will be significantly advanced if consumer education 
programs are created. Several consumer awareness programs being 
developed by school systems have been enormously successfuP7 
The development of these programs in public schools will have long 
range effects. The traditional home economics type courses, under 
a new format of "human ecology," are the most effective vehicles 
for developing awareness and preventive consumer protection. En-
!:an~e to the public school system by local government agencies is 
ri_a~IVely easy consequently, local consumer protection and school 
° Cials may work together to develop strong and innovative pro-
grams. 
th There are other reasons why local governmental bodies are 
I e most appropriate agencies for controlling consumer protection. 
n home rule jurisdictions. the police and licensing power of the 
~t~~e ~s usually delegated to. municipalities .18 In non-home rule jur-
~:chons, the extent of such powers varies with the jurisdictio_ns. 
· ny_ local governmental umts have enacted consumer protectiOn 
:gencies based on their police powers. Yet even without such pow-
l .t'~ an effective local consumer protection agency may be estab-
pls l'e?. In Virginia, where local powers are limited and munici-
P a lhes must petition the state legislature for meaningful police 
~;ers, the Arlington County Board was able to move quickly and 
C · ou_t ~ubstantial opposition to create the Consumer Protection 
omrnission. The explanation for this is the political responsive----"o . . 
cess. a~Chionblly, however, prime time programming has met with a measure of suc-
SUlner II ts een the case with WTIG-TV, Metromedia. Washington, D. C., Con-
17 ln ·~l b:ochure, supra note 2. See note 28 infra and accompanying t ext. 
in the Pub a_shmgton, D. C., no less than three groups are teaching consumer prot ction 
speaking he schools. The Arlington Consumer Protection Commission has also begun 
18 The engagements at schools and before various civic organizations. 
ferred u power of home rule would be a nuJlity if the police~ power were not con-
Quiet la~n hdome rule jurisdictions. "Public safety, public health, morality, peace and 
ditio~al a~ ?rder - these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the tra-
D.s 26 3a2pp(l1Ication of the police power to municipal affairs." Berman v. Parker, 348 . ' 954). 
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ness of local government to local consumer groups. An anti-con-
sumer stance is a luxury not available to local politicians. Business 
groups and trade associations are less able to "lobby" effectively 
against creation of consumer protection agencies at the municipal 
level because representatives of consumer groups can easily obtain 
access to local officials. A final advantage of local control of con-
sumer protection rests with the flexible nature of local government. 
For example, it is far easier to establish a consumer protection 
agency in such consumer-related municipal offices as Weights and 
Measures or Licenses than to establish a similar office in the Agri-
culture or Commerce Departments of the state or federal govern-
ments. There are fewer papers to push and less bureaucratic red 
tape to cut. Moreover, consumer protection is one of the least ex-
pensive regulatory activities that a local government can establish.19 
III. THE IMPETUS TO LOCAL CONSUMER PROTECTION 
ENACTMENTS. 
A. PoLITICAL AcTION 
It is not uncommon to find instances in which politicans pro-
vide the original impetus to local consumer protection. This occurs 
as the popularity of consumerism prompts increasing endorsement 
of these laws. Thus, relying heavily on his consumer record, the 
individual who originally submitted the consumer protection reso-
lution in Arlington County, successfully campaigned as an inde-
pendent challenger later that year for a seat on the County Board.20 
As indicated in the introduction, anti-consumerism is a politi-
cally impractical position. The political feasibility of enacting local 
consumer protection measures often prevails over the traditional op-
position of local commercial interests to such enactments. In fact, 
the Arlington resolution establishing the Consumer Protection Com-
mission forewarned business interests of the futility of attempting 
to dissuade Board members from enacting the resolution. 21 Hence, 
19 For example. the Consumer Protection Commission of Prince Georges County, 
Maryland operated on a $5,000 budget during its first year of operation. 
20 In Virgjnia, the 1971 campaign for the office of Lieutenant Governor was a tough 
three-way battle. eventually won by Independent Harry Howell, who based much of 
his campaign on his own consumer program. 
21 The resolution contained such clauses as: "Whereas, many Arlington residents 
have grievances arising from advertisements or sales of merchandise, repair and other 
services ... "; and "Whereas, consumers aggrieved by sharp practice lack an adequate 
means of obtaining aid and redress ... " Arlington County, Va., Resolution on Con· 
sumer Protection, Sept. 11, 1971. 
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populist pressures to enact consumer protection regulations may 
prompt local politicians, regardless of party affiliation, to provide 
the impetus for such action. 
B. CoNSUMER GRoUPs 
In many cases, failure of municipal gov~rnments to act on 
~onsumer protection is directly attributable to a lack of consumer 
~nertia. Local consumer organizations should develop into special 
l~terest pressure groups. Since interest groups exist in most coun-
ties and municipalities and as public officials are subject to, and re-
spond to, their pressures, consumer organizations should make their 
pressure felt by demanding of these officials governmental action 
on consumer problems. There are many channels through which 
consumer advocates may present their views and arguments, there-
~y providing an original or added impetus for local consumer protec-
tlon. ~onsumer groups can propose original resolutions to local 
governmg bodies or submit amendments and modifications to pro-
gra.rn~ already in operation. In communities where consumer as-
shoc~ab~ns are active and well-known, they are usually solicited for 
t elr VIews. 22 
Where open hearings take place to measure public sentiment 
0~ P~oposed consumer ordinances and resolutions, consumer orga-
~lZabons should be mobilized to testify. Marshalling consumer 
l ~ces may seem an overkill, but it is necessary. Business groups 
1 
e the Chamber of Commerce, Better Business Bureau and numer-
hus trade associations, are already mobilized, and, until recently, 
ave successfully neutralized most efforts at local controP3 Con-
~;rn~r gr~ups from beyond the local jurisdiction can be enlisted to 
~ In th1s effort. At the Arlington hearings, for example, local 
th 
06~ ~ere assisted by consumer organizations headquartered in 
C e l~tnct of Columbia, as well as the Virginia Citizens Consumer 
ab~ncll, a J?rivate body active statewide. Consumer HELP was even 
of ~to enhst _support for the resolution from the National Council 
c ette~ Busmess Bureaus, Inc., which was further interested in 
~bng with a consumer arbitration project in Arlington.24 
tio~ ~h~dC?~surner HELP Center has been in operation since March, 1970. In addi-
consumer Vl511 ~he Arlington County Board, the Center has provided testimony on 
Prince Ge~egu at10ns ~md codes in the District of Columbia, and in Montgomery and 
note 2 rges Counties, Maryland. See generally Consumer Help brochure, supra 
23 s 
Reviv/l~ ej{f"· Schoenfeld, Consumer Report: Bill to Create Advocacy Unit Will be 
24 See!~ vel.f-' Congress, 2 NAT'L J. 2771 (Dec. 1970). 
<~ , mira. 
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Local consumer ordinances and regulations are novel developments. 
Cooperation and pressure from all consumer groups are necessary 
to secure passage of even voluntary mechanisms. 
Such broad-based support is further necessary to supply em-
pirical data on consumer problems in the area and the need for 
regulation. If local control of consumer protection is to be effec-
tive, empirical data is required to point out the problems to be 
met, the type of response that has been effective elsewhere to meet 
such problems, and a flexible program to deal with situations that 
may prove peculiar to the locality.25 Local programs must recog-
nize the variation in consumer problems resulting from qualitative 
differences in marketplaces, such as the differences between inner 
city and suburban marketplaces. 26 This requires using all the avail-
able consumer data, and most importantly, suggestions on mech-
anisms to gather new data. Thus, local consumer groups can serve 
as important sources of up to date statistics and research. 
In some locales, officials may maintain private or general ad-
visory boards to aid them in determining policy and in formulating 
programs. For example, one of the authors has served as a special 
consultant on consumer affairs to the District of Columbia City 
Council Chairman, and has frequently been called upon to parti-
cipate in \i'Vashington metropolitan consumer activities. Where 
such avenues of decision-making are open to consumer represent-
atives, they should be utilized to maintain a link between govern-
ment and private consumer groups. 
In addition to providing testimony and advice, consumer groups 
can enlist the local media to perform independent investigation of 
local consumer problems. Consumer HELP, for example, has a 
unique relationship with Metromedia News in the District of Co-
lumbia whereby law students and newsroom personnel investigate 
consumer problems and develop television documentaries, based on 
their research which are telecast during prime time newscasts.27 
25 On research to be performed, see §§ IV, F, G, infra. 
26 The experience of the Consumer HELP Center's storefront operation in the heart 
of Washington's black community demonstrates that the following problems are ram-
pant in the ghetto: fraud by merchants, credit, disclaimers of warranties, assignment of 
contracts and high-pressure sales tactics (especially those of door-to-door salesmen). 
See generally St. Thomas More Institute for Legal Research, Law and the Ghetto Con-
sumer. 14 CATHOLIC LAw. 214 (1968); Symposium - Consumer Protection and the 
Urban Poor. 37 GEo. WAsH L. REv. 1013 (1969). On the other hand, the consumer 
protection commissions in Prince Georges County, Maryland and Arlington, Virginia 
have found that the problems of suburban areas concern, generally, the sale of goods 
and services. 
27 Consumer HELP's programs have dealt with a variety of topics: r etail install-
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~onsumer groups can also publish pamphlets and newsletters 
draWing attention to offensive business practices.28 State level con-
sumer agencies, such as those in the attorneys' general offices of 
New York and Illinois, publish pamphlets alerting consumers to 
u~fa~r business practices. Local consumer groups can aid in the 
distribution of these materials in their communities. 29 
A further strategy through which consumer groups can effect 
needed legislation is political action; that is, to support candidates, 
regardless of party, whose past record has been responsive to con-
surn~r goals. Implicit in this support is the requirement that such 
consistency and responsiveness be maintained after election to guar-
antee continued electoral support.30 
C. BusiNEss GRouPs 
Business and financial interests have traditionally maintained 
~ov:erful positions at the local governmental level. Indeed, it is the 
1smess-financial-economic sector which often provides the politi-
ca leadership in most communities. If not candidates themselves, 
rnernbers of such groups as the Chamber of Commerce, Better Busi-
~ess Bureau, and numerous trade associations provide a financial 
pas~ _for candidates to local office. Business interests, thus, are in a 
~Sltion both to exert considerable influence over the form and 
s ength of local consumer protection ordinances and to block their 
enactrne t c d d d 1 .n s.. onsequently, they are a force to be respecte an a ea t With In any contemplated legislative proposal. It should be 
si~~urned that these interests desire to retain their comfortable po-
a 
10~ and that they will view most consumer protection proposals 
th c allenges to their hegemony. For example, in discussions with 
e authors, the Executive Vice President of the Arlington Chamber 
ll:l.ent contra t 
Pairs reco d s,l ebm:ployment agencies, car warranties, automobile and tele1rision r e-
Purchases. r c u s and computer dating, as well as appliance, grocery and land ---su:::.e: adoteworthy example is the Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, a private con· 
hlatters ;ocate group, which r egularly publishes newsletters on statewide consumer 
~~~s . Co~~sum~r Proposals before the state le~isla ture, and specifi~ c~msumer prob-
t!Vlties. S umer groups, however, should be mmdful of the legal lnruts to such ac-
UnethicaZI{ <;:omment, Extraiudicial Consumer Pressure: An Effective Impediment to 
29 For in~szness Practices. 1969 DuKE L. J. 1011 (1969) . 
education · ance, an effortless yet frequently overlooked method of public consumer 
b
roorns of IS tf :P~ace these materials in municipal and public service offices, waitin g 
raries. etc pro ess10nal persons, banks, credit unions, labor union offices, public li-
so :a 0 
(1963)." KAUFMAN, PoLITics AND PoLICIEs IN STATE AND LocAL GoVERNMENTs 99 
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of Commerce expressed his opinion that no further laws with sanc-
tions were necessary. It is not likely that business groups will pro-
vide an impetus to local action. Therefore, proponents of local 
consumer regulations have a very real responsibility of persuasion, 
diplomacy, and mobilization of resources. 
Consumer advocates should not, however, view all local busi-
ness groups in a negative light. Most businessmen conduct their en-
terprises with high standards of honesty and due regard for the con-
sumer, since such conduct promotes good will and confidence in the 
commercial community. As a result, such prestigious groups as the 
Chambers of Commerce and Better Business Bureaus have not been 
deaf to consumer outcries against sharp businessmen who are mo-
tivated more by quick profit potential than by fair dealing. These 
people compromise the standing of business in the community as 
a whole and threaten the success of their more reputable competi-
tors. Therefore, it is in the interest of honest and responsible busi-
ness associations to combat these abusive practices, and to eliminate 
those firms which operate on the fringe of legality. A significant 
number of local businessmen realize this and may provide an im-
petus for local governmental action. Nevertheless, it is more 
likely that these businesses will prefer the self-policing approach 
of their local Chamber or Better Business Bureau. 
D. CoNsULTANTS 
Once a local governing body decides to study the consumer 
problem, all aspects of consumer protection should be thoroughly 
investigated, including need, local powers, alternative proposals, 
and recommendations. In this regard, the retaining of consultants 
is advisable. The report of a consultant may serve as a persua-
sive demonstration of the need for local action. 
Research into local consumer affairs and possible governmen-
tal response is a sophisticated undertaking. Such a study will take 
researchers into the fields of municipal corporation or county law, 
commercial law and practices, administrative law and technique, 
local and state politics, sociology, human relations, and protocol· 
Prior experience of the consultants in consumer affairs is highl1 
recommended, as they will inevitably have access to a wide varietY 
of information through their contacts, thus eliminating, perhaps, 
the need for a significant amount of original research. Where con· 
sumer consultants have kept up-to-date with consumer legislation i!l 
other jurisdictions, they will be better able to analyze alternativ'e 
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:proposals by comparing provisions of enactments which have been 
ln existence elsewhere. In situations where the community is for-
tunate to have consultants from the immediate vicinity, their sta-
tistics will be all the more meaningful as the figures will likely in-
volve relevant marketplaces. 
These observations suggest the use of two possible sources of 
consultants: the county or city attorney's office and law student re-
sea~c~ groups.31 Although the city attorney's office may have more 
~ammg in analysis32 and have greater experience in dealing with 
lllegalities, the staff may be hampered in its endeavor to produce 
a. comprehensive report due to manpower and budgeting limita-
tlons. For example, in Arlington, one of the reasons for the com-
monwealth (county) attorney's initial negativism toward a local 
~onsumer protection resolution was the fear that his office might 
ave been charged with responsibilities under the measures with-
out adequate funding and personnel. 
A law student research team with experience in the consumer 
complaint field, bringing to bear upon the project the information 
~le~ned from the experience, would also have analytical and ob-
~ectlVe talents and the availability of extensive research tools. This 
1~ not to suggest that the student group should not consult with the 
Clty 0 h C BE r county legal department. On the contrary, t e onsumer 
offi LP ~enter periodically contacted the commonwealth attorney 's 
l c~ W1th regard to the legal research and tentative legal con-e Us1ons. 
Once selected, the consultants should begin preparation of a 
co:rn~rehensive report addressing consumer problems in the com-
:rnumty. Such a report would outline the legal basis for a local 
~o7surner protection agency, local business abuses and complaint 
~ Ume, and a range of alternatives suitable to accomplish the goal f consumer protection. These efforts can prove to be a persuasive 
mpetus to local action. 33 
E. ExiSTING STATE AND LocAL AGENCIES 
1. State Agencies 
---2:,_he remoteness and inadequate performance of state consumer 
res
8
o~~~e aBthot:s are aware that only urbanized areas vvill have access to both of these 
est need sf ut lt should be noted that these areas are the ones which have the great· 
32 The or ~ons_umer programs. See note 25, supra. 
erations sb]e~nvity of such offices may, however, be compromised by political consid. 
sa Se~ ~IV '?§III A, C supra. 
~ • zn/ra. 
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protection offices may stimulate local initiative. It is possible to 
predict the relative success of state consumer protection offices by 
studying the legislature's placement of the agency within the state 
administrative structure. For example, an office of consumer af-
fairs located in the attorney general's office and under the supervi-
sion of a young assistant attorney general is likely to be a more 
potent force in the business community than a similar office, di-
rected by a bureaucrat with 40 years experience in state affairs, lo-
cated in an obscure department of weights and measures. In this 
r egard, it should be recalled that business, finance and industry are 
omnipresent at and highly influential with state legislatures. Com-
munity loyalty arguments are not persuasive in enlisting business 
support for governmental intrusions into their sphere of operation. 
Such state departments as Agriculture and Commerce often become 
puppets of the enterprises they are to regulate; producing a situa-
tion where the regulated control the regulators. 
It is frequently a period of years between the introduction of a 
piece of legislation creating a new state governmental body and the 
initiation of that agency's operations. This lag may create expec-
tations that go unrealized, thereby producing demands by residents 
for local action. At the loca l level, however, the time lag is com-
monly a matter of a few months. For example, in Virginia, the 
State Office of Consumer Affairs was established in April, 1970. Yet, 
a plan to open field offices throughout the state was not fully im-
plemented until February, 1972. In Arlington County, however, 
the Consumer Protection Commission members were appointed on 
the same day as the passage of the resolution establishing the Com-
mission. Within five months, the Commission h ad achieved im-
pressive results. It held five full meetings ; hired two full time 
staff members; developed complaint and other forms; mailed form 
letters to business and other community groups announcing its ex-
istence, aims and soliciting cooperation; adopted landmark arbitra-
tion rules and procedures; held an official opening; and had been 
receiving consumer information requests and complaints for si"" 
weeks! 
State consumer protection statutes may expressly or impliedlY 
anticipate local programs as supplements to state action. State per-
sonnel must realize that a comprehensive state-wide consumer pro-
tection scheme can best be achieved only by cooperatjon with lo-
cal bodies. 34 
34 See §IV, E, infra. 
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2. Local Agencies 
In the absence of a specific consumer protection agency, con-
sumers may address their complaints to such other local govern-
ment departments as Weights and Measures, Public Utilities, Land-
lord and Tenant, Business Licensing, Human Relations, Public 
Health and Safety, and Police. To the degree that these bodies are 
not specifically charged with responsibility for complaint-handling 
or that procedures and manpower limitations militate against the 
:ffe.ctive handling of this additional activity, complaint receptio.n 
lS hkely to hinder such departments in the efficient pursuit of the1r 
proper responsibilities and objectives. This dysfunction may fur-
ther create demand for a local consumer office. 
IV. THE PROCESS OF ENACTMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
If the authors are tempted to expound on an "in my experi-
~nce · · · " thesis it is at this point. For there are two ways to em-
ark on the process of enactment - and, yes, one is right and the 
fther is wrong. Before drafting proposed regulations it is a bso-
o~tely necessary to proceed with detailed research into the doctz:ine 
2 local government power as it relates to ( 1) local regulatwn, ~ ) the state in question, and ( 3) a specific municipal subdivision. 
f onve.rsely, it is wrong to "cut and paste" regulations that are in 
orce 1ll other jurisdictions. Therefore, the first step in regulating is 
research into specific local govemment powers. 
B. LocAL GovERNMENT PowERS 
all Local governments obtain their powers from the state. Virtu-
as Y. all forms of govemment within a state are considered in law 
isl creatures of the state," subject entirely to the will of state leg-
by a~res within limitations that may be imposed on the legislatures 
sen e people through the state constitution.35 That is, in the ab-
pl ce of state constitutional restrictions, the legislature possesses enary p · th Po ower over the number, nature, extent, and duratwn of e 
recwers. conferred on local goveming units.36 Thus, it is commonly 
ogmzed that counties and municipalities have only those powers --•tc · 
as 1 A.N-ir:;,NT]IEAu MuNiciPAL CollPORATION LAw, §1.00, at 3 (1968) [hereinafter cited 
as B u . 
unter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907). 
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which the state constitution, general laws, or its charter from the 
legislature37 have bestowed upon it. The powers of a county or mu-
nicipality are conferred upon and exercised by the local governing 
body.38 The issue of whether a county or municipality may enact 
consumer protection regulations or ordinances39 essentially reduces 
to a determination of the powers possessed by the local governing 
body. These are numerous powers which, if granted to local gov-
ernment units, may be exercised to enact consumer protection meas-
ures. Such powers are the same whether given to a home rule or 
non-home rule municipality or county. There are certain distinc-
tions that must initially be made between the concepts of home rule, 
non-home rule and county enactments before these powers are ex-
plored, as the differences affect the interpretations given to the 
powers conferred. 
1. Home Rule Municipalities40 
The powers of home rule municipalities may emanate from two 
sources: state constitutional provisions which directly confer pow-
ers on municipal corporations; or home rule laws which the legis-
lature must or may pass in compliance with constitutional directive. 
The former states are labelled "constitutional home rule" or "self-
executing" states; the latter are "legislative home rule" states. The 
scope of the power granted is frequently found in the municipal 
37 1 ANTIEAU, supra note 35, §1.00; C. ANTIEAU, CouNTY LAw §31.06·24 (1966) 
[hereinafter cited as CouNTY LAw]; 2 E. McQUILLIN, MuNICIPAL CoRPoRATIONS, §10.03, 
at 793-40 (3d ed. 1966), [hereinafter cited as McQuiLLIN]. 
88 See 1 ANTIEAU, supra note 35, § 4.00; CoUNTY LAw, supra note 37, § 32.03; 4 
McQuiLLIN, MuNICIPAL CoRPORATIONs, § 13.01 (1968 rev. vol.). See e.g., VA. ConE 
ANN. §§15.1-7, 15.1-837 to -838 (1969) . 
39 "Although an 'ordinance' is not a law in every sense of the term as used in con-
stitutions and statutes, it is nevertheless a local law of the municipality, emanating 
from its legislative authority, and operative within its restricted sphere as effectively as 
a general law of the sovereignty." Maynard v. Layne, 140 W. Va. 819, 825, 86 S.E. 2d 
733, 737 (1955), citing 2 McQUILLIN, supra note 37, § 662. See also State ex rei Leach 
v. Redick, 168 Ohio St. 543, 550, 157 N.E.2d 106, 111 (1959); S. SATO & A. VAN Av 
sTYNE. STATE AND LoCAL GovERNMENT LAw 419 (1970). 
Resolutions are usually ministerial or procedural in nature. They are less "formal" 
than ordinances and may be used more for ad hoc or interim purposes while ordinances 
exert a more permanent influence on the locality. See, e.g., Parr v. Lansing City Clerk, 
9 Mich. App. 719. 158 N.W.2d 35 (1968); City of Salisbury v. Nagel. 420 S.W.2d 37, 
43 (Mo. App. 1967); Mitchell v. City of Parshall, 108 N.W.2d 12 (N.D. 1961). But see 
McLaughlin v. City of Millville, 110 N.J. Super. 200. 264 A.2d 762 (1970). 
"Regulation" is frequently held to be synonymous with "ordinance." See, e.g., 
City of Clayton v. Nemours, 237 Mo. App. 167, 164 S.W.2d 935 (1942); Villines'/. 
Freeman, 370 P .2d 307 (Okla. 1962), quoting State ex rel Krebs v. Hoctor, 83 Neb. 
690, 120 N .W. 199 (1909). 
40 Municipalities vested with home rule powers are free from state interference, 
regulation, and control over matters which concern the relationship between the local 
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charter-it which cannot enlarge or contravene the municipal power 
allowed by the state constitution.42 Nor can home rule charter con-
travene general law, case law, or the public policy of the state.43 
~~vCrlment and its constituency. See, e.g., People ex rel Attorney General v. Johnson, 
o o. 143, 86 P. 233 (1 905) (dictum) . 
Cor-; The constitutions of the following states contain home rule provisions: ALAsKA 
CoL ST.Cart. X. §§ 9-11; ARIZ. CaNsT. art. XIII,§§ 2-3; CAL. CaNsT. art. XI,§ 6, et. seq; 
GA 0 · ONsT. art. XX, §§ 1-6; CoNN. CoNST. art. X, § 1; FLA. CoNST. art. 8, §§ 1-2; 
§ 5.CksT. art. XV, § 2-8301; HAWAII CoNsT. art. VII,§§ 1-5; KAN. CaNsT. art. XII, 
am ' · CoNsT. art. XIV §§ 3a, 22, 40; Mo. CaNsT. art. XI·A. -E; M Ass. CoNsT. 
Moen~ art. II; MicH. CoNsT. art. IV, §§ 29, art. VII; MINN. CoNsT. art. XI, §§ 3·5; 
§ B· NNH. art. VI, §§ 19-20; NEB. CoNsT. art. XI. §§ 2·5; NEv. CoNsT. art. VIII, 
IX·'N · · CaNsT. pt. I, art. 39; N. MEX· CoNST. art. X, §§ 4-5; N. Y. CaNsT. art. 
§§2.7 . . D0 CaNsT. art. VI, §130; Omo CoNsT. art. XVIII, §§2-3; OKLA. CoNsT. art. VIII, xxvin.ir CoNsT. art. XI, §§2·2a; PA. CaNST. art. IX, §2; R. I. CoNST. amend. 
UTAH C · DAK. CaNsT. ar t. X; TENN. CaNST· art. XI, §9; TEx. CoNsT. art. XI, §5; 
§39a · WONST. art XI, § 5; WAsH. CoNsT. art. XI, §§ 10-11; W. VA. CoNsT. art. VI, 
' Isc. CaNsT. art. XI, §3. 
note ~~r ~~ more extensive treatment of the subject of home rule, see ANTIEAU, supra 
• ~~ 3,00-36. 
Gooo<;,HICAGO HoME RuLE CoMM'N·, MoDERNIZING A CITY GovERNMENT (1954) ; F. 
op M;w, MUNICIPAL HoME RuLE (1897) ;H. McBAIN, THE LAw AND THE PRAcTicE 
PAL II NICIPAL H oME RuLE (1916); S. McGoLDRICK, LAw AND PRACTICE oF M uNICI-
§ 10 25°ME RuLE, 1916-1930 (1933); 2 McQuiLLIN, supra note 37, § 10.13 at 774, Nici~AL' at 804; R. MoTT, HoME RuLE FOR AMERICA's CITIES (1949); E. Rusco, Mu-
For u HoME RULE: GUIDELINES FOR IoAHO (1960); C. RYNE, MuNICIPAL LAw (1957) . 
Iowa be·f~l law review articles discussing this subject, see Abels, "Home Rule" for 
The v·ztzes and Towns?, 13 DRAI<E L. REv. 53 (1963); Baum, Scope of Home Rule: 
Cr~:~s ~.the Con.Con Local Government Committee, 59 ILL. ST. B. J. 814 (1971): 
County H' ztr Home Rule in Kansas, 9 W ASHBURN L. J. 1 (1969) ; Glauberman, 
consin H orne Rule: An Urban Necessity, 1 URBAN LAw, 170 (1970; Hagensick, Wis-
Nebrask o'5ecRule, 50 NAT'L. CiviL REv. 349 (1961); Janney, Home Rule Charters in 
in Colo a, REIGHTON L. REv. 98 (1971); Klemme, The Powers of Home Rule Cities 
U. KA:ato•l6 U . CoLO. L. REv. 321 (1964); Martin, Home Rule for Kansas Cities, 10 
cusE L · R. Ev 501 (1 962); Millenbach, Municipal Home Rule in New York, 22 SYR.o\-
Rule · A REZ. 736 (1971). Sandladow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home 
Hom~ R. 0 e for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REv. 643 (1964); Smalley, The Municipal 
Metropotle Act of 1965, 3 GA. ST. B. J. 333 (1967); Tollenaar , Home Rule Puzzle: 
NAT'L C ztanR Area Functional Consolidation Calls for Modification of the Theory, 50 
States 10v. EV. 411 (1 961); Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United Police' p w~. & MARY L. REV. 269 (1968); Vaubel, Municipal Corporations and the 
tucky~ sfer zn Ohio. 29 0Iuo L. J . 29 (1968); Note, Municipal Home Rule for Ken-
sora 47 M KY. L. J. 757 (1966) ; Note, Home Rule and Special Legislation in Minne-
lerns? 16 .J.pr... L. REv, 621 (1963); Note, Home Rule: A Solution for Municipal Prob-, YO, L. J. 47 (1961). --41 N 'th 
rule t;>o~ .er legislative action nor a municipal charter is necessary where home 
at 98. Al:h are honferred by constitutional provisions. ANTIEAU, supra note 35 § 3.02, 
lllunicipal't' oug these are unnecessary as sources of power, a number of home rule 
"do not c 1 Ies !:tave adopted charters. In most states, constitutional home rule powers 
tion suchome lhnto existence until the performance of some public or official act or ac-
at 7l5 as t e adoption of a charter! ... " 2 McQuiLLIN, supra note 37, § 10.13, 
0~ 0 
43 See, e.g., 2 McQuiLLIN, supra note 37, § 10.16, at 777·78. 
l.Ir.., su';;a e~g.t, C
3
oLO. CaNsT. art. XX, §6; OHIO CoN sT. art. XIX. See also 2 McQUIL-
0 e 7, § 10.13, at 776. 
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a. Constitutional Home Rule:44 A constitutional grant of 
home rule will likely be quite broad.45 The power granted, how-
ever, is limited to municipal or local affairs. 46 Controversy has thus 
arisen over the determination of what is local, in contrast to a state, 
affairY Since consumer problems are matters of both state and 
local concern, the resolution of this controversy is particularly im-
portant to advocates of local government consumer protection. 
The judiciary has taken two approaches to the validity of the 
exercise of power by a municipality on a subject arguably of state 
concern. First, the problem may be considered a dual state and 
local concern in which case the acts of the municipality, if consist-
ent with its charter, will be upheld until the state preempts the 
area.48 Second, the municipal act can be invalidated in the absence 
of a specific constitutional or legislative grant.49 Of course, in either 
case, the state legislature may end the controversy by defining as 
exclusively a state concern an area that could arguably be either 
local or state. A constitutional grant to "frame a charter" in these 
self-executing states is sweeping and should be interpreted to grant 
a municipal corporation all power over local affairs. In today's in-
creasingly urbanized society with the movement to decentralize gov-
ernment services it should be recognized that "local affairs" is a 
term without a precise definition which fluctuates with every 
change in local conditions. 50 No objective tests have evolved to dis-
tinguish local from state concerns.51 As Professor Rhyne has as-
serted, 
In the process of inclusion and exclusion of matters relating 
to municipal affairs, the courts will respect the desire to safeguard 
the health, safety, welfare and property rights of the inhabitants of 
home rule cities, but are likely to reject exclusive local control . .. 
if there is a need or desire to effect uniformity in regulation through· 
out the state. 52 
44 See note 40, supra. 
45 1 ANTIEAU, supra note 35, § 3.03, at 99. 
46. !d., § 3.06. at 107. 
47 See generally id., § 3.17; 2 McQuiLLIN, supra note 37, § 4.78, at 140. 
48 2 McQuiLLIN, supra note 37, § 4.87; see note 127, infra, and accompanying text· 
49 In re Lane, 58 Cal. 2d 99, 372 P.2d 897, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1962). See generallY 
Feiler, Conflict Between State and Local Enactments - The Doctrine of Implied Pre· 
emption, 2 URBAN LAw 398, 404 (1970). 
50 See, e·g·, Los Angeles Brewing Co. v. Los Angeles, 8 Cal. App.3d 391, 48 P.2d 71 
(1935); Holmer v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. App. 140, 191 P.1000 (1920); People ex rel 
Public Utilities Comm'n. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel., 125 Colo. 167, 24·3 P .2d 397 
(1 952); State ez rel McElroy v. City of Akron, 173 Ohio St. 189, 181 N.E.2d 26 (1962)· 
See generally S. SATO & A. VAN ALSTYNE, STATE AND LocAL GovERNMENT LAw 236· 
38 (1970). 
51 1 ANTIEAU, supra note 35, § 3.17, at 14-2. 
52 C. RYNE, MuNICIPAL LAw 65 (1957). 
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Although states cannot legitimately be denied power over state 
commercial practices, it is submitted that consumer protection is 
predominantly a matter of local concern.53 The fact that business 
practices are likely to differ in areas which are themselves different 
lU socio-economic, cultural, and population traits demands that 
~unicipalities have the ability to respond adequately, imagina-
tively, and independently. Thus, uniform consumer protection is 
l'lot necessarily desirable throughout a state. The Colorado Su-
pr~me Court approximated this argument when, in upholding a 
vvelghts and measures ordinance passed by Denver, it stated that, 
[t]here can be no doubt that the regulation of standard weights and 
measures .. . is a matter of concern wherever commerce is carried 
on, without regard to local governmental boundaries. Such is of 
state wide concern, but more so of local concern . .. is the regu· 
lation of weights and measures to prevent misrepresentations and 
fraud in commercial transactions .. . and such may be regulated 
under police power . .. at the municipal level, [absent conflict with 
state enactments] . 54 
h A further problem arises in self-executing states in situations 
:-" ere localities adopt charters. These charters may be viewed or 
111~rpreted as "limitations upon particular municipal authorities 
~ as "distributors" of municipal power. 55 Because such charters 
ay_ be unnecessary and are not legislative grants, the powers they 
f~ovlde should be liberally construed, regardless of clauses provid-
in~· that local officials "consider themselves empowered to perform 
lcated functions ." 56 
tul b. Legislative Home Rule States: In states where home 
ti e laws are passed by the legislature pursuant to state constiu-
onal mandate, such statutes are the principal sources of muni----53 s 54 Bee §II, A supra. 
result !~cb~an v. County Court, 160. Colo. 3~, 351, 455 P.2d 885, 8~8 (1?69) . " The 
~UPren1 this case m ay have been different 1f the controversy had ansen m a state 
Jhect to acy home rule state" wh.ere municip~lities hav~ all power over local affairs, sub-
Ol!le 1,';fneral state law covermg the partJcu.l~r Sl;lbJect matter .. In local supremacy 
affairs d states, such as Colorado, the mun1c1pahty has exclusive power over local 
~an defi~ the state may not impinge thereon. However, the state, in either case, 
lty Woulde as exclusively a state concern what was once a local concern and th~ local-
sentatio be Without power to enter the area. In Blackman prevention of misrepre-
concern 11 add fraud in commercial transactions was found to be a dual state and local 
state law an thus the court held the ordinance in question not to be in conflict with 
55 1 S, [d. . 
lllent .I\N1'IEAU , supra note 35, § 3.05, at 104. For an in-depth study of the enact-
lio'rrle P[t[ess of constitutional home rule charters, .see Freilich, Robards &. Wilson, 
1 ~J.tio'rla l c/ for the Urban Countr: Observation on the N ew Jackson Countr Consti-
ss ld Rzarter, 39 U. M . K. C. L. REv. 297 (1971). 
•• <J 3.09, at 125. 
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cipal power. 57 Generally, the home rule law will confer powers upon 
municipalities in a two-part format. 58 First, the act will expressly 
confer certain powers; secondly, it will contain a broad grant of 
power to cover situations not addressed in the explict grants. These 
latter clauses may be phrased for example, as the power " ... [to 
pass J any act to advance the interests of the city, the good govern-
ment and prosperity of the municipality and its inhabitants ... ;59 
or, .. . to enforce all ordinances necessary to protect the health, 
life and prosperity . . . and to preserve and enforce the general 
governm en t, order and security of the city and its inhabitants." 60 
Clearly, these powers of general management should be con-
strued liberally61 to encompass proposed consumer protection or-
dinances. Unfortunately, there are courts which adhere to strict 
interpretations of both the specific grants of powers and the cus-
tomary broadly-worded catch-all grants, and thus deny reasonable 
exercise of power based on these provisions.62 Or, courts may fail 
to make the essential distinctions necessary to uphold the validity 
of home rule power. 63 Certainly consumer protection laws, which 
aim toward detection and correction of improper business practices 
and the strengthening of consumer confidence in commercial trans-
actions, may reasonably be thought to address themselves to we 
"pr osperity," "order," and general welfare of the community. The 
powers conferred by these home rule acts should be liberally con-
strued, unless a contrary legislative intent is apparent. Proper 
construction of broadly stated grants of power, such as those above, 
should allow home rule municipalities to exercise plenary power 
over municipal affairs unless such exercise is specifically limited or 
withheld by the state legislature. 64 
It is submitted that narrow intrepretations are also contrarY 
to the purpose of home rule laws. Under restricted constructioJ'l.. 
home rule laws cannot allow municipalities to adapt to changing 
57 /d., § 3.08, at 115. It should be noted that "[o]ccasionally courts in the noll· 
self-executing or 'legislative' home rule states will admit that the constitutional horJJJ 
1ule clause itself colliers some power upon municipalities. However, when such an a · 
mission is made . . . it is always expressed cautiously and limited to things absolutelY 
essential to local self-govemment." Id. (emphasis added) , citing Clements v. McCabe, 
210 Mich. 207. 177 N.W. 722 (1920). 
58 1 ANTIEAU, supr a note 35, § 3.08, at 115-18. 
59 M xcH. CaMP. LAws § 117, 4i (1948). 
60 TEx. Cxv. STATS. art. 1175, § 34 (1963). 
61 1 ANTIEAU, supra note 35, § 3.08, at 118. 
62 ld., § 3.08, at 119-22. See also People v. Delgardo, 146 N.Y.S.2d 350 (1955) . 
63 Corpus Christi v. Unitarian Church, 436 S.W.2d 923, 929-30 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968)· 
64 1 ANTIEA U, supra note 35, § 3.08, at 118-19. 
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conditions and exigencies. Municipalities must, under these in-
terR~etations, engage in the lengthy, often frustrating, procedure of 
Petitioning the state legislature for the necessary powers. Further 
exacerbating this situation is the likelihood that state legislators will 
be unacquainted with, and perhaps uninterested in, the peculiar 
Problems of a specific locale. For example, an urban municipality's 
requ_est for additional power may be given a particularly hostile re-
ception by legislators in those states where the legislature is com-
posed predominantly of non-urban delegates, or where a tradition 
~f ~ban-rural animosity exists within the legislature. Where the 
egislature is dominated by rural interests, local control over con-
~U~er protection is even more critical since it is unlikely that the 
egislature will pass meaningful legislation in this area. 
2. Non-Home Rule Municipalities: 
t As already mentioned, the state legislature, in the absence of 
8 
ate constitutional restrictions, possesses plenary power over those 
Powers the local governing units may employ in effectuating local 
consumer protection. 65 
3. Counties: 
1 
1
Consumer protection measures have been enacted at the county 
s:v~ · Where counties are accorde d home n1le, the preceding 
co~ 10~s concerning home rule municipalities do not apply; where 
rul Titles ~r~ not granted home rule, the comment on non-home 
fun~ :rnumc1palities is likely to be relevant. Yet there may be a 
Pal amenta~ distinction between county organizations and munici-
corporations. 
t _Municipal corporations proper are called into existence, either 
~ duect solicitation or by free consent of the people who compose 
em. Counties are local subdivisions of the State, created by the 
~~Wereig~ power of the State, of its own overeign will, without 
le Phrh~ular solicitation, consent, or concurrent action of the peo· t e w 0 mhabit them. The former organization is asked for, or at 
peastda
1
ssented to by the people it embraces; the latter is superirn· 
ose . Y a sovereign and paramount authority. A municipal cor· 
PoratJO.n proper is created mainly for the interest, advantage, and 
?onvenience of the locality and its people ; a county organization 
lSt lreated almost exclusively with a view to the policy of the State 
: arge. · .. With scarcely an exception , all the powers and func· 
Ions of the county organization have a direct and exclusive refer· 
enc t h · - ---- e 0 t e general policy of the State . . . 66 
65 s 
GG See. ~IV. B. supr a 
nnth v, Kelly, 162 Va. 645, 174 S.E. 842 (1934). 
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This is not say that counties are unable to provide for particu-
lar needs of their inhabitants or that municipal corporations are 
not also agents of the state. For example, "[b]oth count[ies] and 
cit[ies] [municipal corporations] in Virginia serve a dual role as 
agents of the state and as local law-making bodies with the power 
to provide, within the limits of the grants of authority from the 
state, for the particular needs of the individual ctiy or county. " 67 
Therefore, the fundamental distinction between municipal corpo-
rations and counties in Virginia is the method by which they come 
into existence. Where consumer protection at the county level is 
desired, it should be determined whether such a dual role has been 
created.68 
C. PowERS WHICH SERVE As A BAsis FOR THE ENACTMENT oF 
MEASURES. 
It is the general rule that non-home rule municipalities, legis-
lative home rule municipalities, and counties, possess and can exer-
cise a tripartite series of powers: 
1. those powers granted expressly; 
2. those powers necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to, 
the express powers; and 
3. those powers essential and indispensable to the existence and 
functioning of the particular kind of municipal corporation.69 
1. Express Powers: 
The express power of legislative home rule and non-home rule 
municipalities and counties is found in the state constitution, legis-
lative acts, or municipal charter.70 Thus, it is necessary to consult 
these sources to determine the specifically enumerated powers· 
Clearly, if a local governing body is expressly granted the powe! 
to enact consumer protection ordinances, this body should be able 
67 McSweeney, Local Government Law in Virginia, 1870-1970, 4 U. RICH, L. RJl~· 
176, 177 (1970) . See generally CoUNTY LAw, supra n ote 37, §§ 31.00, 31.06. 
6
. 
68 1 ANTIEAU, supra note 35, § 5.01, at 215; CouNTY LAw, supra note 37, § 31.0 ' 
2 McQUILLIN, supra note 37, § 10.9, at 755; C. RYNF., MuNICIPAL LAw 70 (1957). 
0 69 1 ANTIEAU, supra note 35, § 5.02, at 219; 2 McQUILLIN, supra note 37, § 10.1 ' 
at 761. f 
70 See, e.g., VA. ConE ANN· §§ 15.1-909 to 919 (1964). On its face, this article.~ 
the Virginia Code r efers only to"'municipal corporations." However, discussions VI'~ ; 
Virginia officials and consideration of VA. ConE ANN. § 15.1-689 indicate that coUJ'Itle 
may obtain such powers upon r equest to the state legislature. 
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to exercise that power. Yet express grants of power over consumer 
Protection need not be phrased in terms of "consumer protection." 
fher~ a_re many powers directly relevant to consumer protection. 
n VIrginia, a particularly potent series of power may be conferred 
on municipal corporations or counties, upon their petition to the 
~tate legislature. Included in this series is the power to regulate and 
~spect the production, preparation, storage, distribution and sale of 
od and food products,71 and the conduct of dealers in second hand 
stores 72 I dd' . v· . . . . l . " · n a Itlon, a Irginia mun1c1pa corporatiOn may pre-
vent fr~ud or deceit in the sale of property; may require weighing, 
~easunng, gauging and inspection of goods, wares and merchan-
Ise offered for sale; and may provide for the sealing of weights and 
rne~sures and the inspection and testing thereof." 73 Moreover, the 
Po~ce power is broadly delineated as the power "to secure, preserve, 
an promote health, safety, welfare, comfort, convenience, trade, 
~ornmerce and industry in the municipality and among the inhabit-
ants thereof "74 
p a. The Express Power to Regulate and Inspect: Local 
o~';hrs, as they relate to the marketplace, may be defined in terms 
v'd e power to regulate and inspect.75 For example, Virginia pro-
I es that 
d · ·. a municipal corporation may regulate and inspect the pro· 
uctlOn · . . distribution and sale of . . . food and food prod-
Ucts ... 76 
ent Likewise, in California, the appropriate local inspectors may 
du ~~ any building used in the various processes, including pro-
cht Ion, distribution, and sale, of food products to inspect all ma-
tio:edry used in these steps, and to report for prosecution any viola-
Iscovered. 77 
tive· L~vvs_ relating to regulation and inspection have a dual objec-
~ e Improvement, through observation of the quality of pro-
71 v c 
72 d'· ODE ANN. § 15.1-866 (1964). 
73 Ii' VA. ConE ANN. § 15.1-866 (1964). 
74 . 
. 75 X~ COI)E ANN.§ 15.1-852 (1964) . 
~ning th!enerallr Southem Ry. Co. v. Russell, 133 Va. 292, 112 S.E. 700 (1922) (de-
.2d 433 (l§gS)er to regulate); O'Hare v. P eacock Dairies, 26 Cal. App. 2d, 345, 79 
. 76 VA C (defining the power to inspect). . 
lllnited to ~nE_ANN. § 15.1-853 (1964) . In other states the power to inspect may be 
(1~~4·). Peclfically enumerated foodstuffs. See, e.g., OHio REv. ConE ANN· § 71.5.46 
n cAL a 
akota ;,[ ]EALTH & SAFETY ConE ANN. §§ 28296-97 (West Supp. 1972). In South 
· · . of' arti~l very£ municipality shall have the ... power to provide for the inspection 
es o merchandise ... " S. DAn: . CoMP. LAws§ 9-34-4 (1967). 
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duct-handling at various stages of preparation for delivery to the 
utlimate consumers and the protection of consumers against fraud 
involving these goods.78 The power to regulate and to inspect is a 
broad power, "comprehensive enough to cover the exercise of au-
thority over the whole subject to be regulated."79 It provides e:x:-
press authority for local govemment officials to enter markets in 
order to examine those businesses or articles of merchandise over 
which it has this power and to correct abuses discovered. 
b . The Power to Prevent Fraud and Deceit: The power 
to prevent fraud and deceit is a particularly potent authority for 
local governments to enact consumer protection regulations. Mon-
tana gives every city the power "to suppress, prohibit, and punish 
all fraudulent devices and practices for the purpose of obtaining 
property."80 In Virginia the legislature may confer the power to 
"prevent fraud or deceit in the sale of property. " 81 Fraud and deceit 
are generic terms with no fixed definitions. Courts have thus found 
i.t necessary to reserve to themselves the liberty to deal with fraud 
:..11 whatever form it may present itself. "Every case involving alle-
gations of fraud must be adjudged upon its own facts, and the cir-
cumstances which warrant or forbid relief cannot be scheduled b)' 
any fixed rule. " 82 
Likewise, local govemment power to prevent fraud and deceit 
must be broad and flexible. Municipalities and counties which are 
given the power to prevent fraud and deceit must be recognized to 
have power equal to the ingenuity which individuals employ to de-
vise fraudulent and deceptive schemes. Certainly, the fact that the 
judicial definitions of these terms is flexible does not diminish the 
power of a municipality to regulate transactions in order to prevent 
fraud and deceit in sales. The essence of the word "prevent" is ail· 
ticipation. Clearly, the power to prevent fraud and deceit conteril; 
plates an administrative scheme which will complement the courts 
role in giving remedies after the fraudulent transaction has oc· 
curred.83 
c. The Power Over Weights and Measures: "Weights 
and measures" provisions are a third category of statutory and chat· 
78 See note 74, supra. 
79 See Blackman v. County Court, 169 Colo. 345, 487 P.2d 377 (1969); Southern Jl1· 
v. Russell, 133 Va. 292. 112 S.E. 700 (1922). 
80 MoNT REv. ConE ANN.§ 11-922 (1947) . 
81 VA. ConE ANN. § 15.1-866 (1964). 
82 Murphy v. Mcintosh, 199 Va. 254, 99 S.E. 2d 585 (1957). 
83 See§ IV, D, infra, (exercise of pow~rs), 
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ter provisions which can reasonably be asserted to support con-
s~rner protection ordinances and regulations. 84 For exam ple, in 
VIrginia, 
a municipal corporation may require weighing, measuring, 
gauging and inspection of goods .. . offered for sale ; and may 
~rovide for the sealing of weights and measures and the inspec-
tion and testing thereo£.85 
. Similarly, in Califomia each county is required to establish an 
off1~e of county sealer of weights and measures for the purpose of 
t~stmg all devices used to gauge "quantities, things, produce, arti-
e es for distribution or consumption purchased or offered . .. for 
sale, hire or reward and ascertain if the same are correct. " 86 
l . Municipalities have used this power to enact consumer regu-
ations and to establish consumer protection commissions. For ex-
arnpi:, Dade County, Florida, used an expanded version of the City 
?f Miarni's Division of Weights and Measures as the comerstone for 
~ts ~rade Standards Division, popularly known as the Consumer Pro-
ection Department. This agency has regulated such diverse items 
as rneat, milk, bread, taxi meters, bottled gas cylinders, odometers 
on . rental cars, and gasoline pumps have been regulated under 
VVeight and measure statutes. 87 Thus, the power over weights and 
t:tneasures is another vehicle with which local governments can pro-ect th · e1r consumers. 
f . d. Police and General Welfare Power:88 Although the 
poregomg powers are all in a sense police powers since their exercise 
; ornotes public interest,89 municipalities and counties ar e a so 
~ ten granted broad inchoate police powers through a general wei-
are clause.90 Various statutory phrases are used to indicate this --84 Se 85 V e ~enerally 7 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONs, § 24.399 (1 968 rev. vol.) . 
Palit:v h IthE ANN. § 15.1-866 (1964) . South Dakota provides the "[e] very munici-
lllerch 5 J· ave the power to provide for the weighing, and measuring of articles of 
86 can ISe . . . .. s. DAK. CoMP. LAWS 9-34-4 (1967). 
87 T~L. Bus. & PRoF. CoDE ANN. §§ 12200-06 (West Supp. 1972) . 
Paginat· ADE) STANDARDs DivisiON. FIRsT ANNUAL REPORT 1968-1869, 10-11 (no official 
of the Ion · _The Director of the Trade Standards Division has stated that " [m]ost 
genera{omplamts are about false or misleading advertis\ng, weights and measures, and 
88 S n;erchandising . . . " Miami H erald, Oct. 25, 1968, at B-2 (emphasis added). 
ll.ft.TtoNee R ANTIEAU_, supra note 35, § 6.00, et seq; 6 McQUILLIN, MuNICIPAL CoRPo-
89 "T' " 24.01, et. seq. (1969) . 
and dut he fundam ental basis for the existence of a police power is the inherent right 
Consun.f 0~ a government to provide for the general welfare of its citizens." Roth schild, 
lracts 3~r G rotection At Last Throu{!h Local Control of Retail Installment Sales Con-so G EO. WASH. L. REV. 1067, 1070 (1969) . 
nrotect e~heral welfare clauses confer on counties and municipalities the power "to 
e health, morals, peace and good order of the community, to promote its 
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power, from the traditional grant to promote the life, health, and 
general welfare of inhabitants to Virgina's more specific grant of 
the power "to secure, preserve, and promote health, safety, welfare, 
comfort, convenience, trade, commerce, and industry in the m unici-
pality and among the inhabitants thereof ... 91 Since the police 
power is co-extensive with the necessity to promote the public in-
terest,92 a fortiori, it must and does embrace the enactment of con-
sumer protection regulations. 93 The police power is "one of the 
powers which m ay be given the broadest application, and it is com-
mon knowledge that this power has been increasingly exercised to 
keep abreast of advances" made in our society. 94 
The police power due to its nature and historical evolution, has 
not been precisely defined. The power to promote general welfare, 
much like that to prevent fraud and deceit in sales of property, 
takes on new substance as new conditions arise. Flexibility within 
certain limits is required 
. . . in order to meet the chang-ing and shifting conditions which 
from time to time arise through the increase and shift of popul ation 
and the flux and complexity of commercial and social relations.95 
As local economic conditions change, local governments need 
the power to meet these changes. The police power is sufficiently 
comprehensive to meet this need and to provide municipalities with 
welfare in trade, commerce, industry, and manufacture . . . " 6 McQUILLIN, supra 
note 88, § 24.44, at 565. See generally CoUNTY LAw, supra note 37, § 35.06; 6 Me· 
QUILLIN, supra note 88, §§ 24.43-45 . Such a broad general welfare clause is liberallY' 
construed. 6 McQUILLIN, supra note 88, § 24.44, at 565; but see id., at 567. Such 
clauses have been construed as granting the locality power as broad as the police 
power of the state. /d., at 566. General welfare and police powers are closely r elated 
in that a general welfare clause vests police power in the county or city "to promote 
the order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of society." State ex rel Car· 
penter v. City of St. Louis, 318 Mo. 870, 882-2 S.W.2d 71 3, 722 (1928) , quoting 12 
C. J . CaNsT. L. § 412, at 904 (1917) ; see 6 McQuiLLIN, supra note 88, § 24.44, at 566, 
§ 24.45 , at 567. 
91 VA. ConE ANN.§ 15.1-852 (1964) . 
92 6 McQUILLIN, supra note 88, § 24.09, at 485. See also n ote 88, supra. 
93 The following cities and counties, among others have based consumer protectio!l 
vrdinances on the police power: Prince Georges County, Maryland; Camden and Bu~· 
lington Counties, New Jersey ; San Bernardino, Santa Clara and Ventura Counties, Ca~l· 
fornia ; and Chicago, Illinois. See Appendix. The Prince Georges County Commls· 
sioners stated that their authority to enact a county consumer protection ordinance was 
provided by its power to " . . . enact 'any other ordinance for the safeguard of life, 
health and property and the promotion of public safety, and moral welfare' and which 
further authorize [s] it to '[PJrescribe the duties, powers and functions of any officer, 
employee, or board appointed by it.'" Prince Georges County, Md., Gen. Res. 3-1970 
§ 1, .Tan . 30, 1970. quoting PRINCE GEORGES CouNTY, Mn., ConE oF Pun. LocAL J .AVVS 
art. 17. §~ 18-1 (b) (3) , (33) (1 963) . 
94 Weber City Sanitation Comm'n. v. Craft, 196 Va. 1140, 1148, 87 S.E. 2d 163, 
158 (1955) . 
95 6 McQuiLLIN, supra note 88, § 24.03, at 472. 
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the ?asis for passage of new and/or revised measur~s to d:al with 
the Immediate demands of the general welfare,96 mcluding con-
sumer protection measures. 
Further, municipal corporations are generally recognized as 
the sole judges of the necessity and reasonableness of their police 
and general welfare ordinances. Every presumption is "in favor 
If ~he lawfulness of the exercise of municipal power making regu-
atio~s to promote the public health and safety, and it is not the 
provmce of the courts except in clear cases to interfere with the 
e . ' ' xercise of powers vested in municipalities for the promotion of the 
public safety."97 
e. Special Enabling Legislation: Two situations may 
~ccur i~ which effective local consumer protection enactments can 
l e _reahzed only after the passage of special legislation by the state 
eglslature. First, the local governing body may be without the 
necessary powers to adequately address the business abuses in its 
marketplaces. Such a municipality or county should petition the 
state legislature for the appropriate grant of powers. 
b In the second situation although the powers of a locality may e suffi · ' . l Cient to enact consumer ordinances, the appropriate commer-
~~a tommunity may be more expansive than the jurisdiction of a 
n ?~ e local government unit. In such cases, the action of a mu-
a 
1~Pality .would be only partiall~ remedial. The only appropriate 
c ~ effective consumer program would require either concerted lo-
a\ governmental action or the conferral of requisite powers upon 
res ar.g~r loc~l unit. 98 Special petition to the state legislature may 
th u t In umque and highly responsive legislation being adopted for 
ose trouble · 1 · · h th · · diction . some commerCia commumtws greater t an e Juns-
--of a smgle local governmental body. 99 
96 Bl k 
97 Re~~ssv. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135 ( 1921) . 
Wood v C' v. To~ of Richlands, 163 Va. 1112,1115,178 S.E. 3, 5 (1935); see also 
City of Richty odf Richmond, 148 Va. 400, 405, 138 S.E. 560, 562 ( 1927); Hopkins v . 
• 98 The lhon '117 V,a. 692, 710, 86 S.E. 139, 144< (1915). 
Cised beyo~~ttl;al rule IS that the powers of a municipal corporation cannot be exer -
751-52; CouN L corporate boundaries. See 2 McQUILLIN, supra note 37, § 10.07, at 
~9 Dade Co:Y AW, sur:ra n_ote 37, § 3 ~ . 06, ~t 23-4. . .. 
Miami and C nty. Flo~1da, IS a case m pomt. The c1ty and county commJsswns of 
the "[c]ou t ade Counties met in special joint session in May, 1967, and resolved that 
Which a·re tl/ assume from tl1e City of Miami the regulation of Trade Standards, 
legislation eh t? .be enforced on a county-wide basis, providing that the State passes 
DrvrsroN Fut · onzmg the county to partic.ioa te in this activity." T RADE STANDARDS 
SPonse to'i IRST ANNUAL REPORT, at 4 (1968-69) . This meeting was held in re-
~hrough 8 ~~reased community concern that c?nsumer.protecti~n ·caul~ be .better achieved 
~'W Passed · unty-level approach. The r esultmg special enablmg legislatiOn and county 
VJ.sion Dad 
11
(; Pursuance thereof gave broad policing power to the Trade Standards Di-
• e ounty. See Appendix. 
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2. Implied Powers: 
Local governments also derive powers by implication; that is, 
their governing bodies can exercise powers which are implied from 
express grants of authority.100 Unfortunately, the implied powers 
of municipal corporations and counties are narrowly construed.101 
Courts limit implied powers to "those powers necessary or essential 
to carry out the express powers"102 or "those powers indispensable 
to local civil government."103 The application of this basic and nar-
row rule has not resulted in uniform decisions as to what powers 
are necessary, essential, or indispensable, as courts differ widely on 
the powers thnt may be implied from a given express grant. Some 
states, through their constitution, statutes or case law, have adopted 
a more liberal rule of construction and thus allow local govern-
ments greater latitude in determining powers which may properlY 
be implied. This more liberal rule may be in the form of "reason-
able necessity," 104 "appropriateness,"105 "reasonable implication,"106 
or "fair implication. " 107 
Contrary to this liberal construction is the so-called "Dillor:t 
Rule" which addresses itself to ambiguities and doubts arising out 
of the grants of power, and which states that " [a J ny fair, reason-
able, substantial doubts concerning the existence of power is re-
solved against the corporation and the power is denied." 108 There 
are, however, certain limitations to this rule. Powers are not to 
be so strictly construed as to defeat legislative intent, to destroy we 
purpose for which the grant was intended, or to hamper the reasor:t· 
able exercise of express powers_l09 Rather construction should be 
consistent with state legislative policy on local affairs. 110 ThuS, 
the power to change an inspection fee for regulatory purposes 
100 1 ANTIEAU, supra note 35, § 5.03, at 220; 2 McQuiLLIN, supra note 37, § 10.12, 
at 765-67; CoUNTY LAw, supra note 37, § 31.06, at 20-24. 
101 See generally, 2 McQUILLIN, supra note 37, § 10.18a, at 787-90. "The rule of 
strict construction flows ... from the judicial viewpoint that charters ate regarded as 
special grants of power, and hence the conclusion is that whatever is not given eJ(' 
pressly, or as a necessary m eans to the execution of expressly given powers, is with' 
held." ld., at 788. 
102 2 McQuiLLIN, supra note 37, § 10.12, at 767 ... See also 1 ANTIEAU, supra note 
35. ~ 5.03. at 220-22. 
103 2 McQUILLIN, supra note 37, § 10.12, at 770. 
104 1 ANTIEAU, supra note 35, § 5.05, at 226. 
105 ld. 
106 ld. 
107 ld 
108 DiLLON, MuNICIPAL CoRPORATIONs,$ 430.14 (3d ed. 1949); See 2 E. McQUILIJrl• 
supra note 37, § 10.19, at 790-91. 
109 2 McQUILLIN, supra note 37, § 10.21, at 794. 
110 ld. 
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is a proper incident of the authority of a city to regulate milk sold 
and the power to license certain businesses is often inferred from 
the power to regulate those enterprises.m 
It is clear, therefore, that advocates of local power to enact con-
sumer regulations will have to consider the state constitution, stat-
ute~ and case law in deciding to which of these possible positions 
their respective states adhere. Arguments anticipating challenges 
to authority will have to be formulated. No apparent problem 
should be encountered in those states which adhere in practice to 
the more liberal construction. 
3. Powers Essential and Inherent to the Existence and Func-
tioning of Municipal Corporations: 
T There are three judicial approaches to this category of powers. 
he general rule of interpretation denies the existence of essential 
0~ inherent powers. 112 Other jurisdictions, apparently confused 
a out the distinction between implied and essential powers, treat 
~ssential powers as implied. 113 Still others recognize essential and 
Inherent powers as a distinct category. Reliance upon these pow-
e~s as authority for the enactment of consumer protection regula-
tlo · . ns Is not recommended, however, because these powers are lim-
Ited · 
In number.ll4 The apparent reluctance of courts to recognize 
~ssential powers as an independent repository of significant author-
~y cuts against the trend of expanding local government powers. 
~ long as the judiciary retains this rigid posture, essential powers 
w~~ not be supportive of the ability of localities to enact consumer 
or d ~nances and regulations. However, this is not a significant im-
pe Iment because the power of a municipal corporation to enact such 
~onsumer protection schemes is usually adequately supported by ex-
tess and implied powers. 
4. Voluntary Mechanisms: 
n It may be determined that. a local governing body has few or 
arrow powers on which to base its authority to pass consumer pro----111 Se c· Pruden/ lty of Des Moines v. Fowler, 218 Iowa 504, 509, 255 N.W. 880. 882 (1934); 
695, 6gaal(?o-op Realty Co., Inc. v. City of Youngstown, 118 Ohio St. 204. 214, 160 N.E. 
112 1 928). See generally 1 ANTIEAU, supra note 35, § 5.08, at 237. 
note 37 tfoTIEAu, supra note 35, § 5.01, at 217·218. See also 2 McQUILLIN, supra 
1! 8 1 • .11. at 763. 114 Th'"NT.IEAU, supra note 35, § 5.01, at 217-18. 
Power e nght to sue and be sued is probably the most widely recognized essential 
generallf 
2
a Mmunicipal corporation. See 1 ANTIEAU, supra note 35, § 5.08, at 236. See 
Y cQUILLIN, supra note 37, § 10.11, at 762-65. 
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tection laws: In such situations, the wisest course is to establish a 
"voluntary" mechanism; that is, one not founded upon sanctions 
or penalties but upon conciliation and negotiation. The Arlington 
County Board passed such a consumer protection resolution. This 
resolution established a nine-member Consumer Protection Commis-
sion and conferred upon it responsibilities and duties in four gen-
eral areas: 
1. Complaint-handling; the Commission is to receive, to re-
cord, to investigate, and to conciliate complaints which allege im-
proper practices and conduct in the sale of goods or services and 
the lending of money or the extension of credit. These conciliation 
efforts may include persuasion, conferences, public hearings, and 
arbitration. 
2. Consumer education; a program of consumer education and 
information is to be developed and disseminated through publicity 
and printed material. 
3. Recommendations; the Commission is to keep the County 
Board up-to-date by recommending improvements in local and 
state legislation and administrative procedures and by reporting an-
nually on the Commission's activities, and present and future needs 
for consumer protection. 
4. Referral; the appropriate law enforcement bodies are to be 
referred information regarding potential violations of law. 
Thus, the Commission must work in a cooperative, non adver-
sarial tone, relying on persuasive rather than police powers. This 
is not fatal to consumer protection. The Consumer HELP Center, 
which does not have governmental power or backing, has success-
fully resolved 70% of the complaints handled by it through nego-
tiation, conciliation, and mediation. The Arlington Consumer Pro-
tection office has also been successfully resolving complaints at a 
70 % rate during its first few months of existence. 115 
D. THE ExERCISE OF PowER 
The legislative grant may be silent regarding the manner in 
which the power is to be exercised by the municipality. 116 In these 
115 See e-g., ARLINGTON CoNSUMER PROTECTION CoMMISSION, MoNTHLY REPORT, J an· 
uary, 1972. 
116 It is generally within a legislature's power "to direct in what way, through what 
board of municipal offices or agents, or by what municipal officers the powers giveii 
shall be exercised." 2 McQUILLIN, supra note 37, § 10.27, at 809. Where this is done, 
substantial compliance is required. /d. 
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Therefore, the major difficulty in the preemption area is deter-
mining whether a conflict exists. Researchers should scrutinize con-
sumer-related state laws dealing with matters upon which a local 
governing body might legislate. They should further investigate 
those areas covered in proposed resolution. These statutes may 
encourage the argument that the state scheme contemplates the ex-
istence of local consumer regulations in significant areas. In Vir-
ginia, for example, the state legislature established an Administra-
tor of Consumer Affairs in the Department of Agriculture and Com-
merce.137 The administrator was, inter alia, 
[t]o serve as a central coordinating agency and clearinghouse for 
receiving complaints . . . of [improper] practices and referring such 
complaints to the State and local departments or agencies charged 
with enforcement of consumer laws.138 
The statute further states that "[t]he responsibiilty of the Ad-
ministrator . . . shall embrace the consumer programs and respon-
sibilities of all the departments and agencies of the state."139 Thus, 
the statute expressly provides that this official is to coordinate and 
to refer complaints to local agencies responsible for enforcing con-
sumer laws. Moreover, the Administrator's responsibilities extend 
beyond the local level to encompass consumer programs of state 
agencies.140 
These provisions reasonably can be interpreted as contemplat-
ing a comprehensive consumer protection scheme. A state Admini-
strator charged with responsibility "to embrace" and to coordinate 
consumer programs throughout the state, may be the cornerstone of 
such a plan, and vesting such an official with these powers indicates 
a rejection of a "piecemeal" approach to consumer problems. The 
essence of a state office with such responsibilities is state and local 
coordination and cooperation. It can be argued that the state legis-
lature contemplated that local governments would : take steps to 
enact local consumer protection programs where they had the 
less the statute limits the requirements for all cases to its own prescriptions. ld. at 
755-56, 61 N.W.2d at 706-07 (emphasis added) . See also Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal-
2d 366, 125 P .2d 482 (1942); United Tavern Own. of Phila. v. Philadelphia School 
Dis., 441 Pa. 274, 272 A.2d 868 (1971); Western Pa. Rest. Ass'n v. City of Pittsburgh. 
336 Pa. 374, 77 A.2d 616 (1951); King v. County of Arlington, 195 Va. 1084, 81 S.E· 
2d 587 (1954). 
137 VA. CoDE ANN. § 3.1-18.1 (Cum. Supp. 1971) . 
138 VA. CoDE ANN.§ 3.1-18.2 (Cum. Supp. 1971). 
139 /d. 
140 In this r egard, it should be noted that counties serve as agencies of the state and 
are charged with enforcement of state law. See, e.g., Mann v. County Bd. of Ar}iJJg· 
ton Cnty., 199 Va. 169, 173, 98 S.E. 2d 515, 518 (1957) (dictum). 
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case.s, the local governing body must exercise its discretion in se-
lec~mg the proper procedural course. The rule of strict construction, 
VVh1ch frequently burdens municipalities in determining whether 
a power exists, 117 is not a factor in evaluating various modes of ex-
ercising determined powers.118 
It is important, therefore, to distinguish between the power to 
ena~t consumer protection regulations and the extent of authority 
ava1lable to exercise that power. 
Assuming that the mode of exercise does not conflict with 
constitutional requirements, the rule of reason predominates. The 
presumption is in favor of the validity and reasonableness of the 
:means selected ; doubts are resolved in favor of the municipality. 
As the Virginia Court stated in reference to tl1e police power, every 
Presumption is 
· · · in favor of the lawfulness of the exercise of the municipal power 
~aking regulations to promote the public health and safety, and it 
IS. not the province of the courts, except in clear cases, to interfere 
With the exercise of the powers vested in municipalities for the pro-
rnotion of the public safety.l19 
Therefore, where the consumer advocates ascertain that tl1e 
rowe.r to promulgate consumer protection regulations exists in a 
ocahty, the validity of a consumer protection commission or de-
P~rt~~nt is clear. 120 The governing body will undoubtedly need an 
a lnlnlstrative staff to supervise the ordinance and to exercise gov-
~rn:mental functions. 121 In addition, it will need advice and evi-
thnce on the need for enacting new or revised regulations. If fur-
:m er s~pport is needed for the creation of a commission or depart-
h ent, lt exists in the fact that every local governmental unit which 
t~ ~nacted consumer regulations has simultaneously either consti-
:m e a commission to act thereunder, charged an existing depart-
th ent, such as weights and measures or law, with responsibility 
ereunder, 122 or created a separate staff in the executive offices.123 --117 s 
118 
ee section IV, C, 2 (implied power) . 
§ 10.2J, ~~I5EAU, supra note 35, § 5.13, at 248. See 2 McQUILLIN, supra note 37, 
119 . 
120 Repass v. Town of Richlands, 163 Va. 1112, 1115, 178 S.E. 3, 5 (1935). 
121 See § IV, C. supra 
122 ;ee text accompanying notes 159-63. 
123 ee Appendix 
ld. 
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Power; or initiate demands for the conferral of the necessary power 
from the state legislature. 141 
In situations where consumer offices exist or are foreseen at 
both levels of government, the use of similar or identical forms of 
regulation should be considered. Such a policy promotes the easy 
exchange of information and complaints and helps to present 
an accurate picture of consumer problems and business practices 
~hro_ughout the state to the legislature. The trend toward computer-
lZ~tion of state and local operations reinforces the vvisdom behind 
thls policy. The state can also contribute immeasurably to the de-
velopment of a consumer education and information program 
throu~h distribution of pamphlets, newsl~tters, posters, newspaper 
~vertisements, and radio and television announcements. States 
s ould share their publicity materials and documents with local 
g~~ernments; indeed, state consumer departments are not, by defi-
~ltlon, doing their job if they do not act as a central clearing 
ouse to distribute this information statewide. 
State enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code might be 
~sserted as evidence of legislative intent to occupy the commercial 
leld and thus preclude local regulation in that area. The UCC is 
a Pervasive scheme,142 but the draftsmen "decided early against any 
ct?mprehensive attempt to control predatory sales and credit prac-
lces "143 C 1 'f' · · · d d t su · onsequent y, spec1 1c prov1s10ns mten e to pro ect con-
t' mers are rare.~44 The DCC defers to other statutes and regula-
Ions for the purposes of consumer protection. 145 
r l !hus, by scrutinizing existing statutes and determining their 
f e ationship with proposed local regulations, state laws may be 
~Und not to preempt but to support and to anticipate the enact-
ent of local consumer protection plans. 
F. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENACTMENT 
1. Comparative Analysis: 
det O~ce the power enabling local consumer protection action is 
er :rmmed, it is advisable to examine how similar powers are ex-
Clsed by other governmental bodies. This phase may require 
-------141 s v 142 s ee UA. ConE ANN.§ 15.1-909 to -915 (1964). 
143 R~~h Nh~FORM CoMMERCIAL ConE§ 1-104. 
144 Se sc 1ld, supra note 9. at 1077. · 
Ring Th 1 GILMORE, SEcURITY INTEREST IN PERSONAL PRoPERTY, 293-94 (1965); cf. 
3Q Cig65 )e New Conceptualism of the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 ST. Lours L. J. 145 . 
See generally, Rothschild, supra note 9, at 1077-81. 
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E. STATE PitEEMPTION124 
Since commerce, trade, and industry are matters of concurrent 
state and local concern, any assertion of local control over these 
affairs rajses the question of municipal versus state jurisdiction: the 
question of state preemption. 
In the case of non-home rule municipalities, a statute always 
prevails over a conflicting ordinance.125 Where a constitutional home 
rule amendment varies this basic common law rule of state suprem-
acy, ordinances dealing with exclusively local matters may super-
sede state statutes; but there is no converse rule of municipal su-
premacy. Courts have narrowly construed the phrase "exclusively 
local," seldom holding in favor of conflicting ordinances.126 There-
fore, it is probdbly accurate to characterize the general rule as one 
of state supremacy. 
Nevertheless, there is a vast area of concurrent state and mu-
nicipal legislative authority especially in consumer affairs . The 
problem arises in determining whether a conflict exists, and if so, 
the extent to which the local enactment is invalid. 127 Of course, if 
an ordinance expressly permits that which a statute expressly pro-
hibits, and vice versa, the conflict is clear and the ordinance will 
fall. 
Three relationships may exist between concurrent but non-con-
flicting statutes and ordinances: ( 1) the ordinance may address itself 
to conduct not explicitly covered by the statute, although within 
the same general area; (2) the ordinance may duplicate the statute; 
or ( 3) the ordinance may establish a less rigorous or more rigorous 
standard with respect to conduct covered by the statute.128 
In the first situation, invalidation of the ordinance is "always 
based on the theory that the state legislation was intended to pre· 
empt the field." 129 The weakness of this theory can be easily dem· 
onstrated. It is unlikely that a state legislature will enact statutes 
in the consumer field which are suitable for the entire state or, more 
specifically, which cover a subject to the extent necessary to pro· 
vide adequate protection against egregious practices that are limited 
124 See Note. Conflicts Between State Statutes and Municipal Ordinances, 72 HAR'I'· 
L. REV. 737 (1959). 
125 See. e.g., Hemphill v. Wabash R. Co., 209 F.2d 768 (7th Cir. 1954), cert denied, 
347 U. S. 954 (1954). 
126 Note supra note 124, at 740-42. 
127 That' part of the ordinance which is not inconsistent with state law may be sev· 
er able from those portions which are invalid. 
128 Note, supra 124, at 744. 
129 !d., at 744-45. 
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research solely into localities with similar population, governmen-
tal structure, and geographic, socio-economic, and historical traits, 
or it may entail comprehensive analysis of all municipalities and 
counties with consumer programs. The latter research is not as 
overwhelming as it may sound because there are relatively few 
local governments with consumer programs.146 However, compara-
tive analysis is meaningful because the cities and counties which 
do control consumer protection exhibit wide differentials of govern-
mental structure, geography, population and socio-economic char-
acteristics.147 This information can be gleaned from a study of the 
language of ordinances and resolutions and the research does not 
usually require an analysis of enactments in actual operation. Al-
though an ordinance in actual operation may not reflect its written 
provisions, such comparisons are useful in that they suggest the 
various provisions that consumer enactments might contain. 
To facilitate relevant comparison, an analysis should be made 
of; power basis, governmental structures, and the position within 
local governm ent of the body charged with responsibility under the 
consumer enactments. 148 
G. I NFORMATION PAcKET AND PuBLIC H E ARINGs: 
Research into the state constitution, general statutes, case law, 
and local powers, and a comparative analysis of other consumer 
regulations should provide an arsenal for consumer advocates that 
must be presented to the local decision-making body. 
The governing body will undoubtedly hold public hearings or 
meetings to discuss the proposed resolution. Prior to these meetings, 
a report should be sent to this body from the consultant or research 
group outlining the research, conclusions, and proposals. 149 The 
contents should comprise persuasive factual and argumentative ma-
terial pointing to the need for and legality of a local consumer or-
dinance or resolution, or a voluntary mechanism, which can alsO 
be presented at the public hearings. A breakdown of the contents 
should reveal: 
1. Statistics: 
The governing body must be shown that there 1s a probleJ1l 
146 See note 1 supra. 
147 See Appendix. 
148 !d. 
149 Where consultants are retained, the local government should require this re· 
port. See notes 3-4 supra and accompanying text. 
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to a specific commercial center. Determining the intent of a state 
!egislature is a difficult task since these bodies seldom express their 
Intentions. " ... [u]sually there are no written committee reports, 
published hearings or debate on state legislation."130 The argu-
:tnent favoring local control in consumer protection cuts against pre-
e:rnption especially where the state legislature has not acted on the 
exact subject sought to be regulated locally. 131 Preemption should 
not be applied automatically to preclude local attention to matters 
of local concern. 
In situations involving duplication between statute and ordi-
nance, redundancy is not a sufficient reason to invalidate an ordi-
nance. Thus, ordinances "regulating the same conduct as a statute 
an~ doing so in substantially the same manner [are J usually held 
vahd."132 Since local regulations seldom merely duplicate state en-
act:rnents, this occurrence warrants little further attention.133 
The third possibility is significant. Ordinances infrequently 
f~o:rnulgate less rigorous standards than statutes, but when they do, 
. ey are usually held invalid on the ground that the ordinances 
l:tnpliedly allow violation of the stat~ laws. 184 Ordinances do, how-
~ver, frequently contain stricter standarrts than their statutory coun-
erparts. This fact raises interesting questions regarding consumer 
regul · 
1. h atl.ons. Local enactments can regularly be expected to estab-1\ Stricter standards because local markets, especially in large 
~ an .commercial centers, require more comprehensive, and per-
yaps dl~erent, treatment than that appropriate for the entire state. 
thet, stncter local licensing laws are frequently declared invalid on 
r· eh theory that the state licenses are intended to grant recipients the 
n
1
.g . t to operate statewide without further interference. 135 Recog-
lZln th" n g 1s problem, courts have adopted a standard of reasonable-
~s and thus uphold a stricter local regulation unless the statute 
ects otherwise. 186 --1so F· 
181 slnley, Book Review, 24 IND. L. J. 328,330 (1949). 
L. J. 2~: Fordham, Decision-Making in Expanding American Urban Life, 21 0Hro ST. 
control ' 275-76 (1960), which represents a strong policy argument in favor of local 
132 . 
183 ~ote, supra note 124, at 747. 
134 • 
135 /d., at 7 48. 
13G 
1£·· at 748-49. 
lature {e Gannett v. Cook, 245 Iowa 750, 61 N.W.2d 703 (1954). Where the legis-
tnunici al assumed to regulate a given course ·of conduct by prohibiting enactments, a 
f~rther~a corporation may make such additional reasonable regula~ions in aid and 
S!ties of nee of ~e purpose of the general law as ma:y seem appr:opnate to the ~e.ces­
of a stat the bParticular locality, The fact that an ordmance enlarges on the prov!Slons 
Ute Y requiring more than the statute requires creates no conflict therewith un-
1972] WCAL CONSUMER PROTECTION 63 
requiring attention. Figures showing complaint volume easily 
overcome the obstructive pleadings of opponents. Where consumer 
groups are active in handling complaints, they should divulge their 
statistics for this cause. Where such a source is unavailable, other 
local government departments,150 including those of neighboring 
l~~lities that receive consumer complaints should be solicited for 
Sltn1lar statistical information. 
2. Legal Memorandum on Local Power: 
This memorandum should state the power of the locality to 
enact a consumer protection program and should cover the areas of 
express, implied, and inherent powers; voluntary mechanisms; state 
Preemption; and special enabling legislation. Reasonable argu-
~ents should be fashioned for each of these categories as support 
0~ local consumer protection. Thus, the memorandum should com-
Pnse a comprehensive analysis of the legal base for local regulations. 
3. Comparative Chart: 
t The comparative analysis undertaken by the local governmen-
al consumer protection programs elsewhere is best condensed into 
~ chart format. This facilitates visual comparison and lends itself 
0 oral presentations at public hearings.151 
4. Substantive Provisions: 
r The legal and comparative research should result in conclusions 
c~g~rdi~g the provisions that can lawfully and practically152 be in-
w~· ed m a local enactment and also the methods of administration 
e lch can best be integrated into the overall administrative machin-
t;:y of. the municipality or county.153 Therefore, a spectrum of al-
lb. rnatlVe provisions should be presented. There are, however, mini-
g urn provisions which any municipality or county may enact re-
tak~less of its legal impotence or the political infeasibility of under-
tio Ing consumer protection in the face of strong business opposi-
ton:n. These minimum provisions were the basis for the Arling-
oth County consumer protection resolution and are found in many 
er local consumer ordinances. Such clauses should provide for: 
l. The receipt, recording, investigation and conciliation of com-----1Go S 151 s ee ~II. E, 2, supra. (local agencies) . 
152 see ppendix. 
153 See § 3, C supra (business groups). 
ee §IV, I, infra (administration). 
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plaints from people alleging improper business conduct in connec-
tion with commercial transactions. 
2. The reporting to an appropriate city law, county, state or 
federal agents of information regarding violations of law. 
3. The development of consumer education and information 
programs and the dissemination of such materials through the news 
media, displays, pamphl ets, and speaking programs. 
4 .. Recommendations to the local governing body on changes on 
local and state legislation and administrative regulations required 
to provide adequate consumer protection . 
5. A voluntary arbitration process for the settlement of com-
plaints where prior conciliation attempts prove futile . 
The above provisions contain no sanctions or penalties which 
would require a statutory power base. Although it is a voluntarY 
mechanism, it should not be thought of as mere window-dressing 
because the majority of complaints can be satisfactorily resolved 
through conciliation and mediation and need not result in a law· 
suit.154 As local powers are determined to be more extensive and 
as practical impediments are neutralized, more powerful provisions 
can be added. 
At the public hearing, consumer advocates or researchers 
should marshal the support of other consumer groups, state con-
consumer protection personnel, and interested associations. 
H. THE APPROACH TO BusiNESS 
The authors believe that the best approach is direct communi-
cation with the business community. For those who disavow the 
politics of persuasion, it should be kept in mind that the alternative 
to voluntary local consumer protection is the expense and delay of 
lit igation. Conferences with business leaders should 1) explain we 
proposal and its purpose, 2) explain how business groups can plaY 
a role, for example by suggesting people to serve on a coinmissiol1 
or advisory body or by offering its expertise in certain areas, and 3) 
request their suggestions and support.155 Further, it should be eii1-
phasized to the business community that the consumer movemetlt, 
generally, expects and aims to benefit businessmen as well as theit 
154 See note 115 supra and accompanying text. 
155 In Arlington County, the authors m et with the Executive Director of the N· 
lington Chamber of Commerce to explain the proposal, to hear his suggestions and tO 
suggest ways in which the Chamber and the proposed office could work together, es· 
pecially on referra l and the possibility of the Chamber supplying arbitrators where 
special expertise is required. 
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customers. The improper practices of many businessmen have der-
ogated the confidence of local consumers in the overall commercial 
community.156 Honest businessmen should welcome efforts to im-
prove or to remove those operators whose business practices are 
fraught with impropriety. 
b I_£ these conferences are properly conducted their success may 
l"e ev1de;nced by the absence of business representatives at the pub-
lc heanngs at which the consumer protection proposals are dis-
cussed and implemented. As previously indicated, the Consumer 
BELP Center was able to persuade a powerful national business 
or~anization to co-sponsor an amendment to the original resolution 
~ er~by the two groups would work in tandem on a consumer ar-
ltra~lon experiment.157 No other business groups appeared at the 
PUbhc meeting at which the resolution was adopted. 158 
th B~sinessmen are often concerned with the possibility, posed by 
th: ex1s_tence of numerous private and public consumer groups, that 
Y. Wlll be pressured or "harassed" by these various groups re-
gardmg a single complaint. That is, 
[s]ome consumers [may] reason that by reporting a single 
cbomplaint to three or four consumer agencies more pressure can 
e brought on the businessman concerned. Most local consumer 
chomplaints are settled by conciliation. And what businessman is in 
t e mood to conciliate after he has been clobbered by several con-
sumer groups? 159 
8 
Although the argument reveals its own weakness in that con-
e U1Uer advocates seek to conciliate rather than "to clobber," this 
oncern does have validity. 
th One measure to protect against harassment is the inclusion on 
the colllplaint form of space for the listing of other assistance that 
othe~om~lainant has sought in resolving his problem. Where no 
not ass1stance has been sought, the complainant should be asked 
e>ch to go beyond the immediate body, at least until that body has 
Pla·austed the possibilities for settlement. In cases where the com-
do 
1~ant has contacted other agencies with little or no success, 
u ts may reasonably be entertained regarding the good faith of --=---- ' 166 s 
157 see~ III. C supra (business groups). • 
158 te ~ V supra (arbitration). 
Preside~ a Panel discussion held after the passage of the resolution, the Executive Vice 
evaluat n of the Arlington Chamber of Commerce stated that his organization would 
'ntonths e t~e operation of the Arlington Consumer Protection Commission for a few 
activitie an then decide whether to cease or to continue its own complaint-handling 
159 s. 
The Arlington News, Dec. 1, 1971, at 4, col. 3. 
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both parties, the consumer in respect of the validity of his com-
plaint and/ or the merchant as to his sincerity in seeking a resolu-
tion of the matter. Where the consumer is folmd to be lacking good 
faith, further efforts are inappropriate. On the other hand, where 
it is the businessman who does not evidence sincerity, his charges 
of harassment should not discourage action by other agencies. 
It is unnecessary to defend these sentiments as an apology for 
business. The argument is that voluntary cooperation is a key ele-
ment to successful local control; but if business withholds its sup-
port, local regulation can and should proceed without it. In fact, 
this realization on the part of businessmen often enhances co-
operation! 
J. ADMINISTRATION 
The positions within local governmental structure of adminis· 
trative bodies charged with responsibilities for local consumer pro· 
tection h ave differed greatly. The choices are: 
1. To create a new office in the executive branch of the gov· 
ernment. 
2. To create a new division within an existing department such 
as weights and measures, corporaton counsel or public safety. 
3. To create a new office under the city or county council. 
4 . To create a citizen commission which is assisted by a full· 
time office staff. 
One administrative apparatus that has proven functional in Ar· 
lington County is the commission form. This mechanism consists 
of a citizen group, appointed by the governing body, which directs 
and is assisted by a full-time office staff. The likelihood that a local 
consumer body will initially be a controversial center of attentioll 
makes it imperative that it not appear subject to the undue influ· 
ences of a particular segment of the business or consumer coiJl· 
munity . Such a commission should clearly appear interested in ac· 
complishin g the goals of the legislative act creating it. Local go"<~· 
erning bodies must be careful to appoint a nonpartisan, or at least a 
bipartisan , body containing representatives of a broad spectrum of 
interests. In this regard, the Arlington County Board solicited rec· 
ommendations for commission membership from a wide range of 
community organizations. The commission members represent a 
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broad spectrum of experience in law, business, education, and con-
sumer affairs. In addition there should be a provision for stag-
gered terms among the members which can serve the dual pur-
pas~ of enhancing the possibility for new members and new ideas, 
';hlle assuring a degree of continuity and knowledge of opera-
tlons.lso 
Local government consumer offices should not attempt, nor 
sho~ld other consumer groups allow it, to preempt any pre-existing 
bodies concerned with consumer affairs. On the contrary, an inter-
agency cooperation effort should be established.161 Joint meetings 
should be held to create working relations and referral policies 
~mong local consumer groups. In this regard, an extensive referral 
In?e:c should be maintained so that duplication of effort can be 
nummized. Such an index can provide access to the total local con-
sumer information resources available. This file should include 
names of public and private bodies active in consumer affairs, as 
~e~l . as contacts within various business establishments who will 
?Cihtate the handling of complaints and inquiries concerning par-
ticular establishments. 162 In those situations where a consumer or-
~anization is retained by the governing body to undertake the stud-
~es previously suggested,163 this group, especially if experienced in 
ocal consumer problems, can assist the commission in establishing 
an office and to forward working papers and other research as re-
~uested. As an outgrowth of its consulting contract with the County 
oard, the Cop.sumer HELP Center has regularly provided assist-
a~~e to the Consumer Protection Commission during the first year 
~· Its operation. This assistance has been in the form of participa-
Ion by law students enrolled in one author's "Problems of the Con-
sumer" clinical law course at George Washington Law School. The 
cons~lting team regularly attends commission and sub-committee 
~e~tmgs and has provided working papers and suggestions on cam-
p ~lllt referral policy. complaint handling and conciliation pro-
~te ures, state legislation, reading material, standard forms, public-
1 Y and education, and arbitration rules and procedures. 
t .To facilitate its efficient overall operation and to focus the at-
entton of members on specific issues, the commission should ser---160 Th . of 8 e nme n;ember Arlington q<>nsumer Protection Commission has three groups 
161 
membe1·s w1th each group haVIng 6 one, two and three year terms. 
162 See§ IV, E supra (state preemption) . . 
n"ss To the extent that coordination and referral are successful and efficient, the busi-
-16S cSomplaints similar to those at note 158 and accompanying text will be reduced. 
ee § III supra. 
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iously consider the establishment of a sub-committee system. The 
Arlington Consumer Protection Commission presently consists of 
sub~committees on education, complaints, legislation, procedures, 
and arbitration. It initially had a law student aide working with 
each committee. These groups held meetings independent of the 
commission proper in order to deal with their area of concentra-
tion, and regularly report their decisions and actions to the whole 
commission at the regular meetings. 
Although the commission should determine basic policy of the 
consumer office, the daily office work of complaint-handling, initial 
contact, refenal and record-keeping requires a regular staff. The 
staff members should also participate in the aforementioned visits, 
discussions, and meetings. The Arlington consumer program capi-
talized on the experience of county employees in representing the 
interests of county residents in public utility matters by appointing 
as Executive Director of the Consumer Protection Commission164 the 
individual who had served in a similar position under the Public 
Utilities Commission. He now serves in both capacities with an ex-
panded but distinctly dual staff. In complaint-handling, the staff 
undertakes the initial investigation and recording of information 
and upon a determination of the validity of the complaint, instigates 
conciliation conferences. When the staff's conciliatory efforts prove 
unsuccessful, a report is forwarded to the Commission which 
embarks on further individual or collective action or determines 
whether the dispute is ripe for arbitration, which is the final step 
in the County's grievance procedure. 
V. ARBITRATION 
A. THE CoNCEPT OF CoNSUMER ARBITRATION 
Traditionally, consumers have sought relief from business 
abuses through the court system or administrative agencies. The 
failure of these approaches in resolving disputes between business-
men and consumers is well-documented.165 Further, resort to ju-
164 The Executiv:e _Director supervises the daily work of the office staff, presents re-
ports to the Corrumsswn and serves as secretary at the regular m eetings. 
165 See, eg., H. BANFIELD, THE UNHEAVENLY Crrr, 158-84 (1970); D. CAPLOVITZ 
THE PooR P AY MoRE (1967 ) ; Cox, Fellmeth & Schulz, The Consumer and the Feder al 
Trade Commission- A Critique of the Consumer Protection Record of the FTC (1969); 
FTC, REPORT oF DISTRICT OF CoLUMBIA CoNsUMER PROTECTION PROGRAM, 4, 17-18 
(1968) ; FTC, DEPT OF CoMM., DEPT OF LABOR & SPECIAL Ass'T TO THE PnESIDENT oN 
CoNsUMER AFFAIRS, REPORT OF THE TASK FoRcE ON WARitANTIES AND SERVICE, 67-68 
(1969); NAT'!:- CoMMISSION ON PnoDUCT SAFETY, FINAL REJ?ORT 2, 13, 78 (1970); CoM-
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~cial procedures does not serve the interests of either consumers or 
. e allegedly offending businessmen. The amount of money at stake 
ln the usual case does not warrant, indeed, it militates against, 
c~~:rt ~ction by either party. Litigation is adverse to the interests 
~ usmessmen in retaining the good will of their customers. "Con-
a~f'-:ently, where differences arise out of day-to-day commercial 
in ~s P~rties often prefer to settle them privately and informally, 
t
1
• ~ lnnd of businesslike way that encourages continued rela-
onshlps." 1ss 
D . Yet, in the modern commercial world, disputes are inevitable. 
an~ntended defects are necessary concomitants of mass production 
fri lllass ~arketing systems. Moreover, there will always be those 
tic nge busmesses which operate with deliberate, unscrupulous prac-
\!a~s and which intentionally exploit the carelessness, ignorance and 
ous hardships of consumers . 
ar;h~ . authors feel that procedure whereby consumer disputes 
for ~tln:ately submitted to arbitration is both a viable substitute 
lllech e . lnadequacies and inappropriateness of litigation, and a 
ness ams1n that can serve the interests of the consumer and busi-
bitr ~an . Furthermore, it is submitted that the presence of an ar-
of a;bl~m ~lternative will put a "cap" on conciliation; the threat 
excee~t~hon will facilitate settlement. This inducement may even 
bitratio : pressure involved in a "threat" of litigation because ar-
n 1S easier, quicker and cheaper to employ. 
sies ~n general, arbitration is an arrangement whereby controver-
settle:: sublllitted to an impartial third party for final and binding 
system ent.
167 
Such mechanisms are designed to avoid the court 
adver a~d are intended to avoid the formalities, delay, expense, and 
cogni;a~al atmosphere of ordinary ~itigation. Arbitration was re-
tllattere at early common law as a method of adjusting disputed 
Ptoced~' but the frequent court practice of construing arbitration 
lUgs and awards so as to defeat them demonstrates that it 
lltnl'-;11' 
(1969)y ACTION p I?.)( ; .Addr ROGRAM, OEO, GREEN PowER: CoNsUMER AcTION FOR THE PooR 4-5 
1[11ecl1tives Febs by Mary Gardiner Jones, Carnegie-Mellon University Program for T?azJ.'rarnirzat~ · 27, 1970; Meserve, The Proposed Federal Door-to-Door Sales Act: 
't'a. \ lty of 1/
0 E of Its Effectiveness as a Consumer Remedy and the Constitutional 
IJel or, 4 p/ nforcement Provisions, 37 GEo. WAsH L. REv. 1171, 1191-92 (1969) ; 
27 °f1nents inz~he for Consumer Problems, 42 OHio BAR 437, 442 (1969); Note , De-
.--.:._ 132-33 1064 e Law - Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1005, 1123. 1126-166--- . ' 1082-83 ( 1967) . 
A.11a .AJ.IJII!.nrcAN A 
16~1'1\ATroN t 3 RBITRATION AssociATION, A BusiNESSMAN's GuiDE TO CoMMERCIAL ~ See ' a (19 .... ). 
nrl'RA1';o~g1· •03SI\un-r, MERRIFIELD & RoTHSCHILD, CoLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND LABOR -17 (1970). 
70 L OYO LA Consumer Protection J OURNAL [Vol. I:Z6 
was a procedure not originally favored by the courts. 168 Due to the 
characteristics of arbitration as an inexpensive, informal yet busi-
nesslike procedings chosen by the parties, it is now favored by the 
courts as a method of resolving disputes.169 
Although such mechanisms have been used with marked suc-
cess in the fields of labor relations and commercial transactions/70 
and less extensively in the international claim area, their use irt 
the consumer field has only recently been seriously considered· 
Under the auspices of local Better Business Bureaus, arbitration pao· 
els have been established in the metropolitan areas of, inter alia, LoS 
Angeles, Atlanta, San Diego, San Joaquin County, and Long Island· 
Unfortunately, the majority of these panels limit the subject matte!' 
of arbitrable disputes.171 In addition, these panels often have a 
greater proportion of business representatives than consumer repre-
sentatives; the result being that the consumer often lacks confidence 
that an impartial judgment will be rendered.172 
B. THE ARBITRATION MEcHANISM IN ARLINGTON CouNTY 
The determination of the Arlington County Board to appoirt1 
a consumer protection commission and to study all aspects of coil' 
sumer affairs and the consulting contract which resulted ther~­
from provided the authors with an opportunity to act upon thel! 
preference for consumer arbitration. The Council of Better BuS!' 
ness, Inc., has recently been under pressure from members "to dO 
something about consumerism" before "mad dog" consumer adV0' 
cates steal the initiative by prompting the local government to enact 
restrictive or burdensome consumer programs. Therefore, ConsuJ!lef 
HELP Center approached the Council with the consumer arbitr8' 
tion idea and proposed joint sponsorship. The outlines of a coJ'l; 
crete plan were eventually agreed upon. Voluntary arbitration W8 
168 !d. at 119-20. 
169 See, e.g., Wauregan Mills, Inc. v. Textile Workers Union of America, 21 Co~ 
Supp. 134, 146 A.2d 592 (1958); Knickerbocker Te~tile ~orp. v. Sheila-Lyn?, Inc.,,!1 f. 
M1sc. 1015, 16 N.Y.S. 2d 435 (1939); Eastern Engmeermg Co. v. Ocean C1ty, 11 I'' 
M isc. 508, 167 A. 522 (1933). we 
170 The importance of arbitration in the labor field was recently indicated bY 
NLRB in Collyer Insulated Wire, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931, 1937 (1971) . eJ! 
171 For example, the Los Angeles, San Joaquin, Atlanta, and San Diego area pall u 
deal with textile complaints, i.e., those involving dry cleaning and laundry firms. Me~~ 
randum from David J. Kingsley of the Council of Better Business Bureaus, Inc., Al.l6" 
12. 1971. f)~ 
172 For example, the Los Angeles Panel is comprised of representatives of a) 
cleaners. b) one launderer who is not involved in a cleaning establishment, c) one dr8~ 
ery-retailer-cleaner, d) one carpet retailer and cleaner, e) one furrier, f) one lea~~b 
goods expert, g) one men's shop retailer. h) two home economists, i) two women's c 
r epresentatives, and j) a writer for Apparel Weekly. !d. 
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adopted by the County Board as an addition to the settlement pro-
~edures of the proposed resolution. The Center and the Council 
ave been primarily responsible for the initial establishment and 
ope~ation of the program. The Council will cover the costs of the 
arbitration for one year, thus relieving the County of initial ex-
penses. The contacts of the Center and Better Business Bureau with 
exp:rienced arbitrators in the Washington community will ensure 
an Impartial operation. The availability of experienced arbitrators 
and the joint sponsorship of the plan by a consumer and business 
group enhance the possibility of consumer· arbitration gaining the 
respect of potential users and being an ultimate success. 
t T~ese peculiarities of the Arlington experience should not de-
tr arbitration proposals in locales without these characteristics. In 
act, the plan, if successful, could be a model for use elsewhere and 
could dr . 11 . £1 b . .1. . amatlca y In · uence local consumer- us1ness conc1 1ation 
trocedures throughout the country. Thus, at little or no cost, the 
ounty gained two distinct benefits: the arbitration expertise of con-
r~~er and business personnel and the likelihood of substantial pub-
t~Clty for the use of arbitration in local consumer affairs. In addi-
~on t? consumers and businessmen, Arlington County and the 
ouncll of Bette~ Business Bureaus will gain from this experiment. 
C. ARLINGTON ARBITRATION PROCEDURES 
a The Arlington County consumer arbitration program is an 
A tnal~am of rules and procedures similar to those used by the 
Se~~ncan Arbitration Association, the National Center for Dispute 
a t ernent, and Better Business Bureaus. It is impractical to give 
ducornplete account of the intricate and detailed arbitration proce-
ca~ebwhich resulted from this study, but the highlights of the plan 
e delineated.t7s 
a S .;onsist:nt with the subcommittee format of the Commission,174 
andUthommittee on Arbitration was created to work with the Center 
th· e Council in the administration of the plan. The duties of 
an~ subc~~mittee will vary as the mechanism becomes operational 
ch mod~flcations are required. Initially the subcommittee was 
arged, znter alia, with ascertaining whether the parties request-.____ 
te 1:~t~~P~sb of the Arlington Consumer Protection Commission's Arbitration Rules may 
a. 222ot Y writing the Commission at Room 206, 2049 15th Street North, Arlington, 
174 • 
See§ IV, I supra (administration). 
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ing arbitration175 had exhausted self-help grievance procedures, such 
as the internal complaint-handling mechanisms of the business es-
tablishment involved, and whether conciliation efforts had also been 
undertaken by the Commission and its staff. Such a requirement for 
"exhaustion of remedies" is consistent with the preference of busi-
nessmen to attempt to settle customer complaints in a private and 
informal manner without outside help, thus promoting settlement, 
The Subcommittee is further charged with the responsibility to de-
termine whether the character of a dispute submitted for arbitra-
tion requires an expert in the field and to administer the selection 
process when such a determination is made. Consumer disputes dif-
fer in their degree of complexity; some require more expertise and 
knowledge to understand and to resolve than others. 
Further, parties may justifiably hesitate to submit technical dis-
putes to an arbitrator unlearned or inexperienced in the area. 176 
Therefore, two arbitration panels were established. A General 
Panel arbitrates cases which involve less than $50.00 and for which 
no particular expertise is deemed n ecessary. To promote impartial-
ity and to discourage the use of lawyers, the General Panel has a 
tripartite membership, one representative each from the business 
and consumer communities and one neutral arbitrator. The Gen-
eral Panel has a revolving membership and sits at regular intervals 
to prevent a backlog of arbitrable disputes from accumulating. All 
decisions, awards, and other rulings of the General Panel are by 
majority vote. However, a Special Panel of one arbitrator is con-
vened to hear disputes involving more than $50.00 and in which the 
Subcommittee has determined that a high degree of knowledge or 
expertise is advisable to promote the rendering of a fully-informed 
and equitable award. Included are such areas as home improve-
ment and automobile and electric appliance repair. 
It is imperative to the integrity of the arbitration process that 
the panels remain free from any apparent control or undue influ-
ence from business or consumer groups. The multiple views repre-
sented on the General Panel should assure the parties of the over-
all impartiality of that Panel. Since the Special Panel is composed 
of a sole arbitrator, the selection process was designed to attract 
similar confidence from prospective users. In cases where the sub-
175 To initiate the arbitration process, the parties to a dispute must sign a contract 
agreeing to arbitrate according to the Arlington Consumer Protection Commission rules, 
and to be bound by the decision. 
176 For example, one businessman with an arbitrable dispute immediately backed 
away from arbitration when he was informed. incorrectly, that law students would be 
panelists. 
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committee determines that an expert is required, it submits to each 
party an identical list of nominees which it feels are technically 
qualified to arbitrate the matter. Each party has seven days from 
th~ date of mailing, in which to eliminate any nominee to which he 
obJects, to number the remainder in the order of preference and to 
return the list to the subcommittee. The list contains identifying 
explanations of each nominee. The explanatory material is not 
lengthy; it merely identifies employment aiid membership in clubs 
an~ organizations. This data promotes the informed choice of an 
arbitrator. These arbitrators will come from the Washington met-
r?politan area, but particularly from George Washington Univer-
:lty ~.aw School. If a party does not return the list within the time 
PeClfled all persons named therein are deemed acceptable. From 
the list of mutual preferences, the Subcommittee appoints an arbi-
tr~tor. If the parties fail to agree upon any of the persons sub-
~ltted or if for any other reason the appointment cannot be made 
:om the submitted list, the Subcommitee makes an administra-
~ve appointment. But in no case will an arbitrator whose name 
as been eliminated by either party be assigned to arbitrate a case. 
. In his accept~nce of appointment, the special arbitrator is re-
{Ulred. to disclose any financial, professional, social or other rela-
;.onshlps, past or present, direct or indirect, with either party to the 
d~spute which .he is assigned to arbitrate. Where the Subcon:m~tt~e 
ems such disclosures relevant to the controversy before 1t, 1t 1s 
~equired to provide this information to the parties. The parties then 
pave the option to waive any conflict of interest objections and to 
i roceed, or ask for a different appointee. Where another appointee 
th requ~s:ted, the Subcommittee will dismiss the arbitrator and fill 
a e ~0Sltlon from other preferences or will make an administrative 
PPointment. 
D. BusiNEss PAB.TICIPATION 
Ul A~ ar?itration in general and consumer arbitration in partie-
it a:r W:tll hkely be unfamiliar to many businessmen and consumers, 
re Was deemed unreasonable to expect all enterprises to subscribe ir-
te Voca.bly to arbitration without reservation.177 Therefore, three al-
co:rnat~ve degrees of participation were provided, ranging from total 
llellltnltment in proper cases, to total abstinence in others. A busi-
ssrnan may agree that all complaints involving his store and ----lll~I~r ~r:n facdit., r equiring an irrevocable commitment to binding arbitration has been the 
Pe m ent to the establishment of consumer arbitration mechanisms. 
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within the Commission's subject matter jurisdiction178 will be set-
tled by arbitration after all other adminstrative remedies have been 
exhausted. On the other hand, a merchant may agree that only 
certain types of complaints involving his business will be . settled 
by arbitration. Finally, the enterprise may agree to judge on a case-
by-case basis whether a dispute will be submitted to arbitration. 
Of course, to the extent that the arbitration process is perceived to 
operate with no apparent bias, additional and stronger commitments 
by business to the process are expected. As an incentive for busi-
nessmen to select one of the first two plans, it is made clear that 
those participants may advertise their participation in their store 
windows, circulars, and public newspapers. 
E. JURISDICTION 
Consumer complaints stem from all areas of business impro-
priety including fraud, breaches of contract, misleading advertis-
ing, breaches of etiquette, ad infinitum, ad nauseum. 
The Arlington Arbitration Rules initially limit the subject mat-
ter of arbitrable disputes to breaches of oral or written contracts 
including breach of warranties. There are at least three arguments 
to support this limitation.. First, limiting arbitrable disputes to 
breaches of contract will leave a sufficient number of complaints 
available for arbitration. Secondly, as previously mentioned, it is 
unreasonable to expect that businessmen will immediately agree to 
arbitrate all future disputes in all potential complaint areas. Satis-
factory experience in this area is expected to lead to a wider accept-
ance of this mode of dispute settlement and a widening of the field 
of arbitrable disputes. Thirdly, arbitration may not be the most 
appropriate settlement procedure for certain types of complaints. 
Fraud, for example is probably more effectively dealt with by the 
appropriate law enforcement agencies. Further, other problems 
such as breaches of etiquette, are not susceptible to resolution by ar-
bitration proceedings. 
F. PuBLICITY 
Because the arbitration program is voluntary, businesses do 
not have to submit any complaints to the process. A major obsta-
cle to the success of such voluntary mechanisms is the reluctance of 
businessmen to accept arbitration as a business practice. A vicious 
178 See § V, E. infra. 
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circle will be encountered because merchants will understandably 
not want to submit to a procedure which they have not seen in 
operation. Yet the system will not operate unless businesses join. 
The American Arbitration Association's consumer arbitration ex-
periment in the District of Columbia failed because of such business 
resistance. Although unfortunate, this hesitation will be under-
standable due to the unfamiliarity of consumer arbitration to busi-
ness. There are various avenues that can be taken to solicit busi-
nessmen's cooperation in the project. 
Familiar figures in the Arlington business community are 
members of the Commission. The acceptance of arbitration pro-
cedures by their own stores may act as a catalyst to cooperation from 
0~ler commercial enterprises. Selling efforts will be particularly 
~llled at the acknowledged "leading" businesses in Arlington with 
the hope that a "coattail" result 'lvill occur upon the acceptance by 
: leaders of arbitration. In this regard, conferences will be held 
~lth the executive officers of the Arlington Chamber of Commerce 
0 seek their official support. The endorsement of the Chamber sepa-
~~e from that of its individual members would be meaningless. 
thus, separate meetings, chaired by the businessmen members of 
t e Commission, will be held with department store managers, chain 
s ore officials, small business proprietors, service personnel, etc. 
''b !n selling arbitration to businessmen, advocates will use the 
othsln:ss interests" argument, i .e., it is good business to submit 
ul erWlse unresolvable complaints to an arbitration panel as a reg-
sib;r business practice. Such a habit is strong evidence of a respon-
s e commercial enterprise and promotes the confidence of con-
Umers in receiving a "fair deal."179 
VI. SUMMARY 
ic l Iio:pefully, the Arlington project-. which provides the empir-
a a bas1s for this article--will continue for a long time and will be 
en:ees_s. Whatever happens to the County's program, more local 
Po es lnto the consumer protection field are necessary. The pur-
de~e l of this report has been to stimulate additional projects and to 
rec e ~p a literature of local control of consumer protection. The 
or to date in Arlington County has been encouraging although ---... -.._ 
llu~:9 S~~itement by Samuel C. Jackson, Vice President-Director of the Center for Dis-
QUssion tNement of the American Arbitration Association, before the Federal Trade Com-
• ov. 21, 1968. 
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conclusions at this time would be premature. Regardless of the ul-
timate degree of success in Arlington, several generalizations can be 
made which may aid future local endeavors. 
The first factor which favors local control of consumer protec-
tion is political in nature. Municipal government is the closest gov-
ernmental contact with consumers. Conversely, business is least 
able to lobby against consumer regulation at the local level because 
of community loyalty and effective lobbying consumer advocates. 
Governmental consumer commissions can be nurtured out of this 
political environment quickly and with surprising ease. 
Secondly, although municipal government law has failed to 
keep pace with urban needs, there is enough flexibility to create 
consumer protection agencies without the necessity of long legisla-
tive and judicial battles. The powers of local governments should 
increase in direct proportion to the emphasis upon decentralization 
of government. 
Thirdly, the contest between state and local agencies for con-
trol of consumer protection must of necessity reach an early accom· 
modation. The problem is too large for state agencies to handle. 
State mechanisms and priorities cut across municipal boundaries, 
and efforts to deal with demographic problems require state govern· 
ments to enlist local support. In short, consumer protection re· 
quires local action because of the specific nature of consumer 
problems. 
Fourthly, traditional legal institutions have failed to protect 
consumers. New alternative agencies and mechanisms to protect 
consumers are needed. There are voluntary methods, such as ar· 
bitration, which can be experimented with at the local level with· 
out substantial commitments of money. Alternative dispute settle-
ment mechanisms are easiest to develop, institute and staff at the 
local level. 
Lastly, real progress toward consumer protection in a societ)' 
characterized by affluence comingled with poverty, a free but 
controlled economy and a business-oriented marketplace, requires a. 
consumer awareness which simply does not exist today. Consumer 
education involves contact with people at the lowest common de· 
nominator - local government. In this area of consumer protec· 
tion, at the very least, the results have been encouraging. 
Burlington Camden 
County, County, Chicago, Dade County, 
New Jerseyt New Jersey2 lllinois3 Florida4 
Governmental Structure 
Board of Board of 
Chosen Chosen Mayor-City County 
Freeholders Freeholders Council Manager 
Position in local government 
Office under 
Department of Commissioner of Dept. within Office under 
County Gov't Public Affairs Executive Branch county Manager 
~uthority Police and Police and Police license special Enabling 
Reg. Power Reg. Power & Reg. Power Legislation 
Powers Granted 
To receive complaints X X x- X 
To investigate complaints X X X X 
To conciliate disputes X 
To initiate its own investigation, research and studies X X X X 
To hold hearings 
Public 
Private 
To administer oaths 
To compel attendance of witnesses (subpoena) X 
To interrogate witnesses X 
To compel production of papers, 
~cuments, records, and other evidence X 
T . 0 rnspect premises X X 
To · -serze and rmpound evidence X X 
To issue cease and desist orders 
To Propose consumer protection legislation 
Local X X X 
State X X X 
To initiate · -cnmrnal or equitable court proceedings X 
to make arrests X X 
To revoke licenses 
To devel X ~ or assist consumer education programs 
To make rules X 
1 Burlington County, N.J. , Consumer Protection Resolution, _Nov. 12, 1969. 
2 Camden County, N.J. , Resolution Creating Office of D1rector of Camden County Con-
sumer Affairs, Oct. 6, 1970; Memorandum from Carol J. Brooks, Direc tor, Camden 
County Office of Consumer Affairs. 
a CHICAGo DEPARTMENT oF CoNsUMER SALES, WEIGHTs AND MEAsURES, ANNUAL REPoRT 
(1970) . 
4 METROPOLITAN DADE CoUNTY, FLA., ConE §§ 8A-65 to -124 (1 968). 
5 JAcKsONVILLE, FLA., CoDE§§ 16.301 to -302, 400.101-4·06.504 (1969) . 
6 Monroe County, N.Y., Res. No. 218 (1971). 
7 NASSAU CouNTY, N.Y., AD. CoDE§§ 21-10.1 to -10.2 (1970), Gov'T CoDE § 2102 (1967). 
8 NEw YoRK CITY, N.Y., CHART. § 2203 (1969), NEw YoRK CITY AD. ConE §§ 773-1.0 to 
-14.0 (1971 N.Y., DEPT. CoNs. AFFAIRS. CoNs. Prot. L. Regs. 6-7, 9 (1971.). 
9 ORANGE CoUNTY, N.Y., CHART.§ 18.6A (1970) . 
Appendix 
COMPARATIVE CHART 
Jacksonville, 
Monroe Nassau Orange Prince George's Rockland 
County, County, New York City, County, County, CountY, 
Florida5 New YorkS New York7 New YorkS New York9 MarylandlO New Yorkll 
Mayor-City County Executive County Executive 
Board of 
Board of Board of Mayor-City Board of County Board of Council Supervisors Supervisors Council Supervisors Commissioners Supervisors 
Division within Joint City-County Office in Dept. of 
Department of Advisory Office under Department of Office under Unpaid Weights and 
Public Safety Commission County Executive City Government County Executive Board Measures 
Municipal Municipal Municipal Municipal Municipal Police Municipal 
Home Rule Home Rule Home Rule Home Rule Home Rule Power Home Rule 
X X X X X X 
X X X X X X 
X 
X X X X X X 
X X X X X 
X X X X X 
X X X X X 
X X X X 
X X X X 
X X X X 
***X X X X 
* *~'X 
***X X 
X X X X X 
X X X X X 
X *X **X *X **X 
"'* *X 
X X X 
X X X X X X X 
X X 
~~ ~rince Georges County, Md., Gen. Res. 3-1970, Jan . 30, 1970. 
ockland County, N.Y., Local Law 5, Oct. 19, 1970. 
12 SAN BERNARDINo CouNTY, CALIF. CoDE§§ 12.220 to -.225 (1971) 13 Santa Clara County, Calif., Ordinance NS- 300.141 ("1970). 
14 Ventura County, Calif., Ordinance Creating Consumer Affairs Division in the Depart-
ment of W eights and Measures, June 21, 1971. 
15 Yonkers, N.Y., Local Law 2 (1971). See also Nat'l League of Cities, United States 
Conf. of Mayors, Consumer Affairs Agencies Survey (1971). Copies of above statutory 
materials may be obtained by writing to the respective agencies. 
San Bernardino Santa Clara Ventura 
County, County, County, Yonkers, 
California 12 Californiats Califo rnia 14 New Yorkt6 
County Executive 
Board of Board of Board of City-Manager 
Supervisors Supervisors Supervisors 
Div. within Dept. 
Department of Department of of Weights and Dept. under 
County Gov't County Gov't Measures City Manager 
Police Police Police Municipal 
Power Power Power Home Rule 
X X X X 
X X X X 
X X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
***X **':'x ***X 
'''**X ***X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X X X 
Key to Asterisks : 
*Thr ough County Attorney 
**Cause Prosecution 
***Deriva tive from the weights and meas-
ures power 
HOME SAFETY AND BUILDING CODES: 
A. Hidden Consumer Issue 
Samuel A. Simon* 
Consumer protection is not limited to the purchaser of chattel 
· · . it applies to the purchaser of real property as well . In this 
article the author discusses the failure of modern building codes to 
make the American Home a safe place to live . He argues that even 
remedial legislation presently before Congress docs not adequately 
address this problem. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
71 
h 
A thirteen-year-old girl was scalded to death last year while 
s 0 0 Wenng after she accidentally turned on the hot water and was 
llnable to extricate herself because of her unfamiliarity with a latch 
0~ the shower door. 1 At about the same time, a mere three months 
a ~er occupying their new home a couple was killed in a fire stem-
~lng from a defective heating system.2 Not long before these inci-
f ents an infant was scalded badly enough to require hospitalization hr s~venty-two days and three skin graft operations.3 The family 
ad JUst moved into a home when it was noticed that the hot water 
c~:rne out at an extremely high temperature; so high, in fa ct, that a 
Slgn Was posted in the bathroom to wam guests. These incidents are 
~ha:rnples of over twenty million injuries of all types that occur in 
ab~· home every year. In 1969, there were over four million "dis-
th lng" injuries and thirty thousand deaths from accidents within e ho:rne.4 
th: ~ernber of the Bar of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 
197Q hurt of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit, and the Court of Military Appeals. During 
serv:in e. Worked for Ralph Nader's Public Interest Research Group, and is presently 
g lU the Judge Advocate General Corps of the Army. ---A.c~r~EPARTM:ENT oF HousiNG AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, SuMMARY REPORT. HoME 
after E~T CAUSEs AND RECOMMENDED REMEDIAL MEASUREs, PHASE I, (1970) [herein-
of lio CJt.ed as HoME AcciDENT STUDY]. The study was prepared for the Department 
and ElSing and Urban Development [hereinafter r eferred to as HUD] by Information 
barna ectronics Systems Division of Brown Engineering Company, Huntsville, Ala-
2 y Under HUD contract number H 113. 
3 so~ngstrom V. Dunn, 447 F.2d 948 (8th Cir. 1971). 
4 Nchlpper v. LPvitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965). 
ATIONAL SAFETY CoUNCIL, AcciDENT FACTs 80 (1970 ed.) . 
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Many of these injuries could have been prevented most simply 
by safer home design and construction. Two recent studies, one by 
the National Commission on Product Safety5 and the other by the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development,6 disclose a lack 
of adequate safety standards governing home construction, products, 
and fixtures. In fact, there is a virtual absence of any rational sys-
tem for the regulation and control of home safety requirements. 
The system ought to be different. 
The purchase of a new home is the most important single pur-
chase, in terms of expense and use, made by the consumer in his 
lifetime. The average purchaser of a new home today obligates him-
self to pay in excess of $24,000 in monthly installments, which 
constitute approximately twenty percent of his income.7 In terms 
of use, the home serves as the center of family life; the entire qual-
ity of the family existence is affected by the physical home environ-
ment. 8 Yet, the purchaser of a new home today has less assurance 
of the quality, workmanship and safety of the product he receives 
than when he purchases an automobile. The home buyer also has 
fewer remedies than does the automobile owner when he discovers 
a defect or is injured because of an improperly designed vehicle. 
Traditionally, a new house has not been looked upon as a single 
consumer product. This attitude stems from the continuation of 
feudal legal property concepts, such as caveat emptor0 and the doc-
trine of merger, 10 which have long been discarded in other areas 
of product liabilityY It makes as much sense today to continue 
5 NATIONAL CoMMISSION oN PRoDUCT SAFETY, FINAL REPORT 2 (June, 1970) . [Here· 
inafter cited as PRODUCT SAFETY REPORT.] 
6. HoME AcciDENT STUDY, supra note 1. 
7 HUD CHALLENGE, Nov., 1971, at 9. In 1969 the average price of a new home was 
$27,900 and in 1970 it was $26,600. ld. 
8 See generallr, 47 TExAs L. REv. 1160, 1172 n.61 (1969). 
9 See generallr, Druid Homes, Inc. v. Cooper, 272 Ala. App. 415, 131 So.2d 884 
(1961); Mitchem v. Johnson, 7 Ohio St. 66, 36 Ohio Ops.2d 52, 218 N.E.2d 594 (1966); 
Allen v. Wilkinson. 250 Md. 395, 243 A.2d 515 (1968). But see cases cited note 11 
infra. 
10 See Cox v. Wilson, 109 Ga. App. 652, 137 N.E.2d 47 (1964); Coutrakon v. Ada)'IIS, 
39 Ill. App.2d 290, 188 N.E.2d 780 (1963), affd on other grounds, 31 Ill. 2d 189, 201 
N.E.2d 100 (1964). 
11 See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) . OnlY 
recently have product liability concepts been applied in the area of housing. In a 19ul68 
T exas decision, for example, the doctrine of caveat emptor was abandoned and the r e 
tha t there is an implied warranty of habitability when a new home is purchased was 
adopted. Humber v. Morton. 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968). See also Berman, Caveat 
Emptor in Sales of Realtr- Recent Assaults Upon the Rule, 14 VANDERDILT L. R~>V; 
541 (1961) ; Roberts, The Case of the Unwarr Home Burer: The Housing Merchqn 
Did It, 52 ConNELL L. Q. 835 (1967) . A number of states have adopted an except1oP 
to the merger rule when a residential dwelling is involved. See Lippson v. Southgate 
Park Corp., 345 Mass. 621, 189 N .E. 2d 191 (1963); Capawelli v. Rolling Greens, Inc., 
39 N.J. 585, 190 A.2d 369 (1963). 
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~ese concepts and to consider the home as something other than a 
smgle integrated consumer product as it would be to consider the 
Purchase of an automobile as individual purchases of its constitutent 
Parts. 
The time when the purchase of a new home was a highly per-
sonal matter with work done by a true artisan is, unfortunately but 
P~haps necessarily, long past. Today the average home buyer gets 
w at amounts to a mass-produced product. He has little or no 
chntrol over the quality of the building materials, the quality of 
t e Workmanship, or the basic safety of the design involved in the 
product he buys. 
th T~e P.urpose of this arti~le, then,. is to look at the basic tool 
b ~tl ~Istoncally has been utilized to msure home safety - local 
UI dmg codes - and to evaluate suggested alternatives with some 
recommendations. 
II. BuiLDING ConE STANDARDS 
d 
The main tools for insuring home safety are the local building 
co es 12 Th d . · ese co es normally consist of 
· : : a series of standards and specifications designed to establish 
mmimum safeguards in . . . the construction of buildings, to protect 
~he human beings who live and work in them from fire and other 
afzards, and to establish regulations to further protect the health and 
sa ety of the public.1s 
in In actuality, these codes have little, if any, relevancy to build-
th g soundness and safety in the residential building category. In 
st ed Words of a Department of Housing and Urban Development 
u Y of building codes: ---thi~2 i~thoughh building codes have been the subject of substantial study in recent years, 
need fo erest as _been concentrated on the relationship between building codes and the 
srol'<r 0~ ntw bmlding techniques to increase housing products. See ADviSORY CoMMIS· 
GovERN" NTERGOVENMENTAL RELATIONS, BuiLDING ConEs: A PROGRAM FOR INTER· 
LocAL tENTAL REFORM (Jan. 1966) [hereinafter cited as BUILDING ConEs]; MANVEL, 
liotrSIN'G AND AND BUILDING REGULATION (1968); PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON URBAN 
18 NA' A DECENT HoME 198-205 (1968) [hereinafter cited as A DECENT HoME]. 
at 254 TIONAL CoMMissiON oN URBAN PRoBLEMs, BuiLDING THE AMERICAN CITY 
Conunitp968) [hereinafter cited as BurLDING THE AMERICAN CITY]. The President's 
urban h ee. on Urban Housing listed three goals that a "quality control" system for 
ouslng should meet: The system should be designed 
the hl. t? Protect consumer lacking the sophistication to judge the quality of 
ousmg product; 
tion 2·. to Protect residents, neighbors and passersby from hazardous condi-
fire;s a~ a housing structure, for example, structural instability or risk of 
bilit 3· }0 establish standards sufficiently uniform to promote free transferra-
A Di 0 mortgages and easy insurance of properties against hazards. 
CENT HoME, supra note 12, at 199. 
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The bulk of information in building codes emphasize engineering 
knowledge of building materials, methods of construction, fire safety, 
and performance requirements for essential equipment and facilities 
in commercial type structures.14 
The HUD study disclosed just how disastrous the overall pic-
ture of home safety is. The study analyzed the five major "model" 
or national building codes, including the Federal Housing Adminis-
tration's Minimum Property Standards,15 in terms of clearly identi-
fiable safety hazards within the home. The four private national 
codes considered were ( 1) the Code of the Building Officials of 
America,16 (2) the National Building Code,l7 (3) the Southern 
Standard Building Code,18 and (4) the Uniform Building Code.19 
The FHA MPS £aired best when compared to the other four codes, 
but it also was found to be inadequate. 
The study compared major accident-producing safety hazards 
identified from a survey of major cities throughout the country. 
Five major accident categories and forty-seven separate safety haz-
ards were used in the comparison, although the report mentioned 
many others. Each code was first examined to determine whether 
there was a standard designed to protect against the identified 
accident-producing safety hazards. If there was, the standard was 
then examined to determine whether it was, in fact, adequate pro-
tection against the particular hazard. The categories considered 
were accidents involving stairways, glass doors, windows, doors other 
than glass, and hot water systems. Each category contained an aver-
age of eight separate safety hazards. For example, the category of 
accidents involving glass doors included seven accident-producing 
safety hazards, including the type of glass used, the existence of 
marking devices, and the thickness of the glass. 
The results of the comparison raise a substantial doubt con-
cerning the usefulness of present-day building codes as a means of 
assuring the home buyer that the product he receives is functionallY 
14 H oME AcciDENT STUDY, supra note 1 at 8 (emphasis added). 
15 UNITED STATES D EPARTMENT OF HousiNG AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, MINIMVl\'I 
P ROPERTY STANDARDs FOR ONE AND Two LEVEL UNITS (1968); UNITED STATES DEPART· 
MENT OF H ousiNG AND URBAN D EVELOPMENT, MINIMUM PROPERTY STANDARDS FO!\ 
MuLTI-FAMILY HousiNG (1968); [both of the above hereinafter cited as the FilA 
MPS]. 
16 -The study included four codes developed by the Building Officials Conference of 
America, Inc.: HousiNG ConE (2d ed. 1970); PLUMBING ConE (1st ed. 1968); BuxrJJ· 
ING CoDE (Cumm. Supp. 1968); and the BASIC BuiLDING ConE (4th ed. 1965). 
17 AMERICAN I NsURANCE AssociATION, NATIONAL BuiLDING ConE (1967 ed.). 
18 T HE SoUTHERN BuiLDING CoDE CoNGRESS, SoUTHERN STANDARD BuiLDING cooll 
(1969 ed.) . 
19 I NTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE O'F BUILDING OFFICIALS, UNIFORM BuiLDING cooll 
1967 ed.) . 
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safe and of sound design. There were 179 accident-producing safety 
hazards for which no standard exists in at least one of the codes. 
Of those standards that did speak of identified accident-producing 
safe:ty hazards, forty-nine were found to be inadequate to protect 
agamst the hazard, while forty-five were found to be adequate. 
Typical of the omissions was the absence from all of the codes 
of any standard pertaining to bathrooms. Similarly, there were n o 
s~andards regulating built-in appliances . . For example, although 
Sl~ty-five percent of new homes come with a pre-installed garbage 
~lsposal, there were no standards in any of the codes governing their 
ln~tallation or use. Even the most obvious and dangerous hazards to 
children, such as a lack of protective coverings over electrical outlets, 
Were found not to be covered. 20 
. An example of standards found to be inadequate to protect 
agamst hazards were those relating to lighting over stairwells. The 
four national codes completely omit standards while the FHA MPS 
Were considered adequate in some respects. Only the FHA M PS 
~ere .considered to adequately cover the hazard of improperly placed 
Ightmg switches on stairwells. Similarly, only the FHA MPS h ad 
standards regulating the location and useability of faucet and 
s~ower controls, and these were considered to be inadequate. Three 
~ the five codes were found to have deficient standards relating to 
ard-to-open windows, while the other two had none at all. Only 
three of the five codes had adequate provisions governing the type 
of glass to be installed in glass doors. 
Significantly, the study also found that most of the omitted 
safety standards can be provided with little or no increase in cost 
of the home to the consumer, who would probably be willing to pay 
a Premium for these items if given the opportunity. For example, 
~ater temperatures can be lowered to reasonable levels by the sim-
p : ~ddition of a mixing valve to the outside of the hot water tank. 
~lxmg valves are available at most hardware stores and cost approx-
ltnately eighteen dollars installed .21 Thousands of injuries from falls --tec~o Ot~er omissions inciude a failure of any of the codes to provide standards to pro-
ty agamst identified accident-producing hazards in the positioning of windows, the 
fo~e 1of glass in windows, low window sills, handles on glass doors, operating pressure too g ass doors, swinging doors, garage doors, location of shower heads and many others 
numerous to mention here. 
ho~1 B:oME AcciDENT STUDY, supra note 1. The study pointed out that while all 
VVat~e_hold needs would be satisfied if hot water were delivered at 115°F.~ present hot 
had 1 8Yste.ms deliver hot water at temperatures of up to 210°F. If the 115 F. standards 
to th~een,_tn effect, the life of the thirteen-year-old girl mentioned in the Introduction 
1
5 arhcle might have been saved. !d. 
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could be prevented by requiring abrasive, non-slip tape on tu~ or 
shower floors. Placement of soap dishes at easily accessible pom~ 
on the wall automatic shower diverters that insure the shower lS 
cut off whe~ the water is turned off, and the placement of electrical 
outlets away from water faucets are other examples of inexpensively 
corrective safety hazards not covered in any of the codes. 
Many of the hazardous objects that were either not c~ver:d 
or inadequately governed were found to be purely decorative m 
nature, designed to increase the aesthetic character of the home. 
Absence of these hazards would most likely result in a cost saving 
to the consumer. Decorative handrails, for example, persent sharp 
edges and protruding surfaces. In one case cited in the study, a 
woman slipped while descending a stairway with a decorative hand-
rail and suffered an amputated finger from a sharp corner of the 
rail. Another example cited was the glassed areas that are placed 
in close proximity to stairs or in unsuspected areas to take advantage 
of panoramic views. 
This failure of building codes to accomplish what they were 
intended to do is best explained by an examination of the process 
by which code standards are developed and promulgated. 
III. PRIVATE BuiLDING ConE SYSTEM 
The private national codes are based almost exclusively upon 
industry-developed standards and specifications.22 There is currently 
no organization that develops building standards or specifica-
tions that does not depend on the construction or building products 
industry for its funding.23 
22 See BuiLDING THE AMERICAN CITY, supra note 13 at 263. The standards and speci· 
ficati~ns development process is highly complex, rendering full explanation neithed 
pr!"ctlcal n~r helpful. A very good summa~ of the organizations primarily concerne 
with established product standards and specifications and the methods used by them can 
be found in PRODUCT SAFETY REPORT, supra note 5 at 51-62. 
23. "Fw? prominent organizations concerned with the development of building product 
specificatiOns and stanrlards are the American National Standards Institute and the 
American Society for Testing and Materials. BuiLDING THE AMERICAN CITY, supra note 
13 at 263; A DECENT HoME, supra note 12 at 200. See also PRODUCT SAFETY REPO~T, 
supra note 5 at 51. Other important organizations in this field are the American F1re 
Protection Association. Underwriters Laboratories Inc. the National Fire Protectio? 
Association, the Association of Home Appliance Manuf~cturers the Plastic Pipe Instl· 
tute and. the Con~truction Standa_rd~ Ins:itute. !d. at 51. Independent laboratories like 
Underwnters. wh1ch are non-profit m nature rely primarily on the fees of those whose 
products they test for their funding. ' 
The primary governmental agency concerned with standards is the National Bureau 
of Stapdards of the Departlnent of Commerce. Its authority, however, is limited t~ the 
establ~s~ent of procedures for development of standards in cooperation with pnvate 
orgaruzatiOns. 19 U.S.C. 272 (1964). In fact, much of this work is done in the Bureaf 
by individuals "lent" to the Bureau by industry. Interviews with National Bureau 0 
Standards Employees, June-Oct. 1971, 
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The customary procedure for inclusion of a new product or 
system in one of the private national codes is for the developer or 
manufacturer to submit the product or system to a special panel 
~long with specifications and standards for its use. 24 The product 
1~ then evaluated in terms of the information provided and a deci-
Sion is made on whether the item is suitable for use.25 The code 
organizations do not test the products submitted, although most 
of them do require that the product be approved by a testing labora-
tory.26 After acceptance, the code organizations include the pro-
duct on their lists of approved products, which are circulated among 
governmental units utilizing their codes. 27 
. ~ocal governments, such as townships, counties and munici-
pal~t~es are the basic units which adopt building codes.28 These 
pohhcal entities enact codes which establish building standards for 
the specific geographic areas under their jurisdiction. Although a 
majority of the local codes are either taken from one of the private 
national codes or are based on one of them, most are not kept up to 
date. 29 As a result, provisions in local building codes depend largely 
on the discretion and expertise of local building code officials. 30 
I? addition to the common lack of sophistication of officials respon-
Sible for maintaining building code provisions, these officials are 
too often subject to substantial pressure from local interests to adopt 
Provisions most advantageous to a particular type of product.81 The 
system, then, is one of manufacturer or developer propaganda, aimed 
at local building code officials, designed to obtain the inclusion of 
a particular product in the local code. This is accomplished by 
lau~ching an "educational program" to acquaint the design pro-
fessions, builders, and building code officials with the virtues of a 
new product or system.32 While approval by a national code of a --24 BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, supra note 13 at 263-64. 
25 ld. 
d 
26 
ld. at 264. See note 23, supra. Either the quality of the testing done by indepen· 
s:ft laboratories is questionable or the laboratories are not very concerned wit~ _the 
of ety of t~e product that bears their seal of approval. For example, the most prest1gwus 
v· .all testmg laboratories, Underwriters Laboratories, Inc., approved thousands of tele-
llSion sets which subsequently caught fire , the Hankscraft vaporizer that scalded a 
't!e number of children and the Little Lady toy oven which r eached temperatures 
~t oooF. PRODUCT SAFET.; REPORT, supra, note 5 at 55. The Product Safety Commission 
ated that Underwriters had attempted to upgrade a number of their standards but 
encountered substantial opposition from the manufacturers. !d. 27 
BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, supra note 13 at 264. 
28 
See generally BUILDING ConEs, supra note 12. 29 B . l C . . on UILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, supra note 13 at 254-57. The Natwna ommission 
l Drban Problems surveyed 18,000 local governments. Of these, less than half actu-
: 1Y
1
had building codes. In governmental units with populations over 5,000, 52.5 percent 
mp oyed one of the model codes. Of these, only 28 percent had adopted as much as 
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product or technique is advantageous, it is not enough by itself to 
secure a nationwide market for a product or construction technique. 
National code approval is no more than an advertising point to be 
stressed in the "educational program" of the manufacturer. The 
detrimental consequences for quality and safety of housing under 
this system are easily foreseeable. 
The classic example of how L~is system operates and the detri-
mental consequences awaiting the consumer may be seen in the 
controversy over plastic pipes. Within the last ten years the plastics 
industry has been developing the technology to enable the applic~­
tion of plastic pipe for commercial and domestic uses.33 With this 
development, the Plastic Pipe Institute34 was established to promote 
plastic pipes by gaining their approval in various building codes. At 
the same time, entrenched copper and cast iron pipe interests, such 
as pipe-fitter unions, began to wage a vigorous campaign to keep 
plastics out of local codes. This campaign met with considerable su~­
cess. In 1968 one study showed that 68.9 percent of the communi-
ties sampled prohibited the use of plastic pipes for any purpose.
35 
This effectiveness in preventing the adoption of plastic pipes in local 
codes demonstrates the importance of strong local influence which 
was available to the unions but which was not available to the PPI.36 
Although the arguments at first centered around quality com-
90 percent of the recommended changes of the model codes within the three previous 
years. The Commission concluded: 
Only about 15 percent of all the municipalities and townships above 
5,000 in population had in effect a national model building code which was 
reasonably up to date; about 85 percent of the units either had no code, 
did not use a model code, or had failed to keep the code up to date. 
Id. at 2.57. 
30 Id. at 264. 
81 A DECENT HoME, supra note 12. at 199. 
82 BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, supra note 13 at 2.64. The National Commission 
on Urban Problems kindly utilizes the term "educational program" to describe the 
final step in the product approval process as follows: 
(~) An edu~ational pr9gram i~ undertaken by the manufacturer to ac-
quamt the des1gn profess10ns, bmlders, and officials with the value of the 
new product. Id. 
83 See generally The Plastic Pipe Code Battle, Status 1970, speech by Jerome H. 
Heckman, .prepared. for the April 2., 1970, meeting of the Plastic Pipe Institute. 
34 _H~remafter c1ted as th~ ~PI. The P?~ . is a division of a larger plastics ~r~de 
assoe1at10n that has had the prmc1ple respons1b1hty of gaining acceptance of plastic p1pmg 
in building codes. ld. 
35 BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, supra note 13 at 259. 
86 T.he latest chapter in th~ battle ~o gain acceptan ce of plastic piping has been 
th~ ~hng of a $20,000,000 anti-trust smt by plastic pipe interests against the Southern 
Bmldmg Code. Congress. 117 GoNG. REc. H 10,060 (daily ed. Oct. 2.7, 1971) (remarks 
of Representative Waggonner). 
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~arisons, 37 a real safety issue soon emerged. 38 When exposed to 
fire, plastics burn and create toxic fumes. 39 Two California fire mar-
shals, members of the House Select Committee on Small Business, 
and others have taken the position that plastic pipes are unsafe for 
Use in multi-family dwellings because of the increased fire risk. 
lYI~reover, the PPI has refused to submit any of its piping to Under-
Writers Laboratories, Inc., for testing. 40 Thus, the safety issue has 
be~ome unduly blurred because of the vested interests of those who 
raise it. To complicate the issue even further, HUD has accepted 
the _use_ of plastic drain, waste, and vent pipes in housing up to six 
stor~es m height which is insured by the Federal Housing Adminis-
tration.41 
. The history demonstrates that within the private sector the 
~ntir: I?echanism for protection of the home buyer is faulty. 42 
B ubh_c mvolve:n:nt i~ this area_ exist~ ~n the form of the Federal 
B ousmg Admimstratwn43 and Its Mmimum Property Standards. 
owever, a look at this system will show that once again the con-
surner is without substantial protection. 
IV. FEDERAL HousiNG ADMINISTRATION 
A. Standards 
In order to qualify for FHA mortgage insurance, a home must 
:tneet that agency's Minimum Property Standards.44 These standards 
serve as a model for many local governments that have adopted one ---37 s 38 ee generally Heckman, supra note 33. 
Pnoa See HousE SELECT CoMM. ON SMALL BusiNESS, SuncoMM. oN SMALL BusiNESS 
AJ:I;o rslVIs IN SMALL TOWNS AND URBAN AREAS, IMPACT OF CRIME, CRIME INSURANCE, 
139Q cfgRETY BoNDS ON SMALL BusiNESS IN URBAN AREAs, 91st Cong., Zd Sess., 93-
89 ld 70). 
40 . • 
Prob[llearz.ngs, House Select Comm. on Small Business, Subcomm. on Small Business 
Suretrne zn Smaller Towns and Urban Areas, Impact of Crime, Crime Insurance, and 
41 b on.ds on Small Business in Urban Areas, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. at 306 (1970 ) . 
Pl\op NITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HoUSING AND URBAN D EVELOPMENT, MINIMUM 
revie~TY- STANJ?~RDs FOR MuLTI-F,~MILY H;ousiNG, J!'H.A ~o. 2600 ( 196~ ) . !'>- . 197_1 
listed draft edthon does not contam the s1x story hmttatwn. Most plastic p1pmg _1s 
and vas ac_c':ptable for distribution of only cold :water, above and below ground dram 
l'vrrN ent Plpmg. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT oF HousiNG AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, 
DipiniJ\iuM ~ROPERTY STANDARDS Vol. 2 a t 115 (1971 review drafted.). The use of plastic 
«hie '}jor distribution of hot and cold water is listed as neither acceptable nor una_ccept-
Pol,Yvi · Yet, the. PPI has J!Ubli~hed its own standards for the use of CPVC (C~o:ma~ed 
S:Yste nyl ~hlonde ) plastic pipe for use in both hot and cold water. d1s_tnbut1
0
0n 
B:ow llls, Which state that the maximum operating temperature for such pipe IS ZOO F. 
high ever, In.odern home hot water distribution systems develop water temperatures as 
Dtt~~;T Ss 210°F. PLASTIC PIPE INsTITUTE, MoDERN PIPING WrTH PusTics; HoME Acci-
42 F Tuoy, supra note 1. 
Sl"Ean or a discussion of the problems of local enforcement of building codes see G. 
LlEB, THE TENEMENT LANDLORD (1966). 
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of the private national codes. In addition, since most housing today 
is completed prior to purchase, builders generally use FHA stan-
dards as their basic guide to provide for the possibility that the pur-
chaser will wish to use FHA financing. 45 The result is that FHA 
standards have a substantial impact on actual building practices 
and standards throughout the country. 
Like the private code organizations, the FHA relies almost 
entirely on standards developed by industry or private standards 
groups. 46 In fact, the FHA neither develops nor tests standards. 
Rather, it relies on many of the same sources from which private 
industry groups obtain information.47 The HUD study48 and the 
Report of the National Commission on Product Safety49 demon-
strated that although better than the private codes, FHA Minimum 
Property Standards are also seriously deficient in their relevancy 
to home safety. 
Two of the most obvious examples involve glass doors and floor 
fumaces. In both cases, the FHA standards were found to be inade-
quate and the safety hazard easily correctable. Prior to the hearings 
held by the National Commission on Product Safety, FHA MPS did 
not require safety glass to be used in sliding glass doors. 50 Although 
safety glass is now required, the standards still do not require the use 
of safety glass in windows. 51 Similarily, the standards do not require 
floor fumace coverings to be designed to minimize heat. Thus, 
every year a large number of children fall and receive extreme 
bums from the covers that heat up to approximately 400• F.62 
43 H ereinafter referred to as the FHA. Unless otherwise indicated, information in 
this section is based on R. Jacobs, Federal Housing Administration: Poor Standards 
Poorly Applied, 1970 (unpublished report prepared for Ralph Nader). 
44 Supra note 15. 
45 See also PRODUCT SAFETY REPORT, supra note 5 at 12. 
46 See generally BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, supra note 13 at 263-64. 
47 For example, many standards utilized are those developed by the American SocietY 
for Testing and Materials and the United States of America Standards Institute. See 
discussion in note 23, supra. In addition, FHA MPS often deem private code standards 
to be acceptable for use as a substitute for the standards of the FHA MPS themselves-
FHA MPS, supra note 15. 
48 HoME AcciDENT STUDY, supra note 1. 
49 See generally PRODUCT SAFETY REPORT, supra note 5. 
50 Id. at 12. Yet, over 100,000 people walked through glass doors in 1969. l d. Tbe 
Comznission also found that "of 10 such injuries studied," all could have been prevented 
or limited by the use of safety glass. I d. 
51 HoME AcciDENT STUDY, supra note 1. 
52 PRODUCT SAFETY REPORT, supra note 5 at 15. Each year nearly 60,000 children 
under the age of five sustain burns, requiring m edical treatment, as a result of falli~g 
on floor furnace covers. !d. D. Julian Waller, testifying before the Commission, state : 
The only other heating device . . . so constructed is the barbeque, and 
this is a device that is deliberately designed to cook flesh . .. . The tempera-
ture at the level of the floor furnace grate has been actually recorded at 
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Yet, the Product Safety Commission was able to obtain three dif-
ferent plans for coverings that would substantially reduce the tem-
perature at floor level, for little or no additional cost. 53 
One reason for the present situation is the constricted view 
taken by FHA officials of that agency's role in the housing area. 
Despite the impact FHA MPS have on housing construction, the 
view within the agency is that standards are designed only to insure 
the soundness of the government's insurance investment. 54 More-
over, both FHA officials and homebuilders agree that a house built 
only in accordance with FHA standards would not only be unsafe, 
but would probably be uninhabitable. 55 
B. Enforcement 
Despite their deficiencies, in terms of safety, the F1IA MPS 
are superior to those of the private codes. Proper enforcement of 
tJ;e standards could serve the useful purpose of insuring that defi-
~lencies occurring in private national codes, but which do not exist 
In the FHA MPS, are eliminated from F1IA insured housing. A 
sampling of inspection techniques for compliance with FHA MPS 
requirements in the Washington, D. C. area, however, indicated 
that standards are often not met. Moreover, when a home owner 
attempts to secure compliance, he often is faced with a mountain 
of .red tape and bureaucratic ineptness. A survey of twenty-five 
bu1lders in the Washington, D.C. area found that the average length 
of time between receipt of a letter of complaint by the FHA and 
the repair of the defect was eleven weeks. In one case, the defect 
existed 150 weeks before it was corrected. 
This poor enforcement record is the result of a lack of man-
power, normal bureaucratic lethargy, and knowledge by the builder 
of the reluctance of FHA officials to use the only enforcement tool 
th~y h ave. Any builder who fails to build to standards or refuses to 
f nng his work up to standards may have his work declared ineligible 
.or FHA financing. This sanction, however, is rarely used. In Wash-
hngton, D. C., a builder will not be subjected to sanctions unless he 
h
as not complied with standards in ten percent or more of his 
omes. . 
between 300° and 350° F .. .. [the usual temperature for cooking] chicken, 
b~ef, ham, veal and . . . other meats. Hearings of the National Commis-
szon on Product Safety, (Feb. 19, 1969). --53 p 54 J RonucT SAFETY REPORT, supra note 5 at 16. 
55 1
acobs, supra note 43. 
d. 
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v. PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE: THE NIBS BILL 
Criticism of codes and code systems has focused more on achiev-
ing greater uniformity in code provisions in order to facilitate inno-
vation in the building industry than on the quality of the standards 
themselves. Very little attention has been given to safety factors, 
although the emphasis on uniformity may incidentally benefit the 
cause of safety. The building code study by the Advisory Commis-
sion on Intergovernmental Relations in 1966 emphasized the need 
for building codes of statewide application.56 The President's Com-
mittee on Urban Housing endorsed the Commission's proposal and 
urged the creation of a national "Building Standards Institute."57 
The National Commission on Urban Problems expanded this con-
cept to include the commitment of large sums of money for research 
and development, and urged an increase in federal involvement 
in the building standards area . 58 There is now before Congress a bill 
which incorporates many of these proposals. 59 
The NIBS Bill is an effort to implement a number of the recom-
mendations made by the National Commission on Urban Problems. 
The bill creates a National Building Sciences Institute as a public, 
non-governmental agency, and a non-profit corporation.60 In the 
declar ation of findings and policy, the bill justifies itself by stating 
that ( 1) there is no authoritative national source to make findings 
and advise the public and private sectors of the economy on build-
ing sciences and technology, (2) a single national building code 
is unworkable because of variations in local needs, (3) the present 
lack of uniformity increases the cost of housing and reduces the 
housing stock, and ( 4) the creation of the Institute will facilitate 
development of new technology. 61 
The Institute would consist of a Board of Directors appointed 
by the President62 and a Consultative Council to be created by the 
Institute itsel£. 63 The Council 's membership would be composed of 
trade associations, building code groups, professional associations 
and consumer groups. The Council would essentially serve as a "line 
of communication" between the above mentioned groups and the 
56 BuiLDING CoDES, supra note 12 at 63-73, 87-98. 
57 A DEcENT HoME. supra note 12 at 29. 
58 BuiLDING THE AMERICAN CITY, supra note 13 at 266-70. 
59 Building Sciences Act of 1971, S.1859, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) [hereinafter cited 
as the NIBS Bill]. 
60 ld. §1003 (a) [hereinafter cited as the Institute]. 
61 ld. §1002 (a). 
62 !d. §1004(a) . 
63 ld. §1004(h). 
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Institute. 64 The function of the Institute would be to dev~lop, pro-
mulgate and maintain nationally recognized performance standards, 
technical provisions and test procedures suitable for adoption in 
b~ilding codes. 65 This would be accomplished through contracting 
With existing private organizations such as testing laboratories.66 
Funding initially is to come from Congress, 67 but the Institute will 
be authorized to charge fees for its services. 68 
. Inclusion of Institute-created standards within building codes 
Is to be on a voluntary basis. The bill is apparently premised on the 
theory that code groups and local building officials will recognize 
~e value of a "single authoritative source" and, having participated 
In the Institute's work, will voluntarily accept Institute standards. 
However, the Institute's standards will be mandatory for all projects 
and programs involving federal assistance.69 In addition, depart-
ments and agencies within the federal government will be required 
to accept the standards of the Institute. 70 
It is suggested that the concept of the NIBS Bill is to facilitate 
the development of performance standards which will be generally 
accepted by both the building industry and building code groups 
and officials. Institute-developed standards will not, however, be 
pr~mulgated into a code, and compliance, except in federally-
ass~sted housing, will be voluntary. 71 It attempts to foster techno-
logical progress by increasing uniformity in codes .. eliminating 
restrictive provisions by providing an authoritative source for 
acceptability of new products and systems, and increasing the 
~~ou?t of funds available for research and development in the 
_U1ld111g sciences. The subject of home safety, however, is not men-
~oned. Although the provisions of the bill are adequate to achieve 
Its goals, the emphasis is clearly not that of home safety. If the 
~I~S Bill is to be made relevant to home safety, substantial changes 
In Its provisions will have to be made. 
. The concept of a single national model building code was 
reJected in the bill 
· · · because of the difficulty at all levels of government in updating ---64 ld. 
:: ~diBS Bill. supra note 59, §1006(a) (1). 
67 /do §1006(b). 
0 §1009. 
:: }~· §1007(b) . 
70 ° §1008(b) . 
tute /d. §1008(a). Federal departments and agencies may also contract with the lnsti-
71 or specific services. ld. §1008(c) . 
ado,.../he Institute has the power to develop appropriate methods for "encouraging" the 
"lOn of its standards by "all sectors of the economy." ld. §1006(c). 
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their housing and building regulations to refl ect new developments in 
technology, as well as the irregularities and inconsistencies which arise 
in applying such requiremen ts to particular localiti es or special local 
conditions ... 72 
It is not clear why the same difficulties will not arise with vol-
untar y standards, which exist under the present model building code 
system. 73 The bill seems to be based on the theory that the prestige 
of the Institute will sufficiently motivate local building code offi-
cials and organizations to up-date their building regulations. Yet, 
Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. and other prestigious testing organ-
izations certify many products and product systems that are rejected 
by code groups and local code officials. 
If Institute standards are to serve the purpose of insuring home 
safety, they must be promulgated into a national building code. The 
voluntary standards proposed by the present NIBS Bill may be 
sound for the purpose of increasing uniformity in order to reduce 
costs and increase technological development. But self-regulation 
or voluntary standards as a system to insure product safety is 
unworkable. After an exhaustive study of product safety, the Na-
tional Commission on Product Safety concluded: 
As related to product safety, self-regulation by trade associations 
and standards groups, drawing upon the resources of professional 
associations and independent testing laboratories, is legally unenforce· 
able and patently inadequate.74 
The implementation of a national building code would necessi-
tate the development of effective enforcement machinery. This could 
be done through regional FHA offices, utilizing personnel already 
employed in inspecting housing for compliance with FHA MPS. 
In addition, closer formal ties between the Institute and the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development should be provided. As 
the bill is presently written, there is no requirement that the Insti-
tute work with HUD.75 Yet HUD is the governmental agency whose 
primary responsibility is housing.76 Specifically, the Secretary of 
72 !d. §1002 (a) (2). 
73 See discussion in Part III, supra. 
74 PRODUCT SAFETY REPoRT, supr a note 5, at 2. 
75 The Institute is r equired to "consult with the Department of Justice and other 
agencies of the government to the extent necessary to insure that the national interest 
is protected and promoted in the exercise of its functions and responsibilities." No spe-
cific m ention is m ade of HUD. NIBS Bill, supra note 59, §1006(c) (3). 
76 The NIBS Bill provides that the Institute will be created with the advice and 
assistance of the "Academies-Research Council." /d. §1002(c). This advice and assistance 
will continue through the first five years of the Institute's operation. ld. §1003(b). It 
would seem, however. that HUD is the more appropriate governmental agency to as· 
sist in the operation of the Institute. At least it should have an equal role with the 
"Academies-Research Council." 
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HUD, or his representative, should be made a permanent member 
of the Institute's Board of Directors to assure coordination between 
IiUD and the Institute.77 
The problem of varying local conditions cited in the bilF8 can 
be easily resolved in a variety of ways. Most obvious would be the 
fashioning of standards to apply only where relevant. If u nique 
condition s exist, the problem could be brought to the Institute's 
attention and a provision written into the applicable standard of the 
national building code. An alternative would be to provide for sup-
plementation of the national code on the state level with approval 
of the Institute. This would reduce the workload of the Institute, 
increase the flexibility of the code system and reduce objections to 
a further federal involvement in what historically h as been an area 
of state and local prerogatives . An additional alternative would be 
to authorize limited changes by the enforcement officials in regional 
FHA offices. 79 
If the NIBS Bill is to address itself to home safety and amended 
~0 provide for a national building code, provision should be made for 
Increased participation by consumer representatives.80 As presently 
~rafted, the only direct participation of consumer groups would be 
In the Consultative Council.81 The bill also provides that the Board 
of Directors should, insofar as practicable, be representative of 
the consumer as well as industry and regional interests. 82 However, 
no mention of consumer interests is made when the bill states that 
the government should seek the assistance of the "Academies-
~esearch Council" and achieve the "greatest practicable participa-
~on" of industry in the creation of the Institute.83 Nor are consumers 
Included in the groups to be consulted by the "Academies-Research 
Council" when it proposes rules and procedures for the Institute. 84 
A system providing for permanent involvement of consumers 
should be developed. If the Institute's standards are to be binding, --St 77 ~he NIBS Bill does not specify the membership of the Board of Directors. In-
~~d, 1t merely provides guidelines for the selection of Board members. !d. §1004(a). 
79 
ld. §1002(a) (2) . 
av- ·lt would be necessary to provide the Institute with appeal procedures in order to 
gi 01 the present problems of product competition. Also, consumer groups should be 
in "en standing to appeal as a further check on undue local influence by a particular 
terest group. 
ad 
8~ .Even if the present NIBS Bill is not amended to include a national building code, 
Wo~~~onal consumer representation should be required at all levels of the Institute's 
:~ NIBS Bill, supra note 59, §1004(h) . 
83 ld. §1004(a). ld. §1002(c). 84 ld. §1003(b) (3). 
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rule-making hearings in accordance with the Administrative Pro-
cedures Act85 will have to be held. A permanent office should be 
created within the Institute whose function would be to represent 
consumer interests at these hearings. Legislation proposed by the 
National Commission on Product Safety86 includes a provision for a 
"Consumer Safety Advocate" who would be authorized, inter alia, 
to bring safety hazards to the attention of the proposed Consumer 
Product Safety Commission, comment on proposed and existing 
safety standards and to appeal decisions of the Commission.87 
Further, as currently drafted, the NIBS Bill envisions that a 
substantial portion of the work in developing standards will be done 
through delegation of the Institute's duties to private organizations.88 
While this concept is sound, provision must be made for indepen-
dent development of standards by the Institute when industry either 
fails to accept contracts or proposes unacceptable standards.89 
Finally, if it is to be an effective protective mechanism for the 
consumer, the NIBS Bill should provide a workable enforcement 
system and remedies for homeowners against builders who know-
85 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §1001 (1967). 
86 Consumer Product Safety Act of 1971 S.983, 92d Gong., 1st Sess. [hereinafter cited 
as the Product Safety Bill]. The National Commission on Product Safety proposed the 
Product Safety Bill to implement the findings of its extensive study of product safety. 
The stated purposes of the bill are to ( 1) protect the public from unreasonable product 
hazards to its health and safety; (2) assist consumers in evaluating the safety of con· 
sumer products; (3) to aid manufacturers of consumer products by encouraging indus· 
try to develop uniform safety standards . . . and ( 4) to promote research and investi· 
ga tion into the causes and prevention of product-related deaths and injuries. Product 
Safety Bill §2(b). This would be accomplished through the creation of a Presidentially-
appointed "Consumer Product Safety Commission." /d. §3(a). [Hereinafter cited as the 
Commission]. The Commission would have authority to issue mandatory product safetY 
standards. /d. §7; ban unreasonably hazardous products. ld. §14(a); require manu· 
facturers to notify the Commission of defects in their products. /d. §16(a); require recall 
and r epair of defective products. /d. §16 (h); require labeling of the product to indicate 
its compliance with product safety standards. /d. §7(b); hold hearings and issue sub-
poen as. ld. §19; and impose civil penalties for violations of standards. !d. §25. The 
Product Safety Bill also authorizes the imposition of criminal penalties. /d. §26; confers 
a private cause of action for treble damages on persons injured by reason of a "wilful 
or knowing violation of a consumer product safety standard or regulation . . .. " /d. 
§30; and preserves other common law remedies that might exist. /d. §29. 
Whenever it is determined that a safety standard is necessary, the Commission would 
be required to publish a notice in the Federal Register with a r equest for offers to 
develop 1he stan dard. /d. §S(a),(b) . The offers would be m ade by private organizations. 
Id. §8 (c) . Upon r eceipt of an offer, any action by the Commission would be suspended 
for 180 days, /d, If no offer is r eceived the Commission itself would develop the stand-
ard. Product Safety Bll1 §S(Il ) . Oneil devE!loped, the gt dnrcl ould B€! publt ll@d Jn 
th Fccl e~:al l\egi•tcr and then p.romuJgutcd by the Commission . hl . 
87 P roduct Safety Bill, supra note 86, §4. 
BB NIBS Bill, supra note 59, §1006(b) . 
89 The Institute shoulcl also be authorized to require labelin g and recall or on-site 
r epairs of defective homes, h ome products, and constr uction work. This authorization 
would have t o be applied only to large producers of mass housing, industrialized hous-
ing, and large developmen~s. Abs~n~e of sue~ authorization, h ?wever, would m ake the 
Institute obsolete as soon as mdustnahzed housmg becomes a r eahty. 
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~ngly fail to comply with building code standards. Civil and crim-
lnal sanctions should be included in the bill and, when enacted, be 
vigorously enforced. Private suits for treble damages against those 
who knowingly violate national code standards should also be 
provided. 9o 
The need for a building code system that will protect the home-
?Wner against unreasonable safety risks is clear. A national build-
Ill~ code with mandatory standards and spe.cifications would accom-
phsh the goals of the present NIBS Bill and also be an effective 
mechanism for insuring home safety. Actual drafting of an ex-
panded NIBS Bill will have to be a careful and meticulous process 
to allow for creativity and personal differences in taste. In addition, 
exceptions will have to be made to either the application of the 
st?ndards or the enforcement penalties for the rare individual who 
Stlll constructs his own home. Small contractors, however, should not 
be exempted. Coverage should extend to anyone who undertakes to 
provide a home for another. While this may tend to eliminate some 
of the smaller builders from the market, it will be a recognition 
that the building of a home for resale is an act with implications 
for the safety and emotional well-being of the consumer. 
VI. CoNcLUSIONS 
It is clear that a real problem of home safety exists today. Yet, 
there is little or no recognition of the problem. This is largely the 
result of the concern for the lack of housing available to large seg-
hents of the population. Great efforts and large amounts of money 
ave been devoted to increasing the supply of housing while little 
br . no concern has been expressed over the quality of the housing 
emg erected. Building codes have been viewed merely as impedi-
ments to technological innovation which must be overcome when-
eve~ possible by avoiding the necessity for compliance. With the 
arnval of industrialized housing on the horizon, the need for an 
~dequate system of consumer protection in the area of home safety 
lncreases . The NIBS Bill, as it is now written, is simply another 
step towards m ore housing at any cost . 
th The problem of the laGk of sufficient hou ing i a rMl 011~ tu:td 
. ~ above discussion is not intended to belittle efforts ail'ned at 
lnc1·~a sing the stock of available h ousing. On the other hand? to 
contmuc de-empha izi11g home safety for the sake of developing a 
gl"eater national supply ignores a legitimate and pressing societal ----90 The Product Safety Bill h as similar provisions. See note 86, supra. 
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interest in home safety. The purchaser of a home is entitled to 
expect that the product he purchases is of safe and sound construc-
tion and design. Solving the housing crisis should not be at the 
expense of the consumer's safety. 
The HUD Study and the Report of the National Commission 
on Product Safety demonstrated not only that serious safety haz-
ards exist, but that they are easily correctable. It is also clear that 
industry has taken no meaningful steps to eliminate these safety 
hazards. It is time that the well-publicized fact that "most accidents 
occur in the home" is taken seriously and that real action in the 
form of a national building code be taken. 
COMMENT 
HUMPTY DUMPTY IN THE SUPERMARKET: 
A Report on How All the King's Men 
Might Repair Those Fractured Pounds and Pints 
with Unit Pricing . 
Where consumers were once able to compare the prices of 
commodities sold by the pound or pint from the crate or barrel in 
neighborhood grocery stores, the contemporary practice of pack-
aging goods in uneven weights and measures has made it impos-
sible, as a practical matter, for shoppers to do so today. A handful 
of jurisdictions have enacted unit pricing laws requiring super-
markets to price each commodity per pound or other unit of 
measurement and to state this price on a label affixed to the com-
modity or shelf from which the product is offered for sale. This 
article explores the feasibility of the unit pricing requirement and 
considers problems inherent in legislation thus far enacted or 
proposed on the subject. 
95 
Today's homemaker would agree that there is something more 
than a merely casual similarity between Humpty Dumpty's di-
lernma and the fractured pounds, pints, quarts and ounces which 
flourish on supermarket shelves. Everyone who patronizes a super-
ll'larket has seen them - the box containing one pound four ounces 
of laundry soap, the package holding 7% ounces of cookies, and 
so forth. The similarity between the fractured measures and 
the plight of that droll little nursery rhyme character is made all 
the more striking when it is discovered that not even all the king's 
~en (the members of the United States Congress) have succeeded 
ln rnaking the pounds and the pints whole again - after twelve 
Years1 of trying! 
Is it so critical that packaged commodities be sold in even 
ll1easures (pounds, ounces, pints or quarts)? How else can a shop-
Per. determine that one product is really cheaper than another? 
~Ulte obviously, one box of soap selling at 58 cents per pound is a 
. e~ter bargain than another offered for 62 cents; especially when 
11 1s the same brand sold in a different size. But if the first box ---i}ll Congress first began to wrestle with the problem in 1960, after Sen. Philip M. Hart 
birroduced legislation which was popularly identified later as the "Truth-in-Packaging" 
A-ct' The bill, as amended, was enacted in 1966 as the Fair Packaging and Labeling 
. 16 u.s.c. §§ 1451-61 (1970). 
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is offered at 75 cents for one pound four ounces, and the purchase 
price of the second is $1.30 for two pounds two ounces, who would 
know that the better bargain is still the first? To appreciate the 
utter futility of attemping value comparisons of commodities sold 
in uneven weights or volumes under actual market conditions, the 
r eader IS challenged to determine which was the best bargain 
among the following products offered for sale by Alpha Beta's East 
Whittier (California) market on February 27, 1972.2 
Brand 
1. Alpha Beta 
2. White King D 
3. Tide 
4. B old 
5 . White King 
6. Miracle White 
7. Citrus 
8. Ivory Snow 
9. Dreft 
10. A lpha Beta 
11. Imperial 
12. Imperia l 
13. White King 
14. Drive 
15. Tide 
16. Pur ex 
17. Ivory F lak es 
18. R inso 
19. All 
20. S alvo 
21. Dash 
22. Imperial 
23. A Jpha Beta 
24. Drive 
25. Alpha Beta 
26. All 
27. Dash 
28. Un-Polluter 
29. Punch 
30. All 
31. Drive 
32. Tide 
33. Punch 
34. Cheer 
35. Cold Power 
36. Tide 
37. Ajax 
38. Gain 
39. Ajax 
40 . Fab 
41. Cold Power 
Designated 
Size 
Jumbo 
Giant 
Family 
Giant 
Giant 
Giant 
Giant 
Giant 
Giant 
Home 
Giant 
Home 
King 
Family 
Regular 
, Jumbo 
Giant 
Giant 
Jumbo 
Giant 
Giant 
Family 
Giant 
King 
Giant 
Home 
Jumbo 
Giant 
King 
Giant 
Gia nt 
King 
Giant 
Giant 
Giant 
Giant 
King 
Giant 
Giant 
Giant 
Giant 
Weight3 
9-13 
3-1 
10-11 
3-1 
2-8 
3-1 
3-0 
2-0 
2-12 
20-0 
3-1 
20-0 
4-10 
10-11 
1-4 
9-13 
2-0 
3-1 
9-13 
2-14 
3-1 
10-0 
3-1 
5-4 
3-1 
20-0 
9-13 
3-1 
5-4 
3-1 
3-1 
5-4 
3-1 
3-1 
3-1 
3-1 
5-4 
3-1 
3-1 
3-1 
3-1 
Price 
$1.41 
.57 
2.81 
.87 
.52 
.87 
.51 
.87 
.87 
2.51 
.29 
2.15 
.87 
2.81 
.37 
2.35 
.87 
.68 
2.35 
.79 
.82 
1.09 
.55 
1.09 
.50 
4.65 
2.35 
.87 
1.11 
.74 
.72 
1.41 
.65 
.87 
.73 
.87 
1.33 
.87 
.87 
.73 
.73 
2 In order of ascending cost, the five lowest priced commodities listed are: 11-lmPJ" 
rial, 9.6¢ per pound; 12-lmperial, 10.8¢ per pound; 22-lmperial, 10.9¢ per pouJJ ; 
10-Alpha Beta (private label), 12.6¢ per pound; and 1-Alpha Beta, 14.4¢ per pound. 
3 ' lVeight is given in pounds and then ounces. 
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Of course, one asks if the loss of a few pennies here and there 
?n unwise selections really makes much difference. In 1971, Amer-
Icans spent an estimated $80 billion at their grocery stores.4 From 
an experiment conducted by the New York City Commissioner of 
Consumer Affairs, 5 and on the basis of observations of at least two 
leading food retailers,6 it is not unreasonable to estimate that from 
~~ to 12 billion might have been slashed from the nation's grocery 
lll ~ast year if shoppers had had the mea'ns of distinguishing the 
relative per pound, per gallon or other unit cost of commodities 
(and utilized this information to guide their purchases) . 
~o appreciate the present Humpty Dumpty state o£ affairs on 
Arnenca's grocery shelves, and to gain some understanding of why 
our national legislators are finding it so difficult to patch the pint 
and the pound, one only has to search back into the recent history 
of the grocery industry's growth and development. 
GROCERY MERCHANDISING: 
A TwENTIETH CENTURY REvOLUTION 
th . Sixty years ago, American homemakers were required to do 
e1r shopping at a minimum of three outlets. Meat, produce and 
rocery items were usually sold at different stores.7 Thus accus-
_orned to shopping so many places, consumers were probably en-
couraged to compare the prices of goods sold at neighborhood stores 
- and to shop elsewhere for better bargains. Price comparison was 
~ade ea~ier by the fact that most staples were sold in bulk from 
the barrel or box. 8 The shopper could easily discem the fact that 
e grocer selling brand X soap chips for 7 cents per pound was ---30 4 1~~~wartz. U. S. Backs U-Price, Sees Brands Still Tops, Supermarket N ews, Aug. 
'5 F · at 1. The figure given was a Commerce Department projection. 
Two Urness, The Cost of Living - Unit Pricing, McCALLS, March, 1970, at 151. 
lowe f~'0l!PS of shoppers were sent into supermarkets with instructions to purchase the 
a co s Pnced commodities from a list of items n ormally consumed in the household. As 
standnseJuence of being unable to distinguish the relative prices per pound and other 
Was ar units of m easure. the. shoppe~s spent an average of 10 percent more than 
6 necessary to purchase the articles assigned. · 
shoufharles Fitzmorris. President of Benner T ea Company, estimates that consumers 
the S~ ble able to save 10 percent of their outlay for groceries. Unit Prices Move Onto 
kets e f, ~us. WEEK, June 6, 1970, at 23. U. S. Mart Stores, a chain of 21 supermar-
their operating in Kansas and Missouri, claims that shoppers would be able to reduce 
Utili ~·ocery bills by as much as 15 percent if this information were available and 
7 ~ · U. S. Mart Goes U-Price. Supermarket News, Feb. 22, 1971, at 31. 
29 (1g
6
MARR:IN, THE SuPERMARKET 7 (1963); J. HANDLER, You AND FooD MARKETING, 
8 s 8). 
l\.ruE ee P. SAYliES, FooD MARKETING 13-14 (1950); J. HANDLER, supra note 7, at 28; W. 
11 chL
6
En. & L. GARDIAN. CHANGEs IN THE MARKET STRucTURE oF GRocERY RETAILING 
1); M. ZIMMERMAN, THE SUPER MARKET 24 (1955). 
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offering no bargain when his competitor across the street was sell-
ing the same goods for 612 cents. Granted, the product might be 
tainted and scales tipped in the grocer's favor, but if the manu-
facturer were careful and the retailer honest, the shopper could de-
part the marketplace with her purse lightened only to the extent 
necessary to clean and feed her family. 
Beginning in that era, three successive revolutionary develop-
ments in grocery merchandising compromised, then finally dis-
patched, the integrity of the pound and other standard units of 
measure as aids to comparison shopping. In 1912, an Alpha Beta 
store introduced "self-service" shopping in Southern California. For 
the first time, shoppers were free to roam through the store and 
examine at close range the products available for sale.9 Freed frorn 
the necessity of asking at the counter for specific goods, shoppers 
were encouraged- and later, motivated - to vary their purchases, 
that is, to buy something they might not otherwise have thought of 
buying. 
Less than two decades later, that marketing innovation cul-
minated in the appearance of the supermarket. 10 Self-service stores 
and supermarkets each represented merchandising developments 
which resulted in reductions in the prices of food and other corn-
modities.11 Since stores could employ fewer persons to handle goods, 
labor costs declined. Increased consumer demand for a greater 
variety of goods, and expansion of shelves to accommodate this de-
mand, 12 resulted in increased opportunities for manufacturers of 
new products or different brands to display their wares. These 
events encouraged competition. To illustrate how self-service su-
permarkets influenced grocery merchandising, King Kullen, the 
New Jersey outlet generally credited as being this nation's first 
supermarket, could undersell conventional competitors by as much 
as fifty percent on many items. A leading brand of soup selling 
for 7 cents elsewhere could be offered from King Kullen's shelves at 
4 cents. 13 
Self-service stores and supermarkets were themselves made pos-
sible by a revolution in the production and packing methods of 
manufacturers. About the time Alpha Beta introduced self-service, 
certain technological advances in the manufacture of cardboard 
9 R. MARKIN, supra note 7, at 9; M. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 8, at 25. 
10 M. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 8, at 24, 30·31. 
11 R. MARKIN, supra note 7, at 10-11; SeeP. SAYRES, supra note 8, at 21-22. 
12 R. MARKIN, supra note 7, at 10. 
13 J. HANDLER, supra note 7, at 30; R.MARKIN, supra note 7, at 11. 
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packages made it possible to include containerization as the final 
step in the on-line food production process.U And since shoppers 
Were novv able to wander freely about their grocery stores, proces-
sors soon recognized that the package could itself be used to pro-
mote its contents.15 To the credit of the industry, packaging to in-
dividual consumer units advanced the elimination of spoilage and 
filth, the inevitable by-products of the bulk packing and barrel re-
tailing methods of the 19th century.16 Unfortunately, if packaging 
promoted sanitation, and if supennarketing represented efficiency 
and economies in the movement of goods from the processor to the 
consumer table, these developments hastened the demise of the 
Pound, pint, ounce and quart as means by which consumers could 
make value comparisons of the rapidly proliferating lines of goods 
making their appearance on grocery shelves. The story of the Ritz 
Cracker is a typical one and will illustrate the truth of the pre-
ceding observation . 
National Biscuit Company introduced the Ritz cracker in 1935. 
Then, as now, the Ritz cracker was packaged and sold in h alf-pound 
quantities . If the consumer had to choose 37 years ago between 
a packaged half-pound box of Ritz selling at X cents and a half-
Pound of crackers selling from the barrel at Y cents per pound, it 
VVas not too difficult for her to calculate 2 times X cents in order to 
compare the prices of the two products. But the barrels of cookies 
and crackers have disappeared from the market, and in the years in-
tervening between 1935 and the United States Senate hearings in 
1965 on the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, National Biscuit 
added 15 other cookies and crackers to its product line- all using 
0e Ritz box under their own labels. Only one other cookie weighed 
eight ounces when packed in this container. 17 Even disregarding 
the difficulty involved in figuring the cost per pound when fre:ctions 
of ounces are involved, as was the case with some National Biscuit 
Products, how many supermarket patrons are likely to pause and 
calculate that a 7-ounce box of crackers costs 14.29 percent more 
than an 8-ounce box selling at the same price er package? How 
many are even likely to read the label and discover there is a dif-
ference in the weights? 
The Ritz experience was hardly unique. Procter and Gamb e 
-----: : ~·DAVIS. PACKAGE AND PRINT 32 (1967). 
16 
d. at 34. 
c196lee J. HANDLER, supra note 7, at 27.28; L. Guss, PACKAGING IS M ARKETING 25-31 
17 ) . 
se Hearing on S. 985 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 
r. 89.28, at 293 (1965). 
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ultimately found itself using the same box for eight different brands 
of laundry cleansing compounds - all of different weights owing 
to the varying density of each product. 18 Kellogg's standard box 
held dry cereals weighing as little as 6Yz ounces- and as much 
as 14 ounces! 19 
If the practice of packaging generically related products of dif-
ferent weights in the same size package was deceptive, the decep-
tion was, at the outset, unintentional. Just as Hum pty Dumpty's 
tumble from the wall was as inevitable as the law of gravity, the 
problem of the fractured pounds and pints was dictated by the law 
of the marketplace. As consumer demand increased (or was stimu-
lated by advertising) for a greater variety of goods,20 manufacturers 
discovered they could hold or expand their share of the market by 
adding products to their existing lines. As companies added new 
products, they found it was cheaper to utilize existing packages 
rather than tool-up the equipment necessary to produce containers 
which would h ave made it possible to offer the new products in the 
standard pound and half-pound weights. Avoiding this cost per-
mitted the manufacturer to introduce a new product at the lowest 
price possible, to minimize his risk and, in some cases, to introduce 
items with limited consumer appeal (salt-free crackers, as one ex-
ample) . Furthermore, using one standard container for several 
products allowed the manufacturer to forego the added cost and in-
convenience of storing and transporting odd-sized packages. 
Even if it is assumed that the savings were passed on to the 
consumer, those savings have been greatly offset in recent years 
because of the inordinate increase in the number of package sizes 
which are u sed. As a consequence of that increase, shoppers have 
been foreclosed from comparing the relative values of the 5,000 to 
15,000 items21 which today line a typical supermarket's shelves. 
M oreover, the increased number of package sizes available has 
tended in recent years to reduce rather than heighten competition . 
The incentive to pr ice competitively is diminished by the realiza-
18 Id. at 244. 
19 !d. at 335. 
20 See P . SAYRES, supra note 8, at 26-27; R. MARKIN, supra note 7, at 50-51, 62. 
21 The average supermar ket carr ies 8,000 commodities. Sanford, Know What You're 
Buying - New Proposals by Ben Rosenthal, T H E N Ew R EPUPLic, Jan. 24, 1970, at 12. 
In 1961, the average superm arket stocked over 6,300 items, an increase of 3,300 items 
over the coiTesponding figure for 1946. R. MAnK IN, supra note 7, at 60. Executives 
of five Southern California m arket chains were interviewed for this r eport. The sm all· 
est inventory per chain store among this group was 6,000 item s, with averages more 
usually ranging from 8,500 to 15,300. Infra n ote: 47, p. 106. 
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tion that there is no practical way for shoppers to compare the price 
?f one size of package with the price of another. The mean-
Inglessness of price per package is made dramatically clear when 
one studies the practice of "packaging to price." The manufac-
turer packages to price when he reduces the contents of his package 
while retaining the same price. Illustratively, the so-called nickel 
Hershey bar was reduced in ~weight three times during the 1960's 
before it was discontinued altogether.22 
UNIFORM PACKAGING 
By the 1950's, it had become apparent to some members of 
Congress that the only shopper who could fare effectively in the 
rna~ketplace was one possessing a lightning-fast arithmetical mind, 
a VIse-like memory and an absolute indifference to the shape, size 
?r boldface promises appearing on the thousands of containers lin-
Ing the grocers' shelves. In 1960, Senator Philip M . Hart (D-Mich.) 
Pr?posed legislation23 which would have required, among other 
things, standardization of weights or liquid volumes of packaged 
cornrnodities found in grocery stores. Supporters of the bill rea-
~oned that even if the standard measures ultimately adopted were 
~ arb~trary quantities, no housewife would be unable to compare 
he pnces of uniformly packaged goods._ This h~pe proved fut~le, 
A.owever, when Congress enacted the Fmr Packag~ng and Labehng 
ct
24 
in 1966 without the mandatory provisions of the original 
~a~ bill. Instead, unifom1. packaging was left to be implemented 
Y Industry on a voluntary basis. 25 
. Despite the disappointment of those advocating uniform pack-
agml?, Congress' rejection of that feature of the Hart proposal did 
~? disservice to consumers. This is true for at least three reasons. 
shrst, _the ~sefulness of unif?rm packaging as an aid to comparison 
0PPlng Is open to questwn so long as the standards selected 
':he not even pounds, pints and quarts (or divisibles or multiples 
ereof) .26 To illustrate, suppose that a shopper loyal to Tide laun-----22 M: b . Sanfo dow ray, Truth in Packaging: How Much a Pound?, 208 NATION 730 (1969); 
2a r • supra note 20. · 
son). 117 CoNG. REc. S. Joun 1516 (daily ed. Feb. 18, 1971) (remarks of Senator Nel-
;! 15 U. S. C.§§ 1451-61 (1970) . 
e)(:pr Shortly after the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act was enacted, Senator H art 
ilnplessed his opinion that uniform packaging was more likely to succeed if voluntarily 
2s elllented than if mandated. Sanford, supra note 21. 
tiaz ]anford, supra note 21; Friedman, Dual Price Labels: Usage Patterns and Poten-
(un en_efits for Shoppers in Inner-City and Suburban Supermarkets, October, 1970 
Cha~b)hshed report to Safeway Stores, Inc., and the National Association of Food 
s · See Mowbray. supra note 22. 
102 LOYOLA Consumer Protection JOURNAL [Vol. 1:95 
dry detergent was attempting to decide which size package yielded 
the best value. In choosing between the "Giant," "King" and "Fam-
ily" sizes, it would be necessary for her to calculate the price per 
pound to ascertain which was the best bargain. The weights of these 
three sizes are, respectively, 3 pounds 1 ounce, 5 pounds 4 ounces, 
and 10 pounds 11 ounces. 27 Clearly, the calculation is not a sim-
ple one. 28 
The second reason why uniform packaging might prove un-
desirable requires a consideration of the relationship between con-
tainers currently utilized and the products they contain. Packaging 
probably played a secondary role in the development of most prod-
ucts now sold in food markets. In formulating a new product, the 
manufacturer was least likely to be concerned by the fact that the 
article would not weigh the same as previously developed goods 
packaged in the processor's standard container. To conform many, 
if not most, popular products to a standard weight so that they 
could be contained in existing packages would either be impos-
sible, or it would require reformulating those products in such 
a manner that they could comply. If reformulated, the products 
would cease to be available in the form or quality popular with 
consumers. 29 If merely repackaged in a container of different over-
all dimensions, a new kind of packaging deception would appear 
on grocery shelves. To illustrate, let us suppose that breakfast ce-
reals were required to be containerized in half-pound and one-pound 
quantities. Many "puffed" cereals are sold in markets and appear 
to be popular with consumers, if long continued availability oil 
grocery shelves is any indication. Other shoppers seem to prefer 
the dense, granular variety of breakfast food. One can imagine the 
temptation of shoppers to select the puffed cereal over the granular 
type if overall package dimensions were altered so that the former 
cereal were to appear in a larger package and the dense variety irt 
an even smaller container than as at present. Recalling the fact that 
Kellogg's standard box contains breakfast food ranging in weight 
from 6Jh to 14 ounces, one can appreciate the deception which 
27 The weights of the package sizes designated are among six weights suppose~lY' 
standardized voluntarily by manufacturers as of December. 1969. Hearings on RevzezP 
of the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act Before the Consumer Subcomm. of the Sen· 
ate Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 91 -30, at 86 (1970). 
5 
28 Solving for X where X equals the price per pound and a commodity weighing 
pounds 4 ounces is priced at $1.41 per package: 
84· oz. 16 oz. $22.56 g¢ 
(1) -- : --, (2) 84X = $1.41 X 16, (3) X = --, (4) X = 26. 
$1.41 X 84 
29 See 1965 Hearing, supra note 17. at 98. 
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would result if these cereals were containerized m half-pound 
quantities. 
The final consideration affecting the desirability of uniform 
pa~kaging is the cost of such a practice. Although there are no 
S~hsfactory figures available to pinpoint this cost, some examples 
Clted by manufacturers at the 1965 Senate hearing demonstrate 
th~t Congress was justified in hesitating to mandate uniform pack-
aging. National Biscuit told the Senators that it would cost the 
company $5,000,000 to tool-up the necessary equipment which 
:vould enable the company to package its 14 nonconforming cookies 
In half-pound weights.30 This figure did not include the additional 
expense involved in storing, crating and transporting the odd-sized 
Packages. Kellogg estimated this latter cost would amount to 
$2,050,000 per year (in addition to an initial C'onversion cost of 
$4,060,000) .31 Armstrong Cork Company, manufacturer of the bot-
tl~s for most baby foods produced in America, estimated that re-
tail prices of these commodities would rise up to 30 percent as a 
:resu~t of increased processing and handling costs. 32 Even were we 
to discount the reliability of these figures because of their sources, 
nevertheless, the author of this article (and presumably Congress) 
Was unable to discover any different figures which would support 
the feasibility of uniform packaging when the practice is subjected 
~~cost-benefit analysis. And it must be kept in mind that National 
Iscuit, Kellogg and Armstrong are only three of the thousands of 
lnanufacturers whose products are sold in grocery stores. 
uNIT PRICING LAws 
. Accepting the futility of promoting uniform packaging because 
of Its apparent unacceptability and doubtful utility as a solution 
to the problem of the uneven pounds and pints which rule gro-
ce~y manufacturing and merchandising, a handful of congressmen 
shifted their support to an alternative solution - one which would 
:require retail sellers to unit price commodities. Two years have 
Passed since bills33 were first introduced to amend the Fair Pack---:~ }d. at 293. 
32 d. at 335. 
83 ld. at 104. ts531Congressman Rodino proposed the first unit pricing law January 26, 1970. H. R. lat ' 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). A companion bill was introduced three months 
th er by Senator Pearson. S. 3752, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) . The bills expired when 
haey Were not reported out of committee by the end of the 91st Congress. Seven bills 
sg3~ been introduced in the 92nd Congress. S. 868, 928 and H. R. 990, 1572, 4425, 
• 6776, 92d. Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). 
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aging and Labeling Act to add the unit pricing r equirement with-
out and visible progress towards attainment of this goal. Where 
the congressmen have failed, however, legislators of Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, Maryland and the City of New York have succeeded 
in obtaining passage of unit pricing laws.34 
Unit pricing - or more accurately, dual pricing -requires 
the grocer to inform his patrons how much each commodity costs 
per pound, quart, 100-count, 100-square-feet, or other standard unit 
of measurement. The retailer is required to do no more than what 
his predecessor did sixty years ago when goods were sold from bulk 
containers. He is also permitted to retain the price per package. 
While the usual unit pricing requirement involves affixing a label 
containing the price per measure to the shelf at point of sale,35 the 
retailer may also include the price per package on this label, or 
continue to stamp this information on the package itself. Thus, by 
merely glancing at the labels along the shelves, shoppers are able 
to determine which product in each commodity grouping is priced 
lowest per unit of measure. From this information, bargain shop-
pers are afforded an opportunity to reduce their weekly grocery 
bill by as much as 10 to 15 percent! 36 
As is to be expected, unit pricing has drawn both criticism and 
support. Detractors argue that the practice of dual pricing is too 
expensive; that it will add from one percent to one-and-a-half per-
cent37 to the cost of doing business and that this cost must be passed 
on to consumers . They claim that the practice has been met with 
34 M Ass. GEN. LAws ch. 885, § 115A (1970); Unit Pricing Regulation, Mass. Con-
sumers' Council Bulletin, No. UP-1-1971 (Mar. 9, 1971); Unit Pricing Regulations, 
Mass. Consumers' Council Bulletin, No. UP-2-1 971 (Jan. 6, 1972); Mass. Consumers' 
Council, Unit Pricing Interpretative Bulletin, No. 1 (May 14, 1971). Conn. Pub. Act 
856 (July 15, 1971); Unit Pricing Regulations, Conn. Dept. of Consumer Pro-
tection Bulletin. Mn. ANN. ConE art. 83 § 21E (Supp. 1972) . NEw YoRK, N. Y., 
AnM. ConE ch. 64, art. J, §§ B64-1.0 - 5.0• (1971); N.Y. Dept. of Consumer Affairs 
Regs. §§ 1-4 (June 1, 1971), as amended (July 1, 1971) . For the provisions of the 
Massachusetts'. Connecticut and New York City Regulations see Appendices B, C and 
D, infra, page MM. 
35 The label may be attached to the item or the shelf over or under the item. Unit 
Pricing Reg. § 3(a), Mass. Consumers' Council Bulletin, No. UP-2-1971 (Jan. 6, 1972). 
The label may be attached to the item, or "directly adjacent to the item, or on the 
shelf on which the item is displayed." Mn. ANN. ConE art. 83, § 21E(d) (1) (Supp. 
1972) . The commodity shall be signified or labeled at "the point of display." NEW 
YoRK, N.Y., AnM. ConE ch. 64, art. 1, § B64-3.0 (1971). 
36 See discussion notes 5 and 6 supra. 
37 Interviews with Roy Bryant, Vice President, Sales and Merchandising, Shopping 
Bag Food Stores, Inc., in El Monte, Calif., Dec. 3, 1970; Sam Novicoff, Grocery M er-
chandiser and Buyer, Food Fair Stores, Inc., Pacific Division, in Los Angeles, Dec. 10, 
'1970; Perry Burnside, President, Buy-Fair Markets, Inc., in Covina, Calif., Dec. 17, 
1970. These r etailers projected the increase indicated, although all admitted to having 
performed no studies on the subject. They stated that this expected increase was the 
principal concern regarding unit pricing, should it be required by law. 
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consumer indifference where implemented.38 They suggest it would 
cause undue hardship and possibly force some operators out of busi-
ness (especially the so-called "mom and pop" stores) .39 And fi-
nally, they conclude that the practice is fraught with its own in-
herent deceptions, which mislead shoppers into purchasing cheaper 
products, thus defeating its purpose of providing a way for con-
sumers to make value comparisons and obtain the most from their 
household financial resources. 40 
Careful examination of the facts advanced in support of the 
preceding arguments will reveal that they contain misleading seeds 
of truth. However, the experiences of retailers who have adopted 
unit pricing, plus studies conducted on the subject, prove conclusive-
ly that the practice can achieve its objectives if intelligently and se-
lectively applied. 
CosT oF UNIT PRICING 
Studies commissioned by industry itself, 41 plus the experiences 
reported by chains which have tested unit pricing,42 demonstrate 
that the cost of unit pricing is negligible if the practice is limited 
to pricing at the shelf level (by way of attaching a shelf tag at point 
of. sale) and does not require stamping each product with the unit 
Pnce.43 Additional savings to retailers may be obtained if the prac---at 3~ Fisher, Few Shoppers Understand U-Pricing, Supermarket News, May 17, 1971, 
L · Ms. Martha Randall, Director of Home Economics, Ralphs Grocery Company, 
u~ ~~eles, r eported that a survey of shoppers disclosed that only 20% understood s1 Pncmg. But see text p. mm, infra. 
40 Interview with Bryant, supra note 37. 
4 Interview with Robert Laverty, President, Thriftimart, Inc., in Los Angeles, Dec. 
p' 1970. Padberg & McCullough A T est of Unit Price Marking of Packaged Grocery 
I~~ducts 14-15, November, 1970 :(unpublished report by ~onsume~ Research Institute, 
4i' 1425 K Street, N.W., Washmgton, D.C. 20005 [heremafter Cited as Padberg]. 
CD L Padberg, supra note 40; see Statement of Congressman Benjamin S. Rosenthal 
fu~··hNY) at Press Conference on Unit Pricing 2, Oct. 30, 1970 (unpublished matter 
42 IS ed by Safeway Stores, Inc.). 
By Statement of Congressman Benjamin S. Rosenthal, supra note 41; interview with 
ge{on Allumbaugh, Executive Vice President, Ralphs Grocery Company, in Los An-
G esM, Dec. 2, 1970; Bay Staters Wrangling Over Measures; Arizona Chain Decides to W averick, Supermarket News, Mar. 1, 1971, at 12; Unit Pricing Costs Chain $3 
s/'kk'l; for Each Store, Supermarket News, June 28, 1971 , at 6; Two Bay State Chains 
Loe C ationwide U-Price Laws, Supermarket News, Dec. 20, 1971, at 8; Wholesaler in 
Pri: ost Unit Pricing, Supermarket News, Dec. 13, 1971, at 8; Marketing - Unit 
by cz,ng Chalks Up Some Surprises, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 31, 1970 at 80; see $1.20 Divided 
tend'ouUrteen Ounces Is What?, FoRBES, Apr. 1, 1970, at 55; McCullough, Oshawa Ex-
I<u· s -Pricing to 138 Ontario IGA Units, Supermarket N ews, May 17, 1971, at 14; 
Labcf, Albertson's N. Calif. Unit-Pricing Brings More Sales of Large Items, Private 
43e • Supermarket N ews, Aug. 9, 1971, at 8. 
that Clarence Adamy, President of th11 National Association of Food Chains. estin1ates 
gro to s~amp each individual item with the 1mit price would increase the nation's 
eery hill by as much as $300 million yearly. Yes, But How Much Is It Per Pound?, 
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tice is further limited to dual pricing only those commodities for 
which the price per unit is helpful to consumers.44 Both these tests 
are satisfied by a Model Unit Pricing Act45 included in the Appen-
dix to this report. (The Model Act was drafted by the author of 
this article for the purpose of comparing pr ovisions of various leg-
lslah ve enactments and. proposa s on e subJect of unit pde1l'ig. ) 
Since consumers shopping for bargains compare the price tags 
placed by grocers along the shelf molding at point of sale, it would 
be unproductive of any real benefit to require stamping each gro-
cery item with the unit price. Furthermore, since virtually all 
supermarkets have been equipped with shelves whose edges are 
slotted or otherwise designed to receive tags, and since shelf tags 
are capable of being printed by electronic data processing equip-
ment (a resource directly or indirectly available to nearly all gro-
cers affected by existing and proposed unit pricing legislation46), 
limiting the practice to shelf marking would reduce the cost of 
dual pricing to retailers, and ultimately to the public. Finally, the 
average supermarket expends from two to three hours weekly chang-
ing shelf tags to accommodate price changes, whereas its personnel 
require from nine to twelve hours to stamp (or re-stamp) commod-
ities with their price per package.47 Since shelf labels are capable 
of carrying both the unit price and price per package, no increase 
in labor costs is necessitated at the store level to maintain this phase 
of its pricing operation.48 To require stamping each commodity 
with its unit price would mean that the market operator must either 
abandon pricing per package or double the man-hours expended 
Bus. WEEK, Jan. 31, 1970, at 51. Adamy is then quoted as stating, "Unit pricing changes 
from something very expensive to something quite nominal if only the shelving below 
the individual items has to be marked." $1 .20 Divided by Fourteen Ounces Is What?, 
supra note 42. 
44 Interview with Allumbaugh, supra note 42. 
45 For the provisions of the MoDEL UNIT PRICING ACT see Appendix A, infra p.MM. 
46 As of 1964, fully 85 percent of all independent supermarkets were affiliated with 
independent or cooperative wholesalers and this percentage was increasing, J. HANDLER, 
H ow TO SELL THE SuPERMARKETS 19 (1966). The affiliated and chain operators ac-
counted for 91 percent of total grocery sales. ld. at 21. "Through their membership 
in [voluntary wholesale affiliates or retailer-owned cooperatives], independent super-
m arkets obtain services similar to those provided to the chain supermarket by its 
company headquarters." ld. at 19. See, MuELLER & GARDIAN, supra note 8, at 17, 
11 7, 120-121, 168; R. MARKIN, supra note 7, at 34-35. It is believed, for example, that 
all independent California supermarket operators are affiliated with Certified Grocers 
of California, Ltd., United Grocers, Ltd., or Orange Empire Stores, wholesalers provid-
ing extensive data processing services to their affiliates. Interviews with Allumbaugh, 
supra note 42; Burnside, supra note 37. 
47 Interviews with Bryant, Novicoff and Burnside, supra note 37; Laverty, supra 
note 40; Allumbaugh, supra note 42. 
48 Interview with Allumbaugh, supra note 42. 
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for commodity pricing.49 If he abandons pricing per package, this 
~ould result in inconveniences and delays at the checkout stand, 
Since no clerk could be expected to remember the prices of all 5,000 
to 15,000 grocery items sold by the average supermarket.50 
, Reference was alsg made earlier to limiting dual pricing to 
ih~lns for which su ch in form ation is helpfu l to consumers. A gn:at 
many items sold by markets are already packaged in even units of 
measure (or divisibles or multiples of those units). For example, 
an 8-ounce package of cookies requires no unit price label to in-
f~rrn the shopper of its cost per pound. A half-gallon bottle of or -
dn:ary household bleach similarly requires no explanation of its 
Pn~e per quart or gallon. And since uniform packaging in even 
umts of measure remains a desirable goal, elimination of goods 
thus packaged from the unit pricing requirement would tend to re-
cruit retailers into the struggle to compel manufacturers to imple-
ment this practice where feasible. 51 
. Regarding the studies and experiences of retailers on the sub-
Ject of unit pricing, in no reported instance has the practice added 
anything near the 1 to 1 Y2 percent increase predicted by some oper -
?tors in their food prices. Consumer Research Institute, Inc., an 
lndustry-sponsored research group, was commissioned in 1970 to 
SUrvey Kroger Company's experience with unit pricing in its To-
ledo, Ohio, division. The study52 was conducted to gather data 
co~cerning the cost of installing and maintaining the particular 
llnlt pricing systems utilized by Kroger, to study the movement 
of goods among the 5,000 items unit priced in each store, and to 
measure the awareness and attitudes of consumers regarding the 
Practice. 53 The Institute's report of the results of this study was 
PUblished in November, 1970. Includjng amortization of set-up 
costs over two years, it was figured that unit pricing entailed 
an annual expense per store ranging from $3,113 .62 downward to 
$2,479.11. 54 Translating these figures into costs in terms of per-......___ 
:~ lnterviews with Bryant, supra note 3 7; Allumbaugh, supra note 42. 
51 nterview with Bryant. supra note 37. 
Wo ld. When asked if unit pricing laws were to favor uniform packages if this 
in Uld cause retail grocers to exert pressure on manufacturers to standardize packages 
be even units of measurement, Mr. Bryant volunteered the observation that they would 
4~ompelled to do so. The provisions of the following should be compared: M Ass. GEN. 
ll.e s Rch. 885 §1 15A (1970); N. Y. City Dept. of Consumer Affairs, Truth-in-Pricing 
Co~· IJ 2(c) (June 1, 1971) (set forth in Appendix B, infra p. MM); Conn. Dept. of 
c .su
1
mer Protection, Prop. Unit Pricing Reg. § 3(d) (1972) (set forth in Appendix 
!>.'~\Ia p. MM); MoDEL UNIT PmciNG AcT§ 1(e) (set forth in Appendix A, infra 
52 ) . 
53 faadberg, supra note 40. 
54 ld. at 3 . 
. at 8. 
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centage of sales, since the typical gross sales of all but a few super-
markets is between $1 and $4 million annually,55 at the lowest end 
of this range, unit pricing would represent a maximum expense 
of one-fifth of one percent of sales. To stores at the highest range 
of sales ( $4 million annually), unit pricing would represent an op-
erating expense of no more than .075 percent of sales. 
Significantly, the Kroger Company's cost of unit pricing is the 
highest reported in the industry. Other operators have been able 
to accomplish dual pricing at a fraction of the above costs. For 
example, Ralphs Grocery Company of Los Angeles, which had gross 
sales from 63 stores of $260 million in 1970, ascertained that unit 
pricing entailed a weekly expense of $35 per store while indi-
cating that the expense of programming and maintaining its unit 
pricing system at the company's data center was so negligible that 
it could not be estimated.56 The $35 weekly cost to Ralphs repre-
sents an operating expense of only .044 percent of sales - not the 
1 t 1 ~ p~rc~nt proj~ct~d by oth~r ope a tors, but less than one half 
of one-tenth of one per cent! 
Other companies have been able to do even better than Ralphs. 
Chicago-based Jewel Food Stores estimate their cost to be under $20 
per store per week. 67 Benner T ea Company's 23 Illinois, Iowa and 
Missouri stores project an addtional expense of only $4 per store per 
week. 58 Twelve stores in Oklahoma's Independent Grocers Alliance 
report a weekly cost of $8.57 (plus an additional set-up expenditure 
of $80.40 per store.) 59 Fox Grocery Company's 85 Pennsylvania 
stores each expend $3 per week (after investing $100 to convert to 
unit pricing) . 
The most impressive achievement reported this far was scored 
by New York's S. M . Flickinger Company, a wholesaler serving 
Buffalo retailers. Flickinger charges its customers $20 to supply 
them with initial shelf labels, plus $1 per week for tags needed 
to accommodate price changes.60 Since Flickinger's business con-
sists of selling goods and services to supermarket operators, the com-
pany's achievement is perhaps the most reliable gauge of the abilitY 
of the industry to perform dual pricing at a low cost. 
55 !d. at 10; How TO SELL THE SuPERMARKETS, supra note 46, at 14. 
56 Interview with Allumbaugh, supra note 42. 
57 Marketing - Unit Pricing Chalks Up Some Surprises, supra note 42. 
58 Price of Everything, (NEWSWEEK) June 15, 1970, at 76. 
59 Dual Pricing to Twelve Oklahoma City IGA 's, Supermarket News, Feb. 1, 1971, 
at 8. 
60 Unit Pricing Costs Chain $3 Weekly for Each Store, supra note 42. 
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Finally, more recent reports suggest that unit pncmg may 
not be costing retailers anything, on account of unanticipated 
savings accruing from the practice. A & P and Star Market Com-
pany, both switching over to unit pricing under compulsion of Mas-
sachusetts law, have been reported as observing that the practice has 
resulted in "spinoff benefits" in the form of better inventory control, 
which in some instances has "more than justified the cost of unit 
Pricing."61 Albertson's, Inc., which has adopted unit pricing in its 
Northern California, Los Angeles, Denver, .Salt Lake City and Ida-
ho62 Divisions, has also indicated that its cost of unit pricing has been 
offset by unexpected benefits. As a direct consequence of unit 
Pricing, Albertson's Northern California Division reports it has 
been able to improve allocation of shelf space and eliminate costly 
duplication of shelf tags by consolidating infonnation previously 
Posted on one or more tickets into one tag printed out by com-
PUter. 63 Alpha Beta, which shifted over to unit pricin g last Sep-
te~ber? also expects to roduc"<~ operating ost by elhni11t1ting du-
Phcative price tags.64 
CoNSUME R INDIFFER ENCE 
. Having seen that unit pricing is not costly, we turn now to the 
obJection that the practice is not justified because too few shoppers 
Pay attention to the labels in stores where they are posted. 
It is true that patrons of some markets do pay little attention 
to the tags. 65 On the other hand, several surveys have demonstrated 
that other markets' customers do heed the tickets and use them in 
~electing their purchases. 66 One suspects that the relatively low 
1n1Pact dual pricing has made in some outlets is not a fault of the 
rr~ctice but an indication that the operators of those stores have 
~lled to promote and educate the public regarding the use of labels. 
t ne suspects, further, that non-promotion is rooted in the hope 
bhat, through benign neglect, the dual price labels may eventually 
1': P~ased out of operation, and that public censure or criticism for ~ ~nunating the practice will be avoided with the observation, "We 
:t'led it and it didn't work. " 67 --- . ~~ Tw? Bay State Chains Seek Nationwide U-Price Laws, supra note 42. 
63 'frr:z.t-Pricing at Albertson's, Supermarket News, Aug. 16, 1971, at 8. 
s4 '"I!~ch, supra note 42. 
!\lew Zwlebach, Alpha Beta Targets September for Chain-wide Pricing, Supermarket 
6s s, June 14, 1971, at 8. 
66 In~erview with Allumbaugh, supra note 42; Fisher, supra note 38. 
ihg lh'nedman, supra note 26; Padberg, supra note 40, at 14; Mal'keting - Unit Pric-
s7 alks Up Some Surprises, supra note 42. 
Ralphs Vice President Byron Allumbaugh, although admitting that his company 
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Ralphs Grocery Company and Alpha Beta Markets, both Cali-
fornia operators, voluntarily added unit pricing to their merchan-
dising. Ralphs did so, ostensibly, to find out if there was a genuine 
public interest in the practice.68 Neither Ralphs nor Alpha Beta 
have substantially promoted their customers' awareness of unit pric-
ing. Several months after introducing the labels (to merely 1,700 
items of its average outlet's total inventory of 15,300 commodities), 
Ralphs reported it had noticed no unusual trends in sales of "pri-
vate labels" (brand name goods sold under the market's label, usu-
ally at significant reductions in the retail price) .69 Alpha Beta 
added unit price labels with so little fanfare that several months 
after the tickets appeared this writer discovered that even some 
clerks employed at one if its local markets were unaware of their 
existence.70 
By contrast, Albertson's two California divisions extensively 
promote unit pricing. The company's television and newspaper ad-
vertising feature a unit pricing theme. As a consequence of its 
promotional efforts, Albertson's Northern California Division has 
reported significant increases in sales of private labels and other 
bargain-priced goodsY Similarly, Fox Grocery Company of Penn-
sylvania stated that it experienced a substantial increase in over-
all sales after it became the first operator to dual price commodities 
in Pittsburgh.72 
Jewel Food Stores, testing unit pricing in all 258 of its Mid-
western outlets, discovered that 62.9 percent of its customers were 
aware of unit pricing, that 45 percent use the labels one or more 
times, and 29.8 percent use them regularly. 73 These figures cor-
respond to the results of a six-month survey of shoppers in two Safe-
way stores dual pricing in VVashington, D . C. The study74 was spon-
sored by Safeway and the National Association of Food Chains. 
Thirty-eight percent of respondents in the suburban store surveyed 
-------------------------------------------------------------
performed no survey of shoppers, stated his opinion that there had been "enough e~: 
perimentation to confirm the suspicions of r etailers who didn't think it would work· 
In justification of this position, Allumbaugh stated in an interview with the authOd 
of this article that Safeway h ad discontinued unit pricing when, in fact, Safeway ha 
two weeks previously expanded unit pricing from its W ashington, D. C., outlets to 
256 stores in four states. Safeway later implemented the practice nationwide. Inter· 
view with Allumbaugh, supra note 42. 
68 ld 
69 u: 
70 Friendly Hills Store, East W hittier, California. 
71 Kilich, supra note 42. 
72 Unit Pricing Costs Chain $3 Weekly for Each Store, supra note 4•2. 
73 Marketing - Unit Pricing Chalks Up Some Surprises, supra note 42. 
7,1 Friedman. supra note 26. 
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stated that they used the dual-price tags, and 25 percent of those 
polled in the inner-city store similarly reported their use.75 Most 
shoppers responding affirmatively continued to use the labels be-
yond the early period of the study.76 A few months after the re-
~ults of this survey were announced, Safeway instituted unit pric-
Ing on a nationwide basis. 
. Also tested in the Safeway study was the effectiveness of unit 
pncing as a means by which buyers coulq improve their ability to 
select the lowest priced commodities. It was found that shoppers 
Were from 2Yz to 7 times more likely to select the best bargains with 
unit pricing than without the aid of the labels .77 It was also dis-
covered that the voluntary implementation of uniform packaging 
and corresponding reduction in the number of package sizes by 
:nanufacturers since enactment of the Fair Packaging and Label-
lng Act was of little help to consumers in making value judgments, 
although some assistance was afforded in comparing the prices of 
:packages of the same size. Uniform packaging ceased to be helpful 
In comparing prices of packages of different sizes. 78 
The Consumer Research Institute study79 attempted to measure 
~roger Company's patrons' attitudes towards unit pricing. There 
~tWas found that 64.2 percent stated that the labels saved time, and 
. 3.9 percent said they saved money. 80 Of the 64.2 percent respond-
~ng favorably to the labels, about half stated they h ad not changed 
f:rands in the 16 weeks they had observed the price tags. But one-
bfth said they had, and the remaining 28 percent could name a 
rand to which they had switched on account of the labels_Bl 
A survey82 of 222 women conducted last summer by the Bu-
r:au of Advertising of the American Newspaper Publishers Associa-
ilo_n_ determined that 69 percent of those polled were aware of unit 
iblcmg. Forty-three percent understood the practice completely. Of 
e 31 percent who had not heard of unit pricing, only 3 percent 
~h:e unable to comprehend the practice after a brief explanation. 
th lrty-eight percent of the women had noticed unit price tags at 
e :tnarket, and 18 percent used them. It was found that women --~: J~· at 3. 
77 • 
7 ld.at4 8 l . 
79 d. at 5. 
80 JJdberg, supra note 40. 
81 1 
. at 14. 
82 d. 
1971 
69% of Women in Study Aware of Unit Pricing, Supermarket News, July' 19, 
• at 10. 
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spending in excess of $11 were more likely to use the labels than 
those spending less. 
Although the preceding surveys do not support the claim that 
supennarket customers are indifferent to unit pricing, they do re-
veal that the majority of shoppers do not utilize the price labels. 
This fact can be read to mean that market operators, government 
and others concemed with advancing consumer interests have a 
large task ahead of them to re-educate the public conceming the use-
fulness of unit pricing as a means of conserving household finan-
cial resources. Remembering that unit pricing has been virtually 
absent from the marketplace for nearly two generations- since the 
disappearance of bulk merchandising - it is not surprising to find 
that only a minority of consumers (albeit a large minority) take 
advantage of the practice once it reappears. It must also be stressed 
that the surveys discussed above were conducted mere weeks or 
months after the practice was re-introduced by certain retailers. 
But even despite this circumstance, the studies demonstrate rather 
rem arkably just how many consumers recognize the inadequacy of 
pr ice per package as an aid to economizing on food purchases. 
Otherwise, why would any shoppers use the unit price labels at all? 
UNIT PRICING UNFAIR 
TO SoME GROCERs? 
As was discussed above, it is possible to dual price at a negli-
gible cost- and, possibly, at no cost whatsoever. 
The fact that unit pricing is inexpensive can be attributed 
to the widespread use of computer technology by supermarkets.83 
When Ralphs Grocery Company began dual pricing, it simply pro-
grammed its electronic data processing equipment to combine price 
and inventory infonnation already stored in its computer files. 84 
Although Ralphs initially utilized the services of a private printer 
to prepare the shelf labels, the company decided to re-program its 
computer to print out the shelf labels in order to further reduce 
its costs. The regular weekly posting of the labels themselves rep-
resented no additional cost to Ralphs since the new unit price 
tickets were substituted for shelf tags used formerly. Alpha Bet_a 
was able to avoid Ralphs' initial cost of converting over to un1t 
pricing by adding the new labels over a period of months; that is, 
83 Interview with Allumbaugh, supra note 42. 
84 ld. 
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substituting the shelf tags as commodity prices changed rather than 
all at one time.85 
It is scarcely to be imagined that a market chain of :my size 
does not own or lease electronic data processing equipment in this 
age of computer technology. Independent and small chain opera-
tors are another matter. Not owning or leasing computers, these 
operators are served by independent or cooperative wholesalers who 
do utilize such equipment.86 For example, Southern California's in-
dependent markets are provided reports of inventory movement 
based on orders placed with their wholesalers. 87 These reports are 
Utilized to determine allotments of shelf space, whether seasonal 
commodities are to be continued or discontinued, and so forth .88 
Transactions between the wholesalers and independents are almost 
entirely dependent upon electronic data processing facilities. 89 It 
takes no imagination to recognize that the wholesalers are capable 
of furnishing the dual price labels as an additional service to their 
customers or members. As a matter of fact, small chains required 
by Massachusetts' law to unit price were able to do so by this 
:tnethod. 90 
. Although it might be thought that operators leasing or own-
lUg their own equipment would enjoy a competitive edge over re-
tailers dependent upon others for labels, the Consumer Research 
Institute determined that this is not the case. The Institute found 
that the cost of unit pricing is dependent upon another and alto-
gether different factor. As was discussed previously, the Institute 
reported that the yearly cost to install and maintain unit pricing 
had a probable range of from $2,479.11 to $3,113.62 (based on 
Kroger Company's system of dual pricing) .91 The report noted 
that the principal factor affecting costs is the number of stores 
served by the computer furnishing the labels, regardless of whether 
the computer is owned or leased by the chain operator or by a 
Wholesaler serving independents. 92 Thus, the highest cost quoted 
represents the expense to an operator served by a wholesaler fur-
..____ 
1 9~~ Many Retailers With Dual Pricing, Open Dating, Supermarket News, Nov. 30, 
86
, at 12; Zwiebach, supra note 64. 
87 Interviews with Burnside and Novicoff, supra note 37; Allumbaugh, supra n ote 42. 
88 
Interviews with Burnside and Novicoff, supra note 37. 
!d. 
89 ld. 
at 
9
2
° Calkins. Wholesalers Color Dual Pricing Costly, Supermarket News, Dec. 7, 1970, 
, ? (cri ticizing the Massachusetts dual pricing law for de-emphasizing price per pack-
«g~11D general merchandising). 
92 Padberg, supra note 40, at 8. ld. at 8, 9. 
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nishing labels to 20 stores, or the cost per store in a chain of 20 
stores owned by one company.93 The lowest figure represents the 
expense per market in a 90-store distribution system.94 Recall, how-
ever, that Kroger's costs were the highest reported, and that one 
New York wholesaler has offered to furnish his customers with unit 
price tags at a cost of $1 per week (plus a one-time charge of $20 
for the initial labels) .95 
The familiar neighborhood grocery ("mom and pop") stores 
and intermediate-sized "superettes," as distinguished from super-
markets, require special consideration. To require operators of 
these small outlets to unit price would be as expensive as it would 
be unproductive of any real benefit to copsumers. Since these stores 
offer a limited variety of commodities, and few package sizes within 
each commodity grouping, one suspects that few shoppers have 
much difficulty selecting the least expensive among goods offered. 
Furthermore, shoppers do business in these establishments knowing 
the prices to be much higher than in nearby supermarkets.96 Con-
sumers usually patronize these small stores because they are more 
conveniently located for the one- or two-purchase shopping trip, or 
because they offer special items not to be found at supermarkets 
(such as ethnic foods), or because they are open for business at 
hours when the supermarkets' doors are closed.97 Finally, since 
neighborhood grocery stores are least likely to have access to com-
puter facilities, unit pricing would require some additional manual 
labor to prepare the dual price tags. This expense need not be nec-
essarily exorbitant, owing to the very fact that these stores carry so 
few items. It might also be expected that price conversion tables 
would be published so that manual calculations could be avoided, 
but is the expense, however little, really justified? 
The unit pricing laws of Maryland,98 Connecticut,99 Massachu-
setts100 and the City of New Yorkl01 took note of the neighborhood 
93 !d. at 8. 
94 !d. 
95 Wholesaler in Low-Cost Unit Pricing, supra note 42. 
96 Shaw, Mom-Pop Stores Appeal in Ethnic Neighborhoods, Los Angeles Times, Dec. 
27, 1970, § B, at 1, 3. 
97 !d. 
98 Mo. ANN. ConE art. 83, §21E (Supp. 1972). . 
99 Conn. Pub. Act 856 (July 15, 1971); Conn. Dept. of Consumer ProtectJOll• 
Unit Pricing Regulations (1972). For the provisions of the Connecticut regulations see 
Appendix C, infra p. MM. 
too MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 885. §115A (1970); Unit Pricing Regulations, Mass. Coj; 
sumers' Council Bulletin, No. UP-1 -1971 (Mar. 9, 1971), as amended by No. UP-2-19 
(Jan. 6, 1972) . For the provisions of the Massachusetts regulations see Appendix D, 
infra p. MM. C"tY 101 NEw YonK, N.Y·, AnM. CooE ch. 64, art. 1, §§ B 64-1,0- 5.0 (1971); N.Y. l 
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grocery stores and attempted to relieve them of the dual pricing 
burden. Maryland exem pts stores owned by "one owner" (presum-
ably corporations would qualify as '"one owner"), so long as no 
rnore than 10 outlets are owned by the "same company" (but only 
those outlets doing less than $750,000 business yearly are exempted) 
and the company does under $30 m illion business annually. 102 Con-
necticut's regulations exempt "owner operated single retail stores," 
Whether doing business as a sole proprietor:ship or partnership, or in 
corporate form. 103 Massachusetts relieves every "retail establish-
:rnent operated by a person as his sole place of business . . .. " 104 New 
Y$ ork City's ordinance requires stores to unit price only if they do 
250,000 or more business yearly (or if they are affiliated with 
other stores doing aggregate business in excess of $250,000) .105 
b Legislation submitted to Congress would exempt persons "who, 
d ecause of few employees or other facto rs, would be serio sly bur-
ened ... " 106 or "whose total gross sales do not exceed $250,000 per 
ann urn .... "107 
£ The Model Unit Pricing Act108 ignores the dollar volume or 
or:rn of ownership of the enterprise, but focuses attention instead 
on the underlying causes creating the need for unit pricing. If the 
problem. facing the consumer is one of selecting the most econom-
lcal :purchases from among a great many products offered for sale 
(a Situation which does not exist in the neighborh ood grocery 
stores), then only those places of business offering a large and 
~nfusing array of articles should be required to unit price. Thus, 
the rnodel legislation proposes that establishments offering more 
an a stated number of commodities - 2,500 food items109 ---D d~{ of Consumer Affairs, Truth-in-Pricing Regulations (June 1, 1971) , as amended 
see f 1• 1971). For the provisions of the New York City ordinance and regulations 
PPendix B, infra p. MM. ---~~: Mo. ANN. ConE art. 83, § 21E(b) (1) (i) (ii) (iv) (Supp. 1972) . 
the P C~~- Dept. of Consumer P rotection, Prop. Unit Pricing Reg. § 2(b) (1972). For 
to/0VIs~ons of this regulation see Appendix C, infra p. MM. 
ClVIat Dmt Pricing Reg. § 2.(~) . Mass . . Consum~rs' Council Bu~letin, _No. UP-1-1971 
to5 ·-J· 1971) . For the provisiOns of this regulatiOn see Appendix D, mfra p. MM. 
of this d"Y YoRK, N.Y., AoM. ConE ch. 64, art. 1, § B-64-3.0 (1971 ) . For the provisions 
1os 8or9
mance see Appendix B, infra P· MM. 
107 · 28 § 3, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. ( 1971). 
tog S. 868 § 2, H.R. 4425 § 2, and H.R. 5939 § 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) . 
lVI!VI. For the provisions of the MonEL UNIT PRICING AcT see Appendix A, infra p. 
109M 
65 Pe arket Basket, a California subsidiary of Kroger Company, Ohio, reports that 
lieved rce]; of its inventory consists of food items. This ratio of food to non-food is be-
be co to 
1 
e typical. Therefore, markets stocking slightly in excess of 4,000 items would 
rnpe led under the Model Act to unit price. Since all but a few supermarkets 
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should be compelled to post the price tags. This approach avoids 
certain difficulties apparent in the preceding statutory schemes. 
Under the former acts, must a department store selling some im-
ported foods unit price those commodities? What are the conse-
quences to the marginally profitable neighborhood outlet doing a 
high dollar volume of business? Under the Model act neither of 
enterprises would be required to add dual pricing labels. 
NEw D ECEPTIONS TO SuPPLANT THE 0Ln? 
The strongest argument against unit pricing is the fact that, to 
some degree, dual pricing contains within it the seed of a new and 
subtler form of deception, capable, in some cases, of supplanting 
familiar ones . 
By way of example, when a shopper chooses a can of water-
packed corn over one which is vacuum-packed, relying on the fact 
that the price per package of the former is less than the price of 
the latter she selects a commodity which yields less food value per 
ounce than one she rejects. 110 This is so because the net contents 
shown on the label of the water-packed corn includes the weight of 
the water. Since both these products appear side by side in a super-
market, unit pricing these goods would tend to even further mislead 
her into selecting the cheaper water-packed product, despite the 
fact that the more expensive vacuum-packed product might be the 
better bargain. Certain brands of liquid detergents have higher 
concentrations of suspended solids (the active ingredients) than 
other less expensive brands, just as some paper towels are of superior 
quality,m and so forth . 
In other words, dual pricing informs the shopper what sh e is 
stock in excess of 5,000 items. the Act would reach those outlets in which consumer.~ 
are confronted by the problem discussed in the text. See the discussion at p. MNJ 
supra. 
Alternatively, the following statutory language would distinguish those grocerY' 
stores which should be r equired to unit price (supermarkets) from those which shouldd 
not (neighborhood stores and "superettes"): "The unit prices of all canned, bottled an 
packaged commodities described in this (act) shall be displayed by m erchants in plac.es 
of business containing 3,500 or more square feet of floor area accessible to the pubhc, 
but only in such places of business which offer commodities for sale at retail to tb.e 
public, fifty (50) percent or more of which commodities consist of food items." Th1S 
language would capture the supermarkets, the smallest of which contain an average of 
3,722 square feet of floor area, and exempt the "superettes," the largest of which hous
7
e 
an average of 3,159 sq uare feet of area open to the public. R. M ARKIN, supra note ' 
at 22-23 . The suggestP.d al ternative statutory language should be compared with the 
MoDEL UNIT PRICING AcT § 1, which is set forth in Appendix A, infra p. MM. 
110 P adberg, supra note 40, at 14-15. 
111 Interview with Laverty, supra note 40. 
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paying per pound or pint, but it tells her nothing about what that 
pound or pint contains. Conceivably, unit pricing could be used by 
less than scrupulous manufacturers to deceive customers in ways not 
commonly practiced today. Mentioned earlier was the device of 
"packaging to price" - the practice of reducing the contents of a 
package while retaining the same price. 112 · One can easily foresee 
~hat some processors might be tempted to "'formulate to price," that 
ls, to reduce the properties of his product while retaining the same 
price per unit. 
Although the preceding argument weighs against unit pricing, 
the following observations are in order. First, even if the manu-
facturer does get away with "formulating to price," the shopper 
Would still be able to use the dual price tags to determine which 
of that manufacturer's various package sizes yields the best bar-
gain. One of the most commonly accepted myths of the market-
pl~ce is the fable that bigger packages are invariably better bar-
gams. One has only to compare unit prices in markets where tags 
a:e available to discover that all too often goods sold in a smaller 
~lze are priced lower per pound or pint than the same brand offered 
ln a larger size. 113 This is frequently the case because manufac-
turers mount special promotions of "popular" sizes, discounting the 
Wholesale price to stimulate sales of the brand label.114 Secondly, 
even if processors toy with the quality of their product - an un-
ce::t~in gamble in any event - the housewife is better off with unit 
tncmg information than without it. The unit price affords her the 
des~ opportunity to recognize sharp reductions in commodity prices 
unng manufacturers' special promotions. The practice also en-
~~ur.ages, rather than discourages, improved buying habits by stim-
h atmg value awareness. Although a shopper might tend to select 
t. e lowest priced commodity on the basis of the unit price informa-
hon · · h , lt 1s probably just as likely that the shopper who does base 
·hr selection on such information will be more critical of her pur-
e ~se . Thus, if her experience with the cheapest article proves un-
sa~lsfactory, nothing prevents her from selecting the n e:x:t lowest 
rlced article on her next shopping trip, and so on, until she h as 
thcated that commodity which performs best to her satisfaction at 
e least cost. · 
-----112 s 113 8ee the discussion at p. MM. the lo ee no~e 2, supra. From the example of laundry cleansers, it was observed that 
1 oun West Pnced commodity was Imperial detergent in the package containing 3 pounds 
contaice. The commodity next lowest in price was Imperial detergent in the 20-pound 
Perial der. The shopper would have saved 24 cents if she purchased 20 pounds of Im-
114 I eter~ent in the small containers r ather than in the large one. 
nterv1ews with Novicoff, supra note 37; Laverty, supra note 40. 
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Ideally, the problem of comparing products of different qual-
ity would best be solved by congressional legislation requiring man-
ufacturers to grade their products according to established govern-
ment standards115 - just as meats, poultry products and dairy items 
are graded. The Maryland and Model Acts provide an alternative, 
although admittedly a less satisfactory solution. The Acts contain 
an exemption feature116 which would permit the retail seller to re-
frain from dual pricing a stated percentage of his inventory. The 
retailer can thus use this exemption to avoid dual pricing articles 
when his judgment informs him that to do so might mislead con-
sumers into making inaccurate value judgments on the basis of the 
unit price labels. Since it is presumed that the grocer is in a better 
position than the consumer to know which products are so inferior 
that their low prices are more indicative of a fraud than a bargain, 
the exemption would make it possible for the retailer to do a public 
service by withholding the unit price information concerning those 
articles. Furthermore, since it is the grocery industry which has 
suggested that extreme quality differences among some products ar-
gues against unit pricing legislation, the argument is robbed of 
m1 ch of its persuasiveness when the particular unit pricing law en-
acted would allow the retail food industry to overcome the difficulty. 
uNIT PRICING LAWS - A DISCUSSION 
OF LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS AND ENACTMENTS 
To gain some understanding and appreciation of grocers' rea-
sons for opposing unit pricing laws, this writer interviewed the pres-
idents or vice presidents of four supermarket chains, and the legal 
counsel and chief grocery merchandiser of one other, during De-
cember, 1970.117 Four of the principal reasons why these business-
men personally opposed laws requiring them to unit price are set 
forth and discussed in earlier sections of this report. Although the 
studies and experiences of grocers who have implemented the prac-
tice since the interviews were conducted clearly establish that those 
objections are largely groundless, other fears cited by the market 
executives to whom this writer spoke appear to have been borne out 
in the laws enacted or proposed. Mr. Robert Laverty, President of 
Thriftimart, Inc., expressed the concern that operators with stores 
115 Interview with Laverty, supra note 40. 
116 MonEL UNIT PRICING AcT§ 1(f) . The provisisons of this act are set forth in Ap-
pendix A, infra p. MM; cf. Mn. ANN. ConE art. 83, § 21E (c) (2) (ii) (Supp. 1972) . 
117 Interviews with Bryant. Novicoff and Burnside, supra note 37; Laverty, supra note 
40 ; Allumbaugh, supra note 42. Novicoff was interviewed along with Eugene L. 
Kramer, Counsel, Food Fair Stores. Inc., Pacific Division. 
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in more than one state would be prejudiced by conflicting provisions 
contained in the laws enacted by each state. Mr. Byron Allum-
baugh, Executive Vice President of Ralphs stores, remarked that the 
draftsmen of such laws, not being grocers, would legislate too 
broadly, with the result that many products inappropriate for unit 
pricing would be required to be tagged at a tre~endous inconven-
lence, if not expense, to the industry. 
CoNFLICT oF LA~s 
Conflicting laws are an understandable, and too often justifi-
able, cause of vexation and concern to persons doing interstate busi-
ness. And so it is with unit pricing. 
Differences have already appeared among the few laws and 
regulations enacted. Others appear in measures which have been 
proposed. Where provisions of the various laws are contradictory, 
the resulting confusion and expense become all too plain. For ex-
ample, New York City requires that products packaged and sold by 
count (such as toothpicks, facial tissues, and so forth) be priced per 
50? count,118 whereas Connecticut, Massachusetts and Maryland re-
qulre them to be priced per 100 count. 119 While New York, Con-
necticut and Massachusetts provide that packaged goods measured 
~!area (such as rolls of aluminum foil) be sold per 50 square feet,120 
!Vlaryland insists that they be priced per 100 square feet. 121 Mass-
lchusetts allows retailers to price liquids per pint, quart or gal-
on;122 Connecticut states that some liquids shall be sold by quart 
While others shall be priced per pint;123 Maryland allows no other 
t~an the quart measure;124 and New York requires that either the 
Plnt or the quart, but not both, shall be used. 125 
Although no one would seriously argue that Congress lacks ----19118 N. Y. City Dept. of Consumer Affairs. Truth-in-Pricing Reg. 3(a) (ii) (June 1, 
13 7.1), as amended (July 1, 1971) . For the provisions of this r egulation, see Appendix 
• zn fra p MM 
p : 1? Co~n. Dept. of Consumer Protection Pricing Reg. § 5(d) (1967); Unit 
JV!Iczng Re,;. 4(d), Mas~. Consum ers' Council Bulletin, No. UP-2-1971 (Jan. 6, 1972) ; 
~20ANN. CooE art. 83. ~ 21E(a) (Supp. 1972). · Pr· . Conn. Dept. of Consumer Protection, Prop. Unit Pricing Reg. 5(c) (1972) ; Unit 
i~ing Reg. § 4(c), Mass. Consumer's Bulletin, No. UP-1-1971 (Mar. 9, 1971). 
122 Mo. ANN· ConE art. 83 § 2lE(a) (Supp. 1972). 
(M Urut Pricing Reg. § 4 (b) , Mass. Consumers' Council Bulletin, No. UP-1-1971 
1~r. 9, 1971 ) . See Appendix D, infra p. MM. 
Ap C?nn. Dept. of Consum er Protection, Unit Pricing Reg. § 6 (1972) . See 
1~~ndllc C, infra p. MM. 
125 Mo. ANN. CooE art. 83, § 21E(a) (Supp. 1972). 
1 
197 
N.Y. City Dept. of Consumer Affairs, Truth-in-Pricing Reg. § 3(b) (iii) (June 
' 1) . See Appendix B, infra p. MM. 
120 LOYOLA Consumer Protection JounNAL [Vol. I:95 
power under the Commerce126 and Supremacy127 Clauses of the 
United States Constitution to establish uniformity among the states' 
unit pricing laws, either by pre-empting the field or by establishing 
limits within which each state might legislate, the several bills 
pending before the national legislature deal only inferentially with 
this problem, while others ignore it completely. Bills introduced by 
Senator Nelson and Congressmen Corman and Rosenthal to amend 
the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act would exempt retail outlets 
doing business in states which have enacted mandatory unit pricing 
laws "comparable in scope and comprehensiveness"128 to the fed-
eral laws, thus implying that the states would have the authority 
to legislate such laws within some vaguely defined limits. Meas-
ures proposed by Senator Pearson,129 Congressmen Ryan130 and Po-
dell,131 and Congresswoman Grasso132 would simply defer the ques-
tion of the states' right to enact unit pricing laws to Section 1461 
of that act, which declares that Congress intends "to supersede any 
and all laws ... insofar as they may now or hereafter provide for 
the labeling of the net quantity of contents of the package . . . 
which are less stringent than, or require information different 
from," the disclosures required by the act.l33 (Emphasis furnished.) 
Arguably, the Section 1461 prohibition might be construed by the 
states as having no bearing on the question of the contents of a 
label placed upon the shelf and not upon the package.134 In any 
event, irrespective of the outcome should the matter ever be made 
the subject of a lawsuit, the unit pricing bills should be amended 
to deal frankly with the subject so that the states, 135 and federal en-
forcement officers, might have some dearer guidance on the matter. 
126 U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 8. 
127 U.S. CaNST· art. VI. 
128 S. 868. 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1971); H .R. 5939, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1971); 
H.R. 4-425, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1971). 
129 S. 928, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). 
130 H .R. 1572, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). 
131 H .R. 990, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). 
132 H .R. 6776, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). 
133 15 u.s.c. § 1461 (1970) . 
134 This construction finds support in Ocean Products, Inc. v. Leth, 292 F. Supp. 615, 
618 (D., Ore. 1968), where the court, after reciting the section, ruled that Congress 
m erely intended to supersede state "net contents" regulations pertaining to labeli!lg 
appearing on the package. By n ecessary implication, if Congress chooses to reqUire 
only that the dual price information appear on the package itself, the states would be 
free to r egulate shelf pricing. . 
135 Even if Congress chooses not to deal with the problem, the states having un1t 
pricing laws may overcome the conflicts in their laws on their own initiative. The 
Massachusetts Consumers' Council and the University of Massachusetts Cooperative EJ>-
tension Service jointly sponsored a Northeastern Conference on Unit Pricing held Marc~ 
13-1 4, 1972, at Amherst. Participating in the conference were Massachusetts, ConnectJ· 
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UNIT PRICING WHERE NoT NEEDED? 
Assuming arguendo that Congress resolves the conflicts prob-
lem, there still remains the troublesome question of how much of 
an umbrella should a unit pricing law provide. Should supermar-
kets' entire inventories be covered, or are exceptions to be made as to 
Particular commodities or groups of commodities? Obviously, many 
goods are sold by modern supermarkets which do not lend them-
selves to unit pricing, as for example, clothing, hardware and other 
~ornrnodities of a similar nature. But there are other items which 
Invite disagreement as to their suitability - or the lack thereof -
for dual pricing. One might include cosmetics in this category 
( vvh_ere brand name preferences might, or might not, be the ex-
clusive consideration of consumers choosing between articles avail-
~ble at their supermarket). Arguments can be made for and against 
Including prepared frozen foods within the reach of a unit pricing 
law. In favor of dual pricing such items is the observation that 
food _is food, and if consumers knew precisely how much more ex-
pensive it is to buy the prepared commodity than it is to buy the 
Ing:edients separately, they might be encouraged to forego the con-
vemence and prepare the particular item themselves. Equally per-
s~asive is the fact that it is the convenience which consumers pur-
e ase. And can there be any doubt that even the least knowledge-
:J:le shopper is aware that prepared foods cost considerably more 
an the component ingredients if purchased separately? 
The Connecticut, Massachusetts and New York City legisla-
ture~ chose to enact laws of general purpose and leave it to their 
:forcement agencies to promulgate the regulations which govern 
e. details of the unit pricing requirement. The regulations de-
~ribe with particularity the commodites to be tagged by grocers. 
hus, labels must be provided for "peanut butter,136 baby foods,137 
coffee"138 and so forth. In contrast, the Maryland and Model Acts 
~~~.Maryland and the City of N ew York. The purpose of the conference was to 
Pro~~d~r ways in which 1fl~se jurisdictions (an.d othez: nor!heastem polit_ical ~ntit~es 
ing sm~ to adopt umt pncmg laws) could achieve uniformity among their umt pnc· 
cil pr.equirements. Northeastern Conference on Unit Pricing, Mass. Consumers' Coun-
~ Release (Jan. 18, 1972). · 
~:;Conn. Dept. of Consumer Protection, Unit Pricing Reg. § 6(a), (1972); N .Y. 
City {jonn. Dept. of Consumer Protection. Unit Pricing Reg. § 6(a), (1972); N.Y. 
Pric· ept. of Consumer Affairs, Truth-in-Pricing Reg. § 4(e) (June 1, 1971); Unit 
197tl)llg Reg. § 5(b), Mass. Consumers' Council Bulletin, No. UP-1 -1971 (Mar. 9, 
1 . 
Cit;s {jonn. Dept. of Consumer Protection, Unit Pricing Reg. § 6(a) (1972); N .Y. 
Pricin ept. of Consumer Affairs, Truth-in-Pricing Reg. § 4(k) (June 1, 1971); Unit 
197t) .g Reg. § 5(a), Mass. Consumers' Council Bulletin, No. UP-1-1971 (Mar. 9, 
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describe the classes of consumer goods which retailers must label, 
as for example, "packaged foods," 139 before going on to list excep-
tions for certain subclasses of commodities ("prepackaged food con-
taining separately identifiable items segregated by physical division 
within the package,"140 such as the ubiquitous TV dinner) . Both 
the Maryland and Model Acts provide an additional exception for 
10 percent of the retailer's otherwise non-exempt inventory141 and 
leave it entirely within the grocers' discretion to choose the articles 
which shall be excepted from the law. 
The advantages of enumerating the articles to be labeled can 
be summarized as follows . First, the laws of Connecticut, Massa-
chusetts and New York City operate uniformly. All stores within 
each state's borders must dual price the same items. Secondly, 
since the r egulations leave no doubt as to which items shall be 
tagged, they are more easily enforceable, since the enforcement of-
ficer need only to go to the section of the supermarket where the 
article is found to determine whether the operator is in compliance 
with the law. Finally, because both businessmen and consumers 
are h eard by the regulating agencies which adopt the regulations, 
a balan ce is struck between what the public seeks and what the in-
dustry claims it can practically deliver. Grocers can hardly com-
plain that the commodities designated for unit pricing are selected 
arbitrarily or without consideration of the industry's point of view 
as to the practicability of including or excluding certain items. 
Advantages of the Maryland-Model Act scheme can be divided 
into two general categories. First, by allowing retailers to use their 
discretion to withhold the unit price information from some items 
within broadly stated categories of goods, a means is afforded where-
by deceptions can be avoided in the case of distinctly inferior prod-
ucts whose low unit prices are not indicative of their real value. 142 
Secondly, some items probably should not be dual priced because 
the expense may not be justified for one or more of a variety of 
reasons. For example, New York, Connecticut and Massachusetts 
139 MoDEL UNIT PRiciNG AcT § 1 (d) . See Appendix A, infra p. MM. Maryland 
requires the pricing of any "consumer commodity." Mo. ANN. ConE art. 83, § 21E(c) 
(Supp. 1972) . A "consumer commodity" is tlefined as "any food. drug, cosmetic, or 
other article, product or commodity of any kind or class which is" consumed or used 
for personal use and which is not a durable item. I d.§ 21E(a ) (1) (2). 
140 Mo. ANN. CooE art. 83, §21E(b) (2) (Supp. 1972); MoDEL UNIT PRICING Ac:r 
§ 1 (e) . For the provisions of the Model Act see Appendix A. infra p. MM. 
141 The exemption is 30 percent during 1972. Mo. ANN. CooE art. 83, § 21E (c) 
(2) (i ) (Supp. 1972) Ten percent of sales of inventory are exempted after Jan. 1, 19r~ · 
I d. § 21E(c) (2) (ii). M oDEL UNIT PRICING AcT § 1 (£). See Appendix A, infra p. Min· 
142 See discussion p . MM supra. 
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require that baby foods be labeled.143 Baby foods are commonly 
s?ld in two sizes: the strained size for young infants and the junior 
~1ze for older children. The strained size, exclusive of meats, is sold 
1n two weights: 4Y2 and 4% ounces. The number of foods avail-
able in this size is nearly equally divided between the two weights. 
In the junior size, a one-fourth ounce difference in weight repre-
sents only about 3 percent difference in price per pound. In the 
strained size, the difference is approxima~ely 6 percent. From the 
grocer's viewpoint, dual pricing the junior size baby foods may not 
be very beneficial; other factors probably being far more important 
to consumers of this commodity than the price per pound (for ex-
a:rnple, taste preferences of the child, dietary considerations of the 
Parent, brand name and price package144 ) . Since the Maryland 
and Model Acts would allow the grocer to exempt 10 percent of in-
ventory otherwise required to be dual priced, it would be possible 
for the retailer to avoid the expense of unit pricing one size of arti-
cles where the number of sizes he canies is rather limited. Fur-
the:more, the grocer is permitted to exclude particular articles for 
:'Vhlch there are no equivalent, as for example, some rare and exotic 
lltlported delicacy, where the unit price is all but meaningless. 
In short, although the executives to whom this writer spoke 
~ere nearly unanimous in conceding that unit pricing could be 
. eneficial to consumers, they believed it would be in the public's 
lnterest for grocers to retain some discretion in the final selection 
or rejection of articles to be labeled. 
1 
It is probably true that the differences between the two regu-
atory schemes thus far placed into practice are more apparent than 
~eal. Certainly, retailers are not unduly prejudiced because a few 
lt:ms must be unit priced which grocers themselves might not other-
~se label. Concerning potential difficulties with enforcement of 
the dual pricing plan under the Maryland statute, it is submitted 
b
at no real obstacle is presented. Since inventory records are avail-
a le at all retail outlets, 145 it would be a simple matter to as-
~h:rtain from such records whether the grocer is in compliance with 
de law. Finally, if Connecticut, Massachusetts and New York law 
oes not provide a means of overcoming the problems of extreme ----Cit~3 Conn. Dept. of Consumer Protection, Unit Pricing Reg. § 6(a) (1972); N.Y. 
Prici Dekt. of Consumer Affairs, Truth-in-Pricing Reg. § 4 (e) (June 1, 1971); Unit 
144ng eg. § 5(b), Mass. Consumers' Council Bulletin, No. UP-1-1971 (Mar. 9, 1971). 
baugh These factors were suggested in interviews with Laverty, supra note 40; Allum. 
145 
• supr~ note 42. 
Interviews with Allumbaugh, supra note 42; Novicoff, supra note 37. 
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quality differences existing among products to be unit priced, there 
is no assurance under the Maryland and Model Act plan that re-
tailers will utilize the exemption for this purpose. 
In any event, either of the statutory plans thus far adopted by 
the states is preferable to the approach taken in the legislation now 
pending before the Congress. The bills awaiting approval of the 
Senate and House Commerce Committees would require the unit 
pricing of all packaged consumer commodities. 146 
CoNcLusiON 
There has been sufficient experimentation with dual pricing to 
determine that it works, that it is practical, and that it effectively 
cements together the pounds, pints and other standard units of meas-
urement fragmented over the years by the unchecked proliferation 
of package sizes. 
If caveat emptor were still the paramount law of the market-
place, reluctance to legislate unit pricing laws might be justified. 
But the notion that enterprise ought to be fully sheltered has long 
been discredited. Our legal institutions have progressed from a 
policy given birth in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.147 to matura-
tion in the Truth-in-Lending148 and Truth-in-Packaging149 Act. The 
social policy underlying the expansion of law into the area of con-
sumer protection recognizes that shoddy workmanship and decep-
tive or misleading practices are deserving of no more legal protec-
tion than negligence or blatant fraud in the manufacture or sale of 
goods. Lawmakers have come to recognize that free enterprise is 
neither harmed nor unduly burdened by laws requiring manufac-
turers and merchants to bear liability for defects in their products 
or to fully and truthfully inform the public concerning those prod-
ucts. Competition is not discouraged merely because the public is 
made aware that one brand of goods is inferior or costs more than 
another brand. On the contrary, a discerning public is more likely 
to recognize manufacturing and merchandising competence with 
the very pecuniary reward which is the basis of a free enterprise 
system. Excellence in the production of goods - and the market-
ing of commodities at the least cost to the public - have always 
been the ideal of a capitalistic or any other economic system. Truth-
in-pricing - or dual pricing - is consistent with those goals. 
- WILLIAM A. S TEPHENS 
146 S. 868, 928 and H . R. 990, 1572, 4425, 5939, 6776, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) . 
147 217 N.Y. 382. 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) . 
148 15 u.s.c. §§ 1601-77 (1970). 
149 15 u.s.c. §§ 1451-61 (1970) . 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A 
MODEL UNIT PRICING ACT. 
. Section l. The unit prices of a ll canned, bo,ttled and packaged commodi-
ties described in this section sha ll be displ ayed by merchants in places of busi-
ness offering more than 2,500 food items for sale at retail to the public. 
(a) An item means a commodity, or commodities, distinguished f rom other 
fornmodities on account. of. weight, volume, area or n_umerica_l cou~t ; manu-
. acturer, processor or d1stnbutor; trade name or specws; or mgredwnts, rec-
~e or _formul~; except that, for the purpose of determining whether the m~r-
lant IS oiienng 2,500 food items for sale, fresh produce, meat and dauy 
Products shall not be distinguished on account of weight or vo lume. 
I (b) Unit price means the retail price per ounce, pound, p int, quart, gal-
5~1 · 50 square feet, 100 square feet, 500 square feet, 50 count, 100 count or 
0 count for which each item is offered for sale. 
l ( l) The unit measurement used to p rice each item shall be utilized for 
a ~ comparable or similar commodities required under this section to be unit 
Pr1ced. 
(2) The unit price disp layed shall be raised to the nearest one cent or 
one-tenth of one cent. 
t (c) Display as used in this section means exhibiting the price per unit in 
Yp~ ten points or larger in size al ong the edge of the shelf or case on which tr .m which each item is offered for sale. The unit price shall be kept visible, 
begtle, and unobstructed to public view. The unit price displayed shall state 
ot the price and the unit to which it refers. 
i I (d) Commodities for which unit prices are required to be disp layed shall 
~c ude and be limited to canned, bottled and packaged foods ; paper, plastic, 
andod, and metal products packaged in counts of ten or more ; paper, plastic, 
80 metal products packaged in roll s; canned, bottled, and packaged per-i s~al , domestic, household, and laundry cleansing, finishing, waxing and pol-
e mg products ; and drug and first aid products sold by liquid volume or in 
ounts of ten or more. 
111 d· (_e) Excepted from the unit pricing requirements of thi s section are com-
oro lhes whose net wei ght is expressly stat~d on the principal package la? el 
p Panel as one-fifth pound, one-quarter pound (or four ounces), one-thud 
111°~n.d , one-half pound (or eight ounces ), one pound (o r sixteen ounces), or 
011~ tl~les of one pound (but such items shall be excepted from the requi rement 
lll Y lf the merchant prices all comparable or simil ar items per the pound 
l o~~surernent) ; liquids sold by pint, quart, half-gallon, or multipl es of one gal-
tip! ' goods packaaed in counts of ten, twenty-five, fi fty, one hundred, or mul -
on es of one hundred ; products offered in rolls of ten, twen ty-five, fifty, or 
go elundred feet, or multipl es of one hundred feet; fresh produce ; durable 
fo 
0
d 8 ; commodities offered for sale for ten cents or less ; and f rozen prepared 
0 8 Physically separated within their containers. 
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(f) The merchant may also except from the requirements of this section 
ten percent of the items otherwise required to be unit priced under subsec-
tion (d). 
(g) The vio lation of any provision of ihis section is a misdemeanor pun-
ishable by a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars ( $25) nor more than five 
hundred dollars ($500), or by imprisonment in the county jail for not exceed-
ing six months, or by both fine and imprisonment. 
Appendix B 
1.- CITY OF NEW YORK 
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE 
CHAPTER 64:, ARTICLE 1 
SECTIONS B64-1.0 TO B -64-5.0 
B64-l.O Definitions- (a) "Consumer commodity" shall be defined as any 
article, product or commodity of any kind or class produced, distributed or of-
fered for retail sale for consumption by individuals, or for use by individuals 
for purposes of personal care or in the performance of services rendered within 
the household, and which is consumed or expended in the course of such use. 
For the purposes of this article, drugs, medicines and cosmetics shall not be 
considered commodities. 
(b) "Price per measure" shall be defined as the retail price of a consumer 
commodity expressed in terms of the retail price of such commodity per such 
unit of weight, standard measure or standard number of units as the comrnis· 
sioner of consumer affairs shall designate by regulation. 
B64-2.0 Display of total selling price - All consumer commodities sold, 
exposed for sale or offered for sale at retail shall be plainly marked by a stamP• 
tag, label or sign at the point of display with the total selling price. 
B64-3.0 Display of price per measure - All consumer commodities desig· 
nated by the commissioner of consumer affairs in accordance wi th section B64· 
4.0 (a) hereof exposed for sale or offered for sale shall be plainly marked by a 
stamp, tag, label or sign at the point of display with appropriate price per 
measure; provided however that the provisions of thi s section shall not appli 
to any food store having had annual gross sales in the previous tax year o 
less than two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000) un less it is a part .of 
a network of subsidiaries, affiliates, or other member stores, under direct or 111" 
direct common control, which, as a group, had annual gross sales in the pre· 
vious tax year of two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000) or more. 
B64-4.0 Regulations - (a) The commissioner of consumer affairs after 
publ_i~ heari~gs shall promul ~at~ regulations designa.ting those consumer coJ!lh~ 
mod1tws whiCh shall come w1thm the scope of sectiOn B64-3.0 whenever t 
commissioner shall find that, because of the nature, form, mode of packagin~ 
or other reason, such price d.!splay fo r that commodity shall be necessary an 
appropriate to pro.vide adequate information to the consumer. 
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(b) The commissioner shall promulgate regulations exempting any class 
or classes of retail establishments from the requirements of section B64-3.0 
h~reof or modifying its application with respect to any class or classes of re-
tail establishments to the extent that and under such conditions as are consist-
ent with the policy of this article whenever the commissioner shall find that, 
because of the nature of such class or classes of retail estab lishments, compli-
ance with section B64-3.0 hereof is unreasonably burdensome or unnecessary 
for adequate protection of consumers. 
(c) The commissioner shall promulgate such other regulations as shall 
he n.ecessary in his discretion to effectuate the purposes of this local law, in-
cl~dmg but not limited to, requirements as to the manner of display of unit 
Pnce information. 
. BM-5.0 Penalties - Any person who shall violate the provisions of sec-
tl~n B64-2.0 or section B64-3.0 hereof or regulations promul gated pursuant to 
} lls article shall pay a civil penalty of not less than $25 nor more than $250 
ofr each vio lation and shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine 
0 not less than $25 nor more than $250 for each such violation. For the 
puh~poses of this section, each group of identical consumer commodities for 
~ lch on any single day the total selling price or price per measure is not 
displayed in accordance with section B64.-2.0 or section B64.-3.0 or regulations 
Promulgated pursuant to this article shall be considered a single violation. 
2.- CITY OF NEW YORK 
DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS 
TRUTH-IN-PRICING REGULATIONS 1-4 
1· Definitions 
it ' a. "Self service" shall mean the offering or display of consumer commod-
lles for retail sale in such a manner that the consumer may examine and se-
ect commodities for purchase without the assistance of sales personnel. 
wh' hb. "Retail establishment" shall mean a single geographical location in 
lc consumer commodities are sold, displayed or ofiered for sale at retail. 
or c: "~etail entity" shall mean any person, partnership, co.rporation or other 
Ill gd?~zatwn engaged in the sale, display or offering for sale of consumer com-
th 0 ltles at retail from one or more retail establishments. For the purposes of 
80 ese regulations, retail establishments owned or contro.Iled by different per-
fans, hpartnerships, corporations or other organizations, but associated together 
cor t e ~urpose of sharing a trade name or advertising expenses or for joint or 
tailPer~tlVe purchase of merchandise or services, shall not constitute a single re-
enhty. 
2· Ex · emptwns 
coil! a. ~6.4-3.0. "Display of Price per Measure," shall apply only to consumer 
lllod1t1es sold, displayed or offered for sale by self service. 
h. B-64-3.0 "'Display of P rice per Measure," shall not apply to any con-
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sumer commodity packaged without a declaration of volume, weight, quantity, 
or other appropriate size declaration. 
c. B64-3.0, "Display of Price per Measure," shall not apply to any con-
sumer commodity sold in one, two, five, or ten units of the applicable standard 
measure designated in regulation 3 (h) below. 
d. B64-3.0, "Display of Price per Measure," shall not apply to any retail 
establishment in which the total dollar volume sales of consumer commodities 
constitutes 20 percent or less of the total do llar volume of sales from such re-
tail estab lishment. 
d. B64,-3.0, "'Display of Price per Measure," shall not apply to any retail 
entity whose gross receipts from retail sales of merchandise of any sort for the 
preceding tax year of such retail entity were less than two million dollars. 
3. Calculation and Display of Price per Measure 
a. Price per measure shall he expressed at least to the nearest whole cent: 
fractional cents of one half cent or more to be rounded up, fractional cents of 
less than one half cent to be rounded down. 
h. Price per measure shall be expressed as follows : 
1. price per pound for commodities hearing a size declaration by 
weight, 
n . price per 500 units for items hearing a quantity declaration. 
m. price per pint or quart for items hearing a size declaration in 
pints, quarts, gallons, or fluid ounces ; however, no single retail es-
tab lishment shall use both the pint and the quart as a basis for 
calculating price per measure. 
c. All price information required by B64-2.0 and B64-3.0 shall be clear 
and conspicuous and shall be on a stamp, tag, label or sign directly above, 
below, adjacent to, or on the consumer commodity to which it relates. Such 
stamp, tag, label or sign shall: 
1. state the total selling price, 
11. state the price per measure, 
111. if not affixed to the consumer commodity, shall identify sufficientlY 
the consumer commodity to which the price information relates. 
d. Every retail establishment req ui red to post price per measure by the 
regulations governing Truth-in -Pricing shall post at least five signs explaining 
the use of price per measure information to the consumer in conspicuous places 
in such retail establishment. 
4. Consumer Commodities Regulated 
The following commodities shall be labelled in accordance with the pro· 
visions of B64-3.0, "Display of Price per Measure," and of the regulations gov· 
ern ing Truth -in-Pricing. 
a. canned and bottled vegetab les which do not require refri gerated storage-
h. canned and bottled fruits which do not require refrigerated storage: 
c. canned and bottled real and imitation vegetahle and fruit jui ces wh1ch 
do not require refrigerated storage. 
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d. canned and bottled tomatoes, tomato sauce, tomato paste, tomato puree 
and other related tomato products which do not require refrigeraed storage. 
e. canned and bottled baby foo.ds which do not require refrigerated storage. 
f . cooking and salad oils. 
g. canned and bottled salmon, tuna and sardines which do not require 
refrigerated storage. 
h . jams, jellies and preserves. 
i. peanut butter. 
i. carbonated beverages. 
k. coffee, instant and regular. 
l. dog and cat foods. 
m. breakfast cereals (does not include corn meal, rice, maize) . 
n. cake, pie crust and o.ther pastry mixes. 
o. macaroni, spaghetti and other dry pasta products (does not include 
Pre-prepared or pre-flavored convenience p asta foods). 
P· paper towels, napkins, facial tissues, plates, cups and toil et paper. 
q. dishwashing and laundry soaps and detergents. 
r . scouring powders. 
2 
The above regulations shall be known as Truth-in-Pricing Regulations l, 
• 3 and 4 . 
Appendix C 
CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER PROTECTION 
PROPOSED UNIT PRICING REGULATIONS 1-8 
(APRIL 1, 1972) 
l. Definit ions 
(a) "Commissioner," as used in these regulations, means the Commissioner 
of Consumer Protection. 
(b) "Consumer Commodity" means any food , drug, device, cosmeti c or 
other article, product or commodity of an y other kind or class, ex-
cept drugs sold by prescription only, which is customarily produced 
for sale to retail agencies or instrumentalities for consum ption by in-
dividuals, or use by individuals for purposes of personal care or in 
the performance of services ordinarily rendered in or around the 
household, and which usually is consumed or expended in the course 
of such consumption or use. 
(c) "Unit Price" of a consumer commodity means the retail price of a 
consumer commodity expressed in terms of the retail price of such 
commodity per unit of weight, measure or co.unt, computed to the 
nearest whole cent or fraction thereof. 
(d) "Point of Sale" as used in these regulations, means the point at which 
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consumer commodities are offered and displayed for retail sale in such 
a manner that the consumer may examine and select commodities for 
purchase without the assistance of sales personnel. 
(e) As used in these regulations, the terms food, drug, device and cosmetic 
are defined as in Section 19-212 of the Connecticut General Statutes : 
(i) "Food" means (1) articles used for food or drink for man o.r 
other animals, and ( 2) chewing gum, and ( 3) articles used for 
components of any such article; 
(ii) "Drug" means (1) articles recognized in the official United 
States pharmacopceia, official homeopathic pharmacopceia of 
the United States or official national formulary, or any supple-
ment to any of them; (2) articles intended for use in the diag-
nosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease in 
man or o.ther animals; ( 3) articles, other than food, intended 
to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or 
any other animal; and ( 4.) articles intended for use as a com· 
ponent of any articles specified in this subsection; but shall 
not include devices or their components, parts or accessories; 
(iii) 
( iv) 
"Device" means instruments, apparatus and contrivances, in· 
eluding their components, parts and accessories, intended (1) 
for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or preven· 
tion of disease in man or other animals, or (2) to affect the 
structure or any function of the body of man or other animals; 
"Cosmetic" means (l) articles intended to be rubbed, poured, 
sprinkled or sprayed on, introduced into, or otherwise applie? 
to the human body or any part thereof for cleansing, beaut!· 
fying, promoting attractiveness or altering the appearance, and 
(2) articles intended fo.r use as a component of any such ar· 
ticles ; except that such term shall not include soap. 
2. Persons to Whom Regulations Apply 
(a) Any person who sells or offers or exposes for sale at retail any of the 
consumer commodities designated in Section 6 of these regulations 
shall disclose to the consumer the p rice per unit of weight or meas· 
ure or count and the total price, as required by Section 4, of the 
regulations. 
(b) Owner-operated s'ngle retail stores are exempt from these regulatio~5 · 
This would include any single store operation wherein the ownershiP• 
be it corporate, proprietorship, or partnership, does not own or o_r-
erate another store in the State of Connecticut in the sale and d1s· 
tribution of consumer commodities subject to this act. 
3. Exempt Products 
(a) Drugs sold only by prescription. 
(b) Beverages subj ect to or complying with packaging or labeling re· 
quirements imposed under the Federal Alcoholic Administration Act. 
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(c) Products which are required to be marked individually with the cost 
per unit of weight under the provisions of Section 42-1151 of the 
Connecticut General Statutes. 
(d) Such consumer commodities which are sold 1n units of even pounds, 
pints, quarts or gallons, and which have a retail price plainly marked 
thereon; but only the particular consumer commodities sold in such 
units shall be exempt. 
(e) Different brands or products co-mingled in one receptacle for the 
purpose of a one-price sale. 
(f) Products sold in one size limit only and which package contains three 
ounces or less in weight or fluid ounces. 
(g) Snack foods such as cakes, candies, or chips, sold in packages under 
five ounces in weight. 
4·· Method of Disclosure 
(a) All retail establishments subject to these regulations shall disclose the 
price per measure to the consumer by the attachment of a tag or label 
of any of the following colors on the item itself, or on the shelf or 
at any other point of sale immediately below the item, or above the 
item, so as to be conspicuously visible to the consumer. The permis-
sible colors are red, blue, green, orange, yellow, or brown. The color 
white may be used in conjunction with any of these other colors, but 
white lettering on clear plastic or cellophane wrappers may not be 
used. 
(b) The tag or label shall contain the following three elements. 
(i) The words "Unit Price" shall appear as a heading, with the 
unit price always appearing to the left of the then-selling price. 
(ii) The price per measure expressed in terms of dollars or cents, 
as applicable, carried to three digits. If the price is over $1.00 
it is to be expressed to the nearest fu ll cent, provided that said 
price is rounded off from .005 and over to the next higher 
cent; and if .004 or less cents, it be carried to three digits. Ex-
amples : "25.3 cents per . pound"; "$1.67 per quart." 
(iii) The applicable unit of weight or measure per count. 
(c) The following additional information may appear on the tag or label 
at the option of the individual retailer: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(d) If the 
sumer 
The description of the commodity being sold by item and size. 
In items such as paper products, the applicable "ply" count or 
thickness may be included. 
Such logistical information which the retail establi shment re-
quires such as order codes, number of rows, or ~helf capacity. 
consumer commodity is not conspicuously visible to the con-
or where the display space used for a particular consumer 
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commodity is inadequate to set forth separate price legends, as re· 
quired by these regulations, a list of the prices per measure shall be 
conspicuously pos ted at or near the point of sale or the point of dis· 
play; or the price per measure may be stamped or affixed to the 
item itself. 
(e) The price per measure shall be displayed in type no smaller than 
that used for the retail price of the item, but in no event shall the 
price per measure appear in size less than pica type. When a retail 
food establishment employs display material at the point of sale 
and the retai l price appears thereon in sizes larger than pica type, 
the unit price information required by these regulations shall con· 
spicuously appear thereon and shall appear in size no less than pica 
type or l,4i, the size numerals used for the retail price, whichever is 
greater. 
5. Price Per Measure 
(a) The price shall be designated as per pound or as per ounce, which· 
ever offers the most meaningful basis of comparison for the con· 
sumer, on all commodities whose net quantity is customarily ex· 
pressed in units of pounds or o.unces or both, provided that the same 
unit of measure is used for the same commodity in all sizes sold in 
such retail establishment. 
(b) Price per pint, quart or gallon for commodities whose net quantity is 
customarily expressed in units of pints, quarts, ga llons or fluid ounces, 
or a combination thereof; provided, that the same unit of measure is 
used for the same commodity in all sizes sold in such retail es· 
tablishment. 
(c) Price per 50 feet or per 50 square feet, as appropriate, for commodi· 
ties and items whose net quantity is customaril y expressed in units of 
feet, inches, square feet or square yards, or whose net quantities are 
expressed in units of area or length. 
(d) Price per 100 units of commodities, whose net quantity is expressed 
by a numerical count. 
Required Units of Measure for Unit Price Designation. The following list 
of products indicates the corresponding unit of measure which is required to 
be used in the designation of the unit price of such products by all retai l food 
establi shments subj ect to the unit price regulations. As a general rule all dry 
bulk products a rc unit priced by the pound; all products sold in aerosol cans 
are unit priced by the pound; and the majority of the liquid products are un!t 
priced by the quart. There are several products on this list which may be umt 
priced by either of two limits of measure, provided that the same unit of meas· 
ure is used fo r the same commodity in all sizes sold in a f>i ngle re tail foo·d 
establishment. 
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6. Products Regulated 
(a) Group l: 
Product Unit Measure 
Detergents: 
liquid ........................................... ..... pints or quarts 
dry ·- ·······-· -· -············ -···············-· ·---- --·POUnd 
Household cleansers, waxes, 
polishes & deodorizers: 
liquid ------ ---- -----···-····-·· ··· ·· ······· ···-······Pints or quarts 
dry ··· ··--- ·-- ----- -- --·- ------··- ······-· ·····--·· ··--POUnd 
aerosols ··-··-······-·-··· -·· --·········· ····- ···· --POUnd 
Cereals ···-··- ···- -·-····· ······-···- ·-····· ·-···············Pound 
Instant breakfast foods -------------- --- ---· -·····-pound 
Butter ·-·-· ···--·· ·- ---- ---- -············ ······· ··········· ·-pound 
Oleomargarine --- ·-····· --·- ··· ··-- ···-·-······-· -·-···Pound 
Coffee, instant & ground ········ ··-···········-··-pound 
Cocoa, chocolate syrups --- -· -··· ···· -···-· ·-·- ····Pints or pounds 
Tea: 
bags ······- -·-···- ·············-······· ··············-Per 100 units 
bulk ... .. .... ..... .. .................................. pound 
instant .. ............. ...... ........ .... .. .... ....... pound 
Jellies & jams ..... ........ .... ...................... .... pound 
Peanut b~tter ··· ······-· ·· ·· ··········· ······· ····· ·····P?und 
Mayonnaise ... .... ... .... ...... ......................... . pmts or quarts 
Sanitary paper products, 
including napkins, paper 
towels, tissues ..... .. .. ....... ... .... ... ............. .... per 100 units 
Aluminum & plastic wraps ...... ... ... .......... per 50 square feet 
Baby Foods : 
solids ... .... ........ .. .. ................ ............. pound 
juices ..... ............. ... ...... .. ... ...... ... ...... . pints 
(b) Group 2: 
Fruits & Vegetables 
canned ....... ................ ........ ...... ..... .... pound 
jarred ........... ............ ............. ...... ..... pound 
boxed ......... .......... ... ......... .. .... .......... . pound 
Jui ces .. .... ... ........ .......... ......... : ............. ..... . quart 
Shortenings ... .... ...... ... ....... ............. .. ... .... . pound 
Flours ............... ......... ....... ...... ......... ... ...... pound 
Cooking oils ... .. ... .. ..... ............. ..... ...... ..... . pints or quarts 
Canned fish & canned meats ...... ....... .... ... pound 
Spaghetti, macaroni, 
noodles & pasta products ............. ............ . pound 
Soups 
canned ..................... .......... .... ...... ..... pound 
dried ... ........ .... ........................ .......... pound 
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(c) Group3 : 
Product Unit Measure 
Frozen fruits, 
vegetables & juices .................. ........... ...... pound 
Pet foods ······· ·······--·····-· -··· ·············--- -· ····- pound 
Prepared baking mixes, 
including cake, pancake & 
biscuit mixes ··-··········· ···-·-··--·---·············· ··-Pound 
Ketchup & mustard ·· ·········-·····-------- -·-· -- ·- -pints or pounds 
Tomato, spaghetti & 
meat sauces ······· ···· ··· ······ -····· ····· ··- ------·-····-Pints or pounds 
Pickles & relishes ·········--· ---- -- --- ---- -- --·-·--- --pints or pounds 
Snack foods, including 
potato chips & pretzels ....... ... ............... .... pound 
Bread & pastry products ···· ·· ········-········· ··pound 
Bottled beverages 
Carbonated & non-carb ......... ..... ......... ..... quart 
Fl~vore~ syrups & powdered . 
dnnk m1 xes ...... ..... ............. .............. ........ pmts 
Cookies & crackers ....... .. .. ... ... ... ....... ........ pound 
Salad _dre_ssings: . 
hqmd ·········· ···· ··---- --·········· ---- --···-· ·· ··-Pmts 
dry mixes .. .... ............... ..... ............... pound 
Toothpaste ··· -·-················· ······ ·········-···· ···· pound 
Shavin ~?; creams ...... ........................... ....... pound 
Deodorants ........... ... ... .... .......... .... .. .......... pound 
~~jd~~~s _  -_·_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_- _-_-_-_-_-:~~~~d 
Fish products & meat -- --·-·· ···-- -- ---- -- ----·-·-· -pound 
7. Extension of Time for Compliance 
Any retail establishment which is unable to comply with these regulations 
may make written app lication to the Commissioner for permission to extend 
such time compliance for a period not to exceed thirty days . Such retai l ~s­
tab lishment shall set fo r th, in as much detail as possible, the reasons for 1ts 
inability to comply. The Commissioner may extend such period from time 
to time, upon such terms and condi tions as may be deemed reasonab le. 
8. Responsibility for Compliance 
In the event of a vio lation of these regul ations, the owner, the manager, or 
the person in charge of such retail establ ishment, and the person employing 
such manager or person in charge, where applicable, shall be deemed to be re· 
sponsib le for compliance by such retail establishment with the requirements of 
these regulations. 
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Appendix D 
MASSACHUSETTS CONSUMERS' COUNCIL 
UNIT PRICING REGULATIONS 1-7 
BULLETIN UP-1-1971 (MARCH 9, 1971) AS AMENDED BY 
BULLETIN UP-2-1971 (JAN,UARY 6, 1972) 
l. Definitions. 
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(a) "Packaged Commodity" means any food, drug, device or cosmetic 
and any other article, product, or commodity of any kind or class 
which is customarily necessary or used for personal, family, or house-
hold use and offered for sale at retail and which is listed in para-
graph 5, hereunder; 
(b) "Unit Price" means the price per measure. 
2. Exemptions. 
t hSellers at retail need not comply with the provisions of these regulations as 
0 t e following packaged commodities: 
(a) Medicine sold by prescription only; 
(b) Beverages subject to or complying with packaging or labeling re-
quirements imposed under the Federal Alcohol Administration Act. 
(c) Such packaged commodities which are required to be marked indi-
vidually with the cost per unit of weight under the provisions of Gen-
eral Laws, Chapter 94, Section 181. 
(d) Such packaged commodities which are sold in units of even pounds, 
pints, quarts, or gallons, and which have a retail price plainly marked 
thereon; but only the particular packaged commodity sold in such 
units shall be exempt. 
(e) Packaged commodities sold by any retail establishment operated by 
a person .as his sole place of business shall be exempt from these 
regulations. 
3· Means of Disclosure. 
pr· All retail establishments subj ect to these regulations shall disclose the 
Ice Per measure to consumers in the following manner: 
(a) Attachment of an orange stamp, tag or label on the item itself, or 
directly under or over the item on the shelf on which the item is 
displayed, and conspicuously visible to the consumer, such orange 
stamp, tag or label carrying the following data and no other: 
(i) The words "Unit Price", as a heading. 
(ii) The designation of the price per measure, shall be expressed 
in terms of dollars or cents, as applicable, carried to three 
digits. If the price is over $1.00, it may be expressed to the 
nearest full cent, provided that said price is rounded off from 
.005 and over to the next higher cent; and if .004 or less down 
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to the next lower cent ; but, that if i t is expressed in cents, it be 
carried to th ree digits. Example : "25.3 cents per pound ; 
$1.67 cents per quart." 
(iii ) The description of the packaged commodity by item and size 
of unit being sold may also be in cluded thereon at the option 
of the retail es tablishment. 
(iv) In such items as paper products, which are manufactured in 
numbers of folds s.bowing in addition to such other informa· 
tion as may be required hereunder, the applicable " ply" count 
or thicknesses, customari ly designated as "ply", by such pack· 
aged commodities. 
( v) Except that the retail estab lishment shall not be required to 
comply with the provisions of paragraph 3(a) as to color and 
3 (c) as to size of type, where the product or commodity carries 
a pre-prin ted retail price on its package, provided that the 
unit price appears thereon in a size no smaller than that used 
for the retail price. 
(b ) If the packaged commodity is not conspicuously visible to the con· 
sumer, a list of the price per measure conspicuously placed near the 
point of purchase, or a sign or list of price per measure posted at or 
near the point of display, or by stamping or affi xing the price per 
measure on the packaged commodity itself, provided that the data, 
color code and size requirements of paragraph 3(a) and (c) are met. 
(c) 
(d) 
The size of the print of the legend required under the provisions of 
paragraph 3 (a) and 3 (b) and in any other place within the retail 
estab lishment, where the price of commodities regulated hereunder is 
displayed, the price per measure shall be disp layed in type no smaller 
than that used for the price of the item, but, in no event shall such 
price per measure appear in a size less than 7 / 16" in height; PRO· 
VIDED, that if any retail establishment is unable to meet the mini· 
mum size requirements, set forth herein, such retail establishment may 
apply to the Consumers' Council for permission to use a size and type 
no less than pica size for such periods of time as the Consumers' 
Counci l may deem to be reasonable. 
(i ) PROVIDED, that when the retail establishment employs dis· 
p lay material and the retail price appears thereon in size 
larger than 7 /16", the unit price required hereunder maY 
appear in a size no less than 7 / 16" or % the size used for the 
retail price, whichever is greater. 
When the display space used for the packaged commodity is inade· 
quate to set forth separate price legends as required hereunder, and 
where the price designations are not customarily used for the com· 
modities, the retailer may set forth such legends as are required here· 
under on display cards or other material used for the display of prices 
for such commodities. The display of unit price shall appear on an 
orange background, be conspicuously visible, and the size of typd 
used for the legend shall be no less than the size of the type use 
for the price of such packaged commodity. 
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4. Price Per Measure. 
The price per measure required to be disclosed under these regulations 
shall be: 
5. 
(a) Price per pound for commodities whose net quantity is customarily 
expressed in unils of pounds or ounces or both. 
(b) Price per pint, quart or gallon for commodities whose net quantity is 
cutomarily exprc sed in units of pints, quarts, gallons, or fl uid ounces, 
or a combination thereof; provided, that the same unit of measure is 
used for the same commodity in all sizes sold in such retail estab· 
lishment. 
(c) Price per 50 feet or per 50 square feet, as appropriate, for commodi-
ties and items whose net quan tity is customarily expressed in units of 
feet, inches, square feet or square yards, or whose net quantities are 
expressed in units of area or length. 
(d) Price per 100 units of commodities, whose net quantity is expressed 
by a numerical count, PROVIDED, that, where the contents of the 
packaged commodities are expressed by a measure other than count, 
either by weight, fluid measure, area, or length, the unit price per 
measure may be expressed either as a price per measure under the 
provisions of paragraphs 4(a), (b) or (c), or by count, provided 
further, that the same unit of measure is used for the same commodity 
in all sizes in such retail establishment. 
(e) For those products or commodities, which are universally sold in sizes 
less than three ( 3) ounces, the price per measure may be designated 
as the price per ounce, provided that the same unit of measure is 
used in all sizes in such retail establishment. 
Packaged Commodities Regulated 
(a) The following commodities shall be labeled in accordance with these 
regulations no later than May 24, 1971. Thereafter, such commodities 
may not be sold in retail stores subject to these regulations, unless 
the conditions of these regulations shall have been met. 
(b) 
Detergents 
Household cleansers, waxes, deodorizers 
Cereals 
Instant breakfast foods 
Butter 
Oleomargarine 
Coffee, instant and ground 
Cocoa 
Tea 
Jellies, jams and sandwich spreads 
~:n 
The following commodities shall be labeled in accordance with these 
regulations no later than July 19, 1971. Thereafter, such commodities 
may not he sold in retail stores subj ect to these regulations, unless the 
conditions of these regulations shall have been met. 
138 LOYOLA Consumer Protection JOURNAL 
Fruits, vegetables, and juices - canned, jarred, boxed 
Pet foods 
Baby foods 
Shortenings 
Flour 
Baking mixes and supplies 
Canned fi sh and meats 
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Sanitary paper products, such as napkins, paper towels, tissues, etc. 
Aluminum and plastic wraps 
Spaghetti, noodles and pasta products 
Ketchups - mustards - sauces 
Snack foods, such as potato chips, pretzel s, etc. 
Soups - canned and dry mixes 
(c) The following commodities shall be labeled in accordance with these 
regulations no later than Sept. 20, 1971. Thereafter, such commodities 
may not be sold in retail stores subj ect to these regulations, unless the 
conditions of these regulations shall have been met. 
Frozen fruits, vegetables, and juices 
Bread and pastry products 
Bottled beverages - carbonated and non-carbonated 
Flavored syrups and powdered drink mixes 
Cookies and crackers 
Salad Dressings 
Toothpaste 
Deodorants 
Shampoos 
Shaving Cream 
Retail sales of food made from bulk, if the quantity is weighed, meas· 
ured or counted at the time of such sale by the retailer, such as 
Cold cuts 
Fish products and meat 
6. Extension of Time for Compliance 
(a) Any retail establishment which is unable to comply with these re~· 
lations within the time set forth herein, may apply to the Consumers' Council 
for permission to extend such time for compliance for a period not to exceed 
thirty days. Such retail establishment shall set forth, in as much detail as 
possible, the reasons for its inability to comply. The Consumers' Council may 
extend such period from time to time, upon such terms and conditions as 1t 
may deem reasonable. 
(b) Exemption from compliance with the requirements of any of the pr.o· 
visions of paragraph 3 may be granted for cause by the Consumers' CouncJI, 
upon the filing of a statement, setting forth the reason for inability to compl~ 
with any of the requirements of paragraph 3. Such exemption shall be grante 
by the Consumers' Council for such period of time as it may deem reasonable. 
7. Responsibility for Compliance. . 
In the event of a violation of these regulations, the manager, or person Jfl 
charge of such retail establishment and the person employing such manager or 
person in charge, where applicable, shall be deemed to be responsible for com· 
pliance by such retail establishment with the requirements of these regulations. 
